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General Alexander Lebed burst upon the Russian political scene like a gallant man
on horseback, promising to restore order out of chaos, crack down on crime and
corruption, and resurrect Russian nationalism. The 1 996 presidential elections confirmed
his growing, independent constituency of those who could not continue to endorse the
Yeltsin government, yet would not retreat to the old ways by voting for the communist
candidate Zyuganov. Quickly appointed as national security chief, Lebed won the vote for
Yeltsin in the run off election, but was dismissed just four months after taking office. Still,
Lebed is today the most popular politician in Russia, admired for his blunt, honest manner
and his ending the war in Chechnya.
Without the communist party, the uncertain civilian control over the Russian
military—especially forces outside the Russian Federation—paved the way for generals like
Lebed. As an army commander in Moldova, Lebed captured the public's imagination as a
firm, honorable, professional soldier.
Lebed earned the reputation as a crude and forceful leader, but did not develop
into the red-brown nationalist portrayed by Western journalism. In this first-ever critical
biography, he was instead a charismatic, skillful yet trainable politician capitalizing on
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Like a gallant man on horseback, General Alexander Lebed aroused some hope
among the Russian people that an enlightened dictator could put the country back in
order. He is a nationalist who sees Russia's future greatness anchored in a powerful and
respected Army commanded by an authoritarian leader. Lebed's personal courage,
obvious military talent and the independence of his judgments, combined with his integrity
and his open contempt for political maneuvering, make him a rare figure in Russia today.
In the 1996 Russian presidential election, Lebed became a surprisingly popular
third choice for voters. He appealed to those who could not continue to endorse the
Yeltsin government, yet would not retreat to the old ways by voting for the communist
candidate Zyuganov. Lebed was quickly appointed as Yeltsin's powerful national security
chief after he confirmed his claim to a growing, independent constituency.
After using Lebed to win the vote in the run off election, Yeltsin tried to gradually
demolish him by giving him the Chechnya problem. Despite Yeltsin's plan, Lebed
successfully negotiated a peace settlement ending 20 months ofbloody conflict and
furthered his popular image. Desperate, Yeltsin and his followers dismissed Lebed just
four months after taking office, but only succeeded in again increasing Lebed's already
soaring popularity. Lebed had become the most politically viable presidential candidate
for the 21st century.
But how did a young army paratrooper who admittedly knew nothing about
politics, who disavowed the Communist party and publicly lambasted the Yeltsin
government rise to become one of the most powerful men in Russia and the heir apparent
to the presidency? Lebed's appointment and dismissal as Yeltsin's powerful National
Security Adviser demonstrated certain aspects of current Russian politics and the nature of
Russian society.
To many Russians disillusioned after the pain of market reform and the shrinking
of their empire, Lebed's message was clear and soothing. He spoke in blunt, vivid images,
with a sharpened instinct for what many Russians were yearning to hear. Lebed was also
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an outsider in Russian politics, winning nationwide popularity for his outspoken criticism
of the government.
In Russia, the presidency dwarfs all other political institutions, and it is ultimately
the president who determines the country's domestic and foreign policies. If Alexander
Lebed (or another nationalist candidate) is eventually elected president, it will have
widespread impact on world affairs - though the impact may not be as severe as many
Western analysts fear. It is important to understand, therefore, what he represents and
from what base Lebed gains his popular support in order to deal with this kind of
administration. Lebed may offer a window into what the future Russia will resemble.
Alexander Lebed was born on 20 April 1950, in the industrial city of
Novocherkassk in the Rostov region of southern Russia. In 1 962, he witnessed the
"Novocherkassk massacre," when Soviet troops guarding the local Communist
headquarters opened fire on workers staging a rare protest against rising prices and falling
wages. The shooting killed 24 people, and several others were subsequently executed.
Lebed graduated from Ryazan Higher Airborne Assault Command School, and
took command of paratrooper unit at age 23. From 1980 until 1982, he commanded the
first battalion of the 345th Separate Paratroops Regiment in Afghanistan. Lebed was
awarded the highest Soviet military decoration, Hero of the Soviet Union, for bravery in
combat. He then graduated with distinction from the Frunze Military Academy in 1985.
Lebed rose from paratrooper regiment commander to division commander of the
elite 106th Guards Airborne Division in Tula, approximately one-hundred miles south of
Moscow. In April 1989, he was sent to put down demonstrations in Tbilisi, Soviet
Georgia. Over twenty people were killed and dozens wounded when a spetsnaz unit
under his command used sapper shovels and chemical weapons to suppress ethnic unrest.
Lebed maintains he flew in with reinforcements after the attacks had happened.
In January 1990, Lebed was named by an Azerbaijani parliamentary commission as
the individual who ordered soldiers to open fire on demonstrators in Baku, Azerbaijan.
Using armored personnel carriers, his troops shot, stabbed to death and crushed more than
120 Azerbaijanis. He also quit the Communist Party that year after attending two party
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conferences, saying he became tired of "screaming, rackets and petty bickering."
In 1991, Lebed's tanks inadvertently became part of the barricades protecting
Russian President Boris Yeltsin's Moscow stronghold during the hard-liners' coup attempt
against Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev. From Yeltsin, Lebed earned the title "savior
of Russia." He later said it was not a stand for democracy, but that he could not kill
Russians.
Lebed was assigned to command the Russian 14th Army in Moldova's breakaway
region of Trans-Dniester, scene of ethnic conflict between the Moldovan government and
mainly Slav separatists. In July 1 992, Lebed's forces launched artillery barrages against
the Moldovans, yet separatists took credit. Because Lebed kept silent about the attack, he
was widely praised for ending the bloodshed peacefully.
Without the communist party, the uncertain civilian control over the Russian
military—especially forces outside the Russian Federation—paved the way for generals like
Lebed. As an army commander in Moldova, Lebed captured the public's imagination as a
firm, honorable, professional soldier.
Lebed resigned from the army in 1995 over a conflict with Defense Minister Pavel
Grachev. Grachev had called for bringing Lebed's 14th Army and its arsenal back to
Russia proper and demanded both the removal ofLebed and a dramatic reduction in the
14th Army's manpower. In a survey ofMoscow residents conducted the month he left the
army Lebed ranked first among politicians viewed as able to provide stability for the
Russian people.
Four years after the fall of communism, Russian democracy was still a fragile and
recent institution. Lebed had even declared that a true democracy will not come to Russia
"in my lifetime" — a sentiment that was shared by even the most ardent but realistic
Russian analysts in the Clinton administration, who anticipated that genuine democracy
may be decades away. Lebed's rise in politics was associated with the aspirations of the
Russian people, and was a sign of Russia's continuing struggle to transform itself into a
rule-of -law state.
In December 1995, Lebed was elected to the State Duma, or lower house of
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parliament. He was a charismatic patriot and crusader for justice, but was also simply a
politician trying to achieve power. In doing so, his political campaign skillfully used
nationalism and the appeal of strong military leadership at a time when everything he grew
up to believe in gradually came apart after the Soviet Union's collapse. In Russia's
situation, the people were demanding a leader like Lebed, and if he did not exist, another
surely would have been created.
After Lebed finished a strong third in the presidential elections of 1996, he joined
Yeltsin's team as head of the Security Council. Lebed persuaded Yeltsin to dismiss
Defense Minister Grachev and the leading members of Yeltsin's inner circle assembled
around him since August of 1991.
Alexander Lebed defied definitions. Some feared him as a Russian Napoleon
dreaming of supreme power. Others saw him as a defender of Russia's new democracy.
Still others considered him just a battle-hardened soldier turned skillful politician.
Whoever he was, in just one year the former two-star general became one of the most
important politicians in Russia and a powerful influence in the future of the nation.
As National Security Adviser, Lebed signed an agreement with Chechen
separatists ending the war in the breakaway republic. The accord was publicly praised, but
met with resistance from some top Russian politicians who said it will cause Russia to lose
Chechnya.
In October 1 996, four months after being appointed, Lebed was dismissed as head
of the Security Council. Yeltsin accused Lebed of excessive ambition and complained that
Lebed made decisions without consulting the president and the rest of the government.
Opinion polls in the month before he left the office of national security chief indicated that
Lebed was Russia's most trusted politician.
Among the military, Lebed was an idol. It is probably true that no Russian general
since 1917, besides Marshal Georgii Zhukov, was so popular as Lebed. In 1957, similar
to the way Yeltsin used Lebed, Nikita Khrushchev used Marshal Zhukov to defeat his
opposition in the Communist Party and then removed him also in four months. But unlike
Lebed, Zhukov was not open in his political ambitions for the highest office.
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Lebed's popularity was a disturbing symptom of Russia's tendency to look toward
its military officers for a savior. His message had strong appeal to millions of Russians
battered by the dismantling of a state-controlled economy that long provided a low but
reliable standard of living. The discontent in Russia was aggravated by a general
breakdown of order, rising crime and a sense that it lost its place among the first rank of
world powers. During the rise of Alexander Lebed, the greatest force in Russia was not
democracy—it was nationalism.
If Lebed is someday elected president, there is no doubt that he would move the
regime towards a new type of authoritarianism. As he has asserted, "Democracy is fine,
but Russians will need decades to grow into it." So today, Russia's future remains open,
but will be a distinctively Russian future. Russia will not become like America, Germany
or Japan. One thing that looks certain is that Alexander Lebed will remain in the political




General Alexander Lebed has emerged as one of the most charismatic figures in
contemporary Russian politics. In the 1996 Russian presidential election, Lebed became a
surprisingly popular third choice for voters. He appealed to those who could not continue
to endorse the Yeltsin government, yet would not retreat to the old ways by voting for the
communist candidate Zyuganov. After Lebed confirmed his claim to a growing,
independent constituency, Yeltsin struck a deal to ensure his own reelection. In return,
Lebed was appointed as Yeltsin's powerful national security chief.
After using Lebed to win the vote in the run off election, Yeltsin tried to gradually
demolish him by giving him the Chechnya problem. Despite Yeltsin's plan, Lebed
successfully negotiated a peace settlement ending 20 months of bloody conflict and
furthered his popular image. Desperate, Yeltsin and his followers dismissed Lebed just
four months after taking office, but only succeeded in again increasing Lebed's already
soaring popularity. Lebed had become the most politically viable candidate for president.
This thesis will be a political biography of the Russian nationalist who tapped in to
deep feelings of discontent in Russian society and captured the public's imagination as an
honest, professional soldier. His strongest followers were those who were outraged by
rampant crime and corruption, and who were tired of economic uncertainty and troubled
by Russia's diminished status in the world. This following emerged as the armed forces
continued to disintegrate and various parties deliberately pulled the military into politics.
General Lebed is an example of this move of the generals into Russian politics.
The intent of this research is to explain how a young army paratrooper who
admittedly knew nothing about politics, who disavowed the Communist party and publicly
lambasted the Yeltsin government rose to become one ofthe most powerful men in Russia
and the heir apparent to the presidency. Lebed's appointment and dismissal as Yeltsin's
powerful National Security Adviser demonstrated certain aspects of current Russian
politics and the nature of Russian society. His allies and enemies played a key role in his
upsurge in popularity, and their impact will be addressed.
1
As the proverbial man on horseback, Lebed aroused some hope among the people
that an enlightened dictator could put the country back in order. He is a nationalist who
sees Russia's future greatness anchored in a powerful and respected Army commanded by
an authoritarian leader. 1 Lebed's personal courage, obvious military talent and the
independence of his judgments, combined with his integrity and his open contempt for
political maneuvering, make him a rare figure in Russia today.
To many Russians disillusioned after the pain of market reform and the shrinking
of their empire, Lebed's message was clear and soothing. He spoke in blunt, vivid images,
with a sharpened instinct for what many Russians were yearning to hear. Lebed was also
an outsider in Russian politics, winning nationwide popularity for his outspoken criticism
of the government. As a military man, Lebed's greatest success was creating the image of
himself as a leader who was not afraid to use "the fist." That is, when necessary, using
unrestrained military force to achieve what he believed as the will of the Russian people.
As commander of the Tula Airborne Division, Lebed's tanks inadvertently became
part of the barricades protecting the Russian parliament building during the infamous
failed coup of 1991, and he earned the title "savior of Russia." In the newly independent
republic ofMoldova, Lebed's 14th Army halted a bloody conflict between Moldovan
security forces and Russian separatists. Lebed was one of the few Russian generals who
had the courage to condemn the unpopular war in Chechnya, and during his short time as
national security chief, ended it.
Four years after the fall of communism, Russian democracy was still a fragile and
recent institution. Lebed had even declared that a true democracy will not come to Russia
"in my lifetime" — a sentiment that was shared by even the most ardent but realistic
Russian analysts in the Clinton administration, who anticipated that genuine democracy
may be decades away. 2 Lebed's rise in politics was associated with the aspirations of the
*Lebed emulates the former military dictator of Chile, General Augusto Pinochet, in this
respect. See Joseph Albright and Marcia Kunstel, "Russian General Warns of New Arms
Race," Dayton Daily News, 12 November 1995, p. 13A.
2 Jon Stewart, "The Year of the Generals," San Francisco Chronicle, 15 October 1995,
Worldview section, p. 8.
Russian people, and was a sign of Russia's continuing struggle to transform itself into a
rule-of-law state.
In this land ofwounded pride and lost identity, Lebed became something of a
popular legend, a self-styled commander who promised to restore order out of chaos,
resurrect Russia as a superpower and reassert partial state control over the economy. In a
survey ofMoscow residents conducted the month he left the army Lebed ranked first
among politicians viewed as able to provide stability for the Russian people. 3 Opinion polls
in the month before he left the office of national security chief indicated that Lebed was
Russia's most trusted politician. 4
Among the military, Lebed was an idol. It is probably true that no Russian general
since 1917, besides Marshal Georgii Zhukov, was so popular as Lebed. 5 In 1957, similar
to the way Yeltsin used Lebed, Nikita Khrushchev used Marshal Zhukov to defeat his
opposition in the Communist Party and then removed him also in four months. The
Zhukov precedent no doubt made Yeltsin and Lebed very nervous about each other, but
unlike Zhukov, Lebed was open in his political ambitions for the highest office. 6
3 Vladimir Shlapentokh, "Russia: Privatization and legalization of Social and Political
Life," The Washington Quarterly 19, no. 1 (Winter, 1996): 65.
4Opinion polls plotted Lebed's meteoric rise after entering politics, casting him as the man
to beat in the succession battle to Yeltsin. Approval rating were issued in October 1 996
by the respected All-Russian Center for Public Opinion Research. Forty percent of the
nearly 2,500 people polled named Lebed the leader they most approve of, far ahead of the
second-place figure, Communist Party leader Gennady A. Zyuganov, chosen by 16%.
Prime Minister Viktor S. Chernomyrdin, Lebed's main challenger for succession, placed
third with 14%, and Yeltsin finished fifth with only 1 1%. Source: Carol J. Williams,
"Russian drawn to Both Sides ofMaverick Lebed," Los Angeles Times, 14 October 1996,
p. Al.
5Vladimir Shlapentokh, "The Enfeebled Army: A Key Player in Moscow's Current
Political Crisis," European Security, Vol.4, No. 3, (Autumn 1995), pp.417-437.
6The Moscow Times, 25 June 1996.
Alexander Lebed defied definitions. Some feared him as a Russian Napoleon
dreaming of supreme power. Others saw him as a defender of Russia's new democracy.
Still others considered him just a battle-hardened soldier turned skillful politician.
Whoever he was, in just one year the former two-star general became one of the most
important politicians in Russia and a powerful influence in the future of the nation.
Newspaper and magazine articles will be the main source of information for
Lebed's views and statements. His background, experiences and beliefs will be
summarized. Speeches and interviews will be analyzed to outline various policies and his
political platform.
In Russia, the presidency dwarfs all other political institutions, and it is ultimately
the president who determines the country's domestic and foreign policies. 7 If Alexander
Lebed (or another nationalist candidate) is eventually elected president, it will have
widespread impact on world affairs - though the impact may not be as severe as many
Western analysts fear. It is important to understand, therefore, what he represents and
from what base Lebed gains his popular support in order to deal with this kind of
administration. Lebed may offer a window into what the future Russia will resemble.
7With the Russian Constitution of 1994 the presidency became not only executive, but also
independent legislature and judge. It is certainly at the limits of a strong presidential
system and probably beyond them.
n. WHO IS ALEXANDER LEBED?
A. YOUTH
Alexander Ivanovich Lebed was born on 20 April 1950, in the industrial city of
Novocherkassk in the Rostov region of southern Russia. He was born into a poor family
with a working class background. Two generations of Lebed's family suffered under
communism.
In 1937 his father, Ivan, was arrested for twice being late for work as a carpenter
and spent two years in a labor camp. 8 With the outbreak of the war with Finland in 1939
he was sent from the camp to a penal battalion, and then to the Russo-Finnish front.
During the war Ivan Lebed took part in the offensive on the Mannerheim fortifications.
Lebed's father and grandfather fought for the Red Army when Nazi Germany invaded
Russia in 1941, and both were wounded during the war. Ivan Lebed served in the army
throughout the Second World War before being discharged in 1947. His son, Alexander,
fondly described him as an extremely reserved man who used few words. 9 Ivan became a
metalworker in Novocherkassk and died in 1978.
Ivan Lebed's son was named Alexander for good reason. It was the name of three
of Russia's most famous czars, and his mother is a Cossack from the Don. The Cossacks
constituted a paramilitary society employed by the Russians in the expansion of their
empire. The Don Cossacks in particular were a major group of Cossacks who settled
along the lower Don River in southwestern Russia during the 16th century and organized
self-governing military communities. Most of the Don Cossacks were Great Russian in
origin, but they mixed with Turco-Tatar people. In addition there were fugitives of
8
"MN file," Moscow News, 20 June 1996, and Carey Scott, "Lebed Reaches for the
Reins," Sunday Times (London), 7 July 1996.
9Anatol Lieven, "Gruff General Reveals Scars That Made Him," Times (London), 27 June
1996.
Ukrainian origin and a sizable body of Kalmyks (physically oriental in appearance). 10
Lebed admits to being part Ukrainian, but on first impression it is his Cossack stock that is
readily apparent. 11 Novocherkassk, situated on high ground upstream from the Don River
delta, was the Cossack capital.
During the 19th century the Don Cossacks became elite cavalry troops in the
Russian army and were often used to suppress peasant unrest and urban disturbances.
After the Russian Revolutions of 1917 they sought to reestablish political autonomy and
fought on the side of the White Russian armies. As a descendant of Cossack heritage,
Lebed's martial policies are well rooted.
Even after Lebed was appointed as Yeltsin's National Security Adviser in 1996, his
Cossack mother still lived in the house in Novocherkassk where he was born. It was a
small cottage without an inside bathroom or even running water. 12 The house was in a
yard lined with cottages, sheds and kitchen gardens, shaded by chestnut trees, and littered
with sleeping dogs and parts of broken-down cars. The dominant scent in the
neighborhood was from the two communal bathrooms in the middle. 13 This is the poverty
that Lebed knew as a child.
He stated in an interview that together with his parents they earned only a 10,000
ruble voucher, which was, in his words, "not enough to buy an iron." Sarcastically, he
remarked that the small salary was their fair share of the people's wealth. 14 Reflecting on
10Robert H. McNeal, Tsar and Cossack, 1855-1914 (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1987),
14.
"William Safire, "Lebedtime Story," New York Times, 25 November 1996, p. A13.




"Russia Has Own 'Colin Powell'; Ex-Soviet General Has an Eye on Presidency," Chicago
Tribune, New York Times News Service, Moscow, 15 October 1995, p. 14.
his upbringing, Lebed told CNN in Moscow that it was his wish to leave a great and
wealthy country to his children. 15
The image ofLebed as an ordinary Russian and not part of the new Russian elite
was tremendously important in his electoral success. His 450-page autobiography, entitled
Za derzhavu obidno...{\X Is Shameful for a Great Power...") demonstrates that it was a
carefully cultivated image, but one that appeared to correspond to reality.
One childhood event that was not mentioned in his autobiography would have led
anyone to question the Draconian measures of Soviet Communism. Lebed claimed his
own distaste for communism goes back to this childhood memory, but he did not mention
it until after entering politics. On 2 June 1962, when he was 12 years old, workers in
Novocherkassk staged a rare protest against rising prices and falling wages. Soviet troops
guarding the local Communist headquarters opened fire, killing 24 people, and several
others were subsequently executed. 16 The shooting became known as the "Novocherkassk
massacre." A massive effort was put into keeping the protests and massacre secret, but
Lebed's early life was in a city swamped with KGB officers and living in the shadow of
1962. 17
The young Lebed was watching the demonstration with other boys, sitting in trees
on the square. He had wriggled through a window because his mother had forbidden him
to go out. When the troops opened fire, two of the boys were hit. Lebed's mother said,
"When the shooting started he and his brother were sitting on the top of the tallest tree in
front of our home. The tree was as old as our city. I was at work at the time. When their
grandmother got there she locked them in the house and told them not to move." 18
15Yuri N. Maltsev, "Lebed Is in Position To Shape Russia's Future," Christian Science
Monitor, 10 July 1996, p. 19.
u
'Jane's Intelligence Review 7, no. 1, puts the total number of people killed at 70. Anatol
Lieven, "Gruff General Reveals Scars That Made Him," Times (London), 27 June 1996.
17Mark Galeotti, "General Lebed - The Voice of Russia's Soldiers," Jane's Intelligence
Review 7, no. 1(1 January 1995): 32.
18Quoted in Michael Specter, "The Wars of Aleksandr Ivanovich Lebed," New York Times,
13 October 1996, sec. 6, p. 44.
Nobody really knows how much young Lebed was affected by learning at the age of 12
that his government would kill innocent people to suppress unrest. Lebed has spoken of
how the local commander committed suicide in protest of the killings and the misuse of
the army. Lebed stated, "He was a true officer." 19
But Lebed did not mention the event in his 1995 autobiography because he
claimed it was insignificant. He later stated his memories could not serve as a basis of
analysis, but admitted it was an act of "willfulness" on the part of the authorities. Lebed
used this episode and the fact that his father went to a labor camp under Stalin for arriving
late for work as reasons for his eventual siding with Yeltsin against the Communists. 20
Other evidence suggests that until he quit the Communist Party in 1990 he was a loyal
subordinate and indeed a model soldier for the USSR.
Lebed went to an ordinary school in Novocherkassk, and Natalya Grishkova, a
former teacher, described him as the star of his class. 21 Although he was a good student,
he was not particularly studious. Lebed excelled instead at boxing and chess. 22 His school
results suggest that he was certainly one of the brighter pupils. He got top marks in
history, geography and physical education, and only slightly lower results in the rest. 23
Lebed stayed in Novocherkassk until graduating from secondary school in 1967.
At 16 his attempt to become a pilot was rejected by the Soviet air force academy
because he had broken his nose in amateur boxing competitions. Two nose operations
19Quoted in Anatol Lieven, "Gruff General Reveals Scars That Made Him," Times




22Michael Specter, "The Wars of Aleksandr Ivanovich Lebed," New York Times, 13
October 1996, sec. 6, p. 44.
23
Anatol Lieven, "Gruff General Reveals Scars That Made Him," Times (London), 27 June
1996.
followed, leaving no bone structure. 24 In his autobiography he claims this did not bother
him: "I'm not a girl; and anyway, at that time, I thought that a real man only had to look a
bit more sympathetic than a monkey. " After the operations, Lebed was able to place his
thumb on his nose, and pressing hard, make his battered profile look entirely flat. 25 In
press interviews, Lebed would proudly use this trick as proof that he was a serious
combatant, willing to get hurt in order to triumph.
Deciding to become a paratrooper, Lebed writes in his autobiography that his
father told him he should try it first. Lebed bribed a guard at the local airport with six
bottles of vodka, and on his first jump broke his back. 26 The injury did not stop him from
pursuing his goal.
In 1969, at the age of 19, he gained early entry into the Ryazan Higher Airborne
Assault Command School, an institution with a prestigious reputation in the military.
There his favorite subjects were marksmanship and tank gunnery. He graduated in 1973,
and spent 23 of the next 26 years in the army as a paratrooper. He was the first in his
family to become a career military officer.
Lebed then served at Ryazan as a platoon leader and cadet company commander.
While there he was under the immediate command of former Defense Minister Pavel
Grachev. Lebed formed a longtime relationship with Grachev, but after the attempted
coup of August, 1991, he became Lebed's nemesis, locked in a personal and political feud
fought openly in the Russian media.
^Joeseph Albright and Marcia Kunstel, "The man who would lead Russia: Alexander
Lebed warns that a new nuclear buildup may be necessary for his country's survival."
Vancouver Sun, 10 November 1995, p. B3.
25Ann Leslie, "Whatever Russia's Election Result, Lebed is the Man to Watch," Daily
Mail, 4 July 1996, p. 24.
26Michael Specter, "The Wars of Aleksandr Ivanovich Lebed," New York Times, 13
October 1996, sec. 6, p. 44.
B. AFGHANISTAN
"Cossack glory means a dog's life." - Cossack saying27
The Afghan War was a defining event. Afghanistan discredited the Brezhnev
regime and pushed into retirement the last of the World War II generals. This made way
for what might be called the political generals, including former Vice President Alexander
Rutskoi, former deputy defense minister Boris Gromov, Grachev and Lebed, all who
served in Afghanistan. 28
From 1981 to 1982 Lebed commanded the first battalion of the 345th Separate
Paratroops Regiment in Afghanistan. 29 He quickly became known as a hardened and
rugged soldier's soldier and was awarded the highest Soviet military decoration, Hero of
the Soviet Union, for bravery in combat. 30 But the experience gave him an outward
contempt for politicians of all kinds. 31 While commanding the battalion in Afghanistan, he
served in a division again under Grachev, who was also decorated as a Hero of the Soviet
Union.
Lebed was a fast learner in Afghanistan, witnessing numerous mistakes by the
Soviet high command. They were lessons that he would later apply in a war that he saw
27 Robert H. McNeal, Tsar and Cossack, 1855-1914 (New York: St. Martin's Press,
1987), 154.
28
Rutskoi, Gromov, and Lebed all publicly repudiated their affiliation with Grachev,
apparently a former comrade of all three of them. In various ways, all three demonstrated
their hatred and contempt for the former defense minister. For a discussion of the Afghan
veteran generals, see Vladimir Shlapentokh, "The Enfeebled Army: A Key Player in
Moscow's Current Political Crisis," European Security 4, no. 3 (Autumn 1995): 417-37.
2911MN file," Moscow News, 20 June 1996.
^Alessandra Stanley, "Russian General Campaigns On Old-Time Soviet Values," New
York Times 13 October 1995 p. Al.
31 Steven Erlanger, "The Russians Have Come! When Will They Go?," New York Times, 21
May 1993, p. A4.
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as a duplicate of Afghanistan's troubles, making peace in Chechnya. As he said, "Fools
learn from their own mistakes, clever people learn from others"132
Reflecting on his tour of duty there, Lebed bitterly criticized the military's lack of
preparation and repeated blunders in an interview for Zavtra.
Historically, it always happens in our country that the military prepares for
the last war, without drawing any conclusions from the preceding one.
Afghanistan, for instance, demonstrated the complete ineffectiveness of
these kinds of preparations, when political goals are murky and vague and
the military ones are unachievable altogether, and when a regimental
commander would get a Hero of the Soviet Union award for 'exemplary
conduct of regimental maneuvers.' It was a complete joke. 33
Combat in Afghanistan failed to disillusion Lebed with the state he served. The era
of Mikhail Gorbachev did. He was dismayed by democratization, which he felt threatened
the army he loved. 34
After Afghanistan, Lebed completed his senior service school education at the
Frunze Military Academy. He graduated with distinction in 1985.
C. DIVISION COMMAND EXPERIENCE
Of course I am an authoritarian person, because I am a general and I have
been entrusted with a heavy and terrible right: to send people to their
death. But throughout my career, I have tried to make sure that they return
from hell alive.
-Obshchaya gazeta, November 1994
After graduating from the Frunze Academy, Lebed was appointed commander of
an airborne regiment, and by 1988 he had already risen to command the elite 106th Guards
Airborne Division in Tula, approximately one-hundred miles south ofMoscow.
32
Interfax, Moscow, 28 December 1994.
33No doubt he was alluding to Grachev. Interview by Aleksandr Prokhanov, Zavtra,
August 1995, pp. 1-3.
^James Meek, "Macho Lebed Exposes His Painful Shame," Observer, 21 July 1996, p. 24.
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From 1985 to 1991 Lebed was sent throughout the USSR to engage in operations
on the troubled Russian periphery putting down mainly ethnic unrest. 35 Lebed was the
Soviet Union's hatchet man for several of the worst acts of repression directed against
increasingly unruly non-Russian republics. It was also during these assignments that he
earned his reputation as a crude and forceful leader, but these assignments were not
operations that he would like the Russian public to remember.
Lebed's spetsnaz, or special operations troops were sent in to subdue the anti-
Armenian massacres in Sumgait, Azerbaijan. He was then sent to put down
demonstrations in the Georgian capital of Tbilisi in April 1989. Over twenty people were
killed and dozens wounded when a "special assignment" unit under his command used
sapper shovels and chemical weapons to suppress the unrest. 36 Lebed claimed in his
autobiography that the demonstrators were crushed by the crowd, but Georgians say
peaceful demonstrators were killed by shovels wielded by Soviet troops. Numerous
accounts support the Georgian claim.
Also in his autobiography, Lebed maintains he flew in with reinforcements after the
attacks had happened. 37 According to Lebed, the blame lay entirely with frightened local
Communist bosses. 38 Lebed either disguised the truth or was ignorant of what was
happening during an operation he personally commanded.
General Igor Rodionov was commander of the Transcaucasian Military District in
1989, and as Lebed's commander in Tbilisi took the ultimate responsibility for the
massacre. He became head of the General Staff college and was a firm ally of Lebed
"Stephen Bowers, "The Crisis in Moldova," RFE/RL Daily Report, no 139, 23 July 1992,
quoted in Jane's Intelligence Review 4, no. 1 1 (1 November 1992): 433.
36
Ariel Cohen, "General Alexander Lebed: Russia's Rising Political Star," Heritage
Foundation Reports, 26 September 1995, p. 1. , and S. Frederick Starr, "A Russian
Politician to Reckon With," Christian Science Monitor, 15 December 1995, p. 19, and
Carey Scott, "Lebed Reaches for the Reins," Sunday Times (London), 7 July 1996.




during his rise in politics. Lebed put strong pressure on Yeltsin to include Rodionov in
Yeltsin's administration after his reelection in 1996. The pressure was eventually
successful, and Rodionov, once known as the notorious "butcher of Tbilisi," was
appointed as Russia's Minister of Defense.
In January 1990, Lebed was sent to impose martial law in Baku, Azerbaijan as the
communist role in Azerbaijan was collapsing. Again, he proved himself a ruthless
commander. Using armored personnel carriers, his troops shot, stabbed to death and
crushed more than 120 Azerbaijanis. 39 It was a Chechnya-like operation that killed at least
25 soldiers and plainly killed unarmed civilians. Lebed was eventually named by an
Azerbaijani parliamentary commission as the individual who gave the soldiers the
command to open fire on the demonstrators. 40
Recalling those tense days and nights much later prompted Lebed to admit,
It was always the same: No written orders. No concrete task. No
explanation of what 'order' means and how it was to be achieved. Never
any explanation of the difference between martial law and a state of
emergency. Give an order to shoot, and you're wrong. Don't give an order
to shoot, and you're still wrong. 41
These trying experiences continued to haunt Lebed, persuading him that he was
betrayed by the civilian leadership.
A report by Helsinki Watch and Russian Memorial, two human rights groups, said
later that ill-prepared troops used excessive force. 42 Instances of shooting at ambulances
39
Sergei Shargorodsky, "Ex-General a Threat or Boon to Russia's Democracy?"
Associated Press, 22 June 1996, and Sergei Karkhanin, "Zigzag ataki," Rossiyskaya
Gazeta, 14 March 1995, p.l. and Stephen Bowers, "The Crisis in Moldova," RFE/RL
Daily Report, no 139, 23 July 1992, quoted in Jane's Intelligence Review 4, no. 11, (1
November 1992): 433.
^S. Frederick Starr, "A Russian Politician to Reckon With," Christian Science Monitor,
15 December 1995, p. 19.
41
Harriet Fast Scott, "Rise of the Afghantsi," Air Force Magazine, (August 1993): 33.
42
Sergei Shargorodsky, "Ex-General a Threat or Boon to Russia's Democracy?"
Associated Press, 22 June 1996.
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and using bayonets against civilians were widely reported. In his book, Lebed gave only a
sketchy description of the Baku events. He denied there were atrocities, but years later he
blamed politicians for misusing the military. His defense was, "I am a sinner. There is no
paratrooper general who is free of sin."43
A degree of ruthlessness, however, is apparent and even boasted about in his
autobiography. Despite what happened in Novocherkassk during his youth, he has
expressed little pity for the civilian victims of Soviet operations in which he was involved
and has tried to minimize these brutal acts.
D. QUITS COMMUNIST PARTY
Lebed's real disillusionment about the government came in 1990. He had been a
member of the Communist Party for 19 years, but entered public politics when the Soviet
regime was collapsing. As a 40-year old division commander, he was given an honored
spot on the Russian Communist Party's central committee, and sent as a delegate to the
28th Party Congress in Moscow. Lebed recalls in his memoir that "A double, a triple
morality was running amok within the Party" and "All the authorities ceased to exist for
me." During the congress, Lebed furiously asked Alexander Yakovlev, the so-called
godfather of perestroika, "Just what do you believe in?"44 The remark suggests that he
was a more obstinate, conservatively principled communist than he would like today's
Russia to believe, and that he was suspicious of reform and reformers. Ironically, it was a
question that was later often asked of Lebed during his presidential campaign.
At the 28th Party Congress, Lebed met people he had previously only seen in
pictures. When he looked them in the face, he said he saw a crowd of imbeciles, adding
41
Ibid.
"Mark Galeotti, "General Lebed - The Voice of Russia's Soldiers," Jane's Intelligence
Review 7, no. 1(1 January 1995): 32.
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that his view was "strengthened" by the failed coup attempt in 1991. 45 After attending two
party conferences, he said he became tired of "screaming, rackets and petty bickering" and
quit the Communist Party in 1990. 46 It is unknown whether Lebed quit because he no
longer believed in the Party or simply because he saw communism was collapsing. From
this point on, Lebed's sense of betrayal by those he served chronicled his career and served
as a focus for his rise in Russian politics.
E. LEBED'S FAMILY
Lebed and his wife, Inna, have three children - a daughter and two sons. He met
Inna, a red-headed former schoolteacher, when they were working in a local factory
before he joined the army, and courted her for four years. 47 Almost in contradiction to the
image of a hardened, professional soldier, he was fond of holding his wife by the hand in
public. Inna, whom he complimented often, was known to always display a pleasant
disposition even after months on the campaign trail. 48
Alexander Zhilin, a military analyst and one of Lebed's old Afghan-war friends,
once said that he wished people could see him as he was at home. He described Lebed as
very loving and full ofjokes, completely different from his public image. When Zhilin first
visited him at home he expected to see a down trodden little wife under the thumb of a
tough general - but it was absolutely the opposite case.
45David Hoffman, "Maverick General Upstages Yeltsin; Top Presidential Candidate
Promises to Restore Order," Washington Post, 21 October 1995, p. AOL
^Joeseph Albright and Marcia Kunstel, "The man who would lead Russia: Alexander
Lebed warns that a new nuclear buildup may be necessary for his country's survival."
Vancouver Sun, 10 November 1995, p. B3.
47Ann Leslie, "Whatever Russia's Election Result, Lebed is the Man to Watch," Daily




According to Inna, Lebed is a warm-hearted husband and grandfather at home
who enjoys singing Russian folk-songs and playing with his grandchildren. 49 "Papa," as
she affectionately calls him, often helped her with housekeeping in their modest tower-
blocked apartment in a Moscow suburb.
Although no longer a Communist, Lebed was unlike other former party members
who expediently wrapped themselves in the patriotism of the Russian Orthodox Church. 50
He said he remained an atheist, perhaps because for Lebed, Russia was "higher than
everything." 51 Lebed has said he does not believe in God, but in his autobiography he
asserts, "We are Russians and God is with us!"
Lebed, a name that means "swan" in Russian, speaks with a southern Russian
accent similar to Mikhail Gorbachev. 52 He traveled widely through the former Soviet
Union on military assignments but did not experience the West until after his appointment
as chief of national security. In his autobiography, he lamented that the United States,
Germany and Japan were held up as "heroes" to Russians. He wrote, "Earlier we were
overtaking and surpassing, and today we are following them. " Lebed's resistance to
Western influence was a consistent theme during his rise in politics, and he often blamed
the West for Russia's wounded national pride.
F. LEBED, YELTSIN AND THE FAILED COUP OF 1991
I was tortured by the feeling that something big and important had passed
me by and I had not seen it, looked at it, understood it. Now it was too late




^Alessandra Stanley, "Russian General Campaigns On Old-Time Soviet Values," New
York Times 13 October 1995 p. Al.
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-Lebed on the attempted coup of 1991, Guardian, 5 July 1996
Lebed played a leading role during the infamous failed coup of August 1991. As
commander of the Tula Airborne Division, his actions during the coup attempt gained him
his first widespread public attention. The significance of this event may come to be
viewed as rivaling and, in a sense, reversing the effects of the Bolshevik coup which
occurred nearly three quarters of a century previously. 53 Surprisingly, he says, he did not
even know that hard-line communist forces were trying to depose Gorbachev until
Yeltsin's aides told him late on the evening of the 19th, after a day of events had already
unfolded54
During the coup attempt, Lebed's troops from Tula were moved into Moscow.
The forces in Tula are known as the guardian of the southern approaches to Moscow and
thus critical to Russian leaders. The commander of the Airborne Assault Forces at the
time, Colonel-General Grachev, gave the order to Major-General Lebed, commander of
the Airborne Assault Forces' Tula Division, to move his battalion toward the Russian
parliament building, known as the "White House." The command had worded orders for
the mission in vague terms, which could have resulted in either protection or arrest. 55
Lebed never stormed the building. Instead, his division parked around the
building, turned around, and prevented the plotters from firing at Yeltsin's headquarters.
His tanks became part of the barricades protecting the building. Apparently unknowing to
him, Lebed derailed the plot, and earned the title "savior of Russia." 56
53John B. Dunlop, The Rise ofRussia and the Fall of the Soviet Empire (Princeton, New
Jersey: Princeton University, 1993), 186.
^Alessandra Stanley, "Russian General Campaigns On Old-Time Soviet Values," New
York Times 13 October 1995 p. Al.
55
"Lebed as Political 'Terminator'," FBIS, 30 May 1995, p. 4, JPRS Report 95UM0456C
from Moscow Kuranty.
56Yuri N. Maltsev, "Lebed Is in Position To Shape Russia's Future," Christian Science
Monitor, 10 July 1996, p. 19.
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According to John Dunlop, it is unknown whether Lebed's forces arrived to storm
the "White House" or to protect it. 57 In an interview with the pro-democracy Interfax
News Service, Lieutenant General Podkolozin of the paratroopers stated: "The
paratroopers are neither against the Russian government nor against the provisional
government...Our task is not to permit disorder, chaos, or hooliganism." 58
There are differing accounts of precisely what happened. Lebed has insisted that
any use of military force in the streets ofMoscow "would have been guaranteed 100
percent to lead to large-scale bloodshed," which would have "engulfed the country in civil
war," something it was "imperative to prevent." 59 In his autobiography, Lebed attributes
the troop movements to confusion about the orders he was given. He also never accepted
praise as a defender of the parliament building. In early 1995, he stated, "I never defended
the 'White House.' I defended common sense. They tried to push me, a Russian general,
to shoot my own people in the capital ofmy own state. No such force exists that would
compel me to do this." 60
Lebed and Grachev publicly debated the role each played in these momentous
events that changed the course of their nation. Lebed says that he was ordered by
Grachev to take up a position near the Russian "White House." According to Lebed, he
informed Yeltsin that his troops had arrived to prevent fighting and then reported to
Grachev that he intended to protect the seat of the Russian president.
"John B. Dunlop, The Rise ofRussia and the Fall of the Soviet Empire (Princeton, New
Jersey: Princeton University, 1993), 241.
5
*Korichnevyi putch krasnykh (Moscow: "Tekst," 1991), p. 75, from John B. Dunlop, The
Rise ofRussia and the Fall of the Soviet Empire (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton
University, 1993), 241.
59
"Anti-Coup Leaders: The Men of the Future?" Jane's Intelligence Review, October
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'"TJavid Hoffman, "Maverick General Upstages Yeltsin; Top Presidential Candidate
Promises to Restore Order," Washington Post, 21 October 1995, p. A01.
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While Grachev insists he supported Yeltsin all along, Lebed claims that Grachev
waffled between the putschists and the president until the last minute61 Grachev, he said,
had prostituted himselfby balancing between the two sides, finally coming down on
Yeltsin's side. 62 During the coup attempt, Lebed also reportedly got into a heated
argument with General Alexander Rutskoi, later Yeltsin's vice president and leader of the
attempted coup of 1 993
.
Lebed described the first 24 hours of the coup as a situation of mass confusion.
The once mighty Soviet Army was collapsing. At one point, unable to find his division and
driving around Moscow in a van without a radio, Lebed said he had to make a call from a
pay phone to headquarters and was told to call back in 15 minutes for the coordinates. 63
According to Lebed, General Grachev appeared to be following orders to prepare an
attack on the White House. It was then that he told Grachev, his commanding officer,
that he was ready to carry out any order, but he "must understand its meaning." 64
Throughout the day, when hundreds of thousands of people were in the streets and
his superiors seemed to be acting so suspiciously, Lebed said he never turned on a radio,
stopped a passer-by or picked up a newspaper. 65 Although Lebed has the reputation as a
self-styled independent, he apparently did not seek his own answers to what was
happening.
Neither the coup plotters nor the Russian government were certain of the loyalty
of the troops that had surrounded and sealed off the "White House." When asked by a
61Alexander Nikolayev, "Pavel Grachev-Alexander Lebed: Du'el na vylet,"
manuscript, Moscow, 1995, p. 1.
62John Morrison, "Many Russians See Tough General as Next Head of State," Reuters,
Limited, 10 October 1995.
63
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journalist whether Lebed's troops had in fact come over to the side of the Russian
government, General Kobets, chief of the defenses of the "White House," responded: "I
would not draw that conclusion." 66 Defense Minister Yazov appeared to consider the
loyalties of the troops a problem. Early the next morning, he ordered them withdrawn
"because he considered the troops unreliable." 67
Lebed was widely praised by reformers when the coup collapsed, and is recognized
in Western journalism as a protector of democracy. Lebed quickly disappointed his
admirers, however, saying he "could not care less for democracy," but, being a Russian
general, could not bring himself to kill Russians. It must also be remembered that Lebed
never received the order to open fire, so it is unknown how he would have actually
responded.
Shortly after the coup failed, Lebed was appointed deputy commander-in-chief of
the Airborne Forces of Russia. President Yeltsin publicly thanked him for defending the
Russian "White House" against the hard-liners behind the coup attempt. In his memoir,
Lebed recalled how he was celebrated as a hero for his part in defeating the coup. 68 His
overwhelming feeling, however, was the rage he felt at being manipulated. At the time of
the coup, Lebed did not fully understand the significance of the event, and being kept in
the dark infuriated him. 69 These events further alienated Lebed from the political
authorities for whom he ultimately served.
^John B. Dunlop, The Rise ofRussia and the Fall of the Soviet Empire (Princeton, New
Jersey: Princeton University, 1993), 242.
67
Stuart H. Loory and Ann Imse, eds., Seven Days That Shook the World (Atlanta, Turner
Publishing, 1991) from John B. Dunlop, The Rise ofRussia and the Fall of the Soviet
Empire (Princeton: Princeton University, 1993), 242.
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(August 23-September 4, 1991), from John B. Dunlop, The Rise ofRussia and the Fall of
the Soviet Empire (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University, 1993), 241.
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Lebed was later rewarded with command of the 14th army in Moldova. Whether
this command was considered a reward or not can today be disputed. Lebed commanded
the 1 4th Army in a troublesome three-year peacekeeping mission in the Trans-Dniester
region ofMoldova. Shortly after his arrival in 1992, he imposed order and arranged a
lasting peace agreement between ethnic Russian separatists in Trans-Dniester and the new
Moldovan government. Lebed preserved the Russian presence in the region, and if it had
been a different commander, the Russians surely would have been ousted. Because of his
tough public stance against Yeltsin administration policies during these years, however,
Lebed's highly-decorated military career was forced to an end.
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ID. THE FIGHTING GENERAL: LEBED IN MOLDOVA
From June, 1992 until June, 1995 General Lebed served as commander of the
Russian 14th Army in Moldova. There he became not only one of the Russian army's
most respected officers, but a popular political figure as well. Admired by his troops, he
was both a symbol of positive military attitude in a depleted and disheartened army and a
champion of ethnic Russians marooned across the former empire by the collapse of the
Soviet Union.
Lebed's controversial position as commander of the 14th Army led to his rise in
political power. After Moldova, Lebed was elected to a seat in the Russian parliament and
was appointed as Yeltsin's national security adviser after finishing third in the 1 996
presidential election. Yet, it was in Moldova where Lebed first gained political
prominence. It was in Moldova that Russian Foreign Ministry officials accused Lebed of
making policy totally independent from his superiors in Moscow. His nationalist
convictions and own ambitions defined his army's positions. Though he had upset relations
between Russia and Moldova from the beginning, Lebed became just too popular for the
Defense Ministry to let go.
Lebed continually made abrasive statements against the Moldovan government, the
Yeltsin government and the Trans-Dniester government. His popularity and reputation for
integrity became more prominent as his anti-government position became well
documented in the media. For two years Lebed was acting practically independently of
Russian civilian leadership. His strong criticism of the war in Chechnya and what he called
the "degradation" of the armed forces became a major problem to the defense minister,
General Pavel S. Grachev, and eventually to President Yeltsin. In July, 1995, he retired
from the Army because of Yeltsin's conduct of the Chechnya war and Moscow's plans to
reassign him to a lesser post. By this time, he was known all over the world and had
become the man on horseback.
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A. BACKGROUND
The Russian 14th Army was deployed in Moldova to guard the Soviet Union's
south-western flank. It has occupied the region since the Soviet republic ofMoldavia was
formed in 1945. The Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic was created largely from land
annexed from Romania after the Second World War. This territory was part ofwhat was
known as Bessarabia, which had belonged to Romania since 1918. With the collapse of
the USSR, the new nation ofMoldova was declared. It became the smallest but most
densely inhabited of any of the former Soviet republics, with a total population of 4.4
million people. 70 Moldova is a land-locked country bounded by Romania on the west and
by Ukraine on the north, east and south.
Towards the end of Soviet control, nationalists in the Moldovan capital of
Chisinau (formerly Kishinev), pushed forward the idea of reunification with Romania. In
the process of de-Sovietization, they Latinized the alphabet once again, made Romanian
the state language and adopted a flag and state seal almost identical to Romania's.
This reunification effort drove the old Russian supporters across the Dniester river,
where the Soviets had put most of the industry and where the 14th Army was already
based. The region was populated mainly by ethnic Russians and Ukrainians. In September
1990, with the support of the 14th Army, the Trans-Dniester Soviet Socialist Republic
was first declared and laid the groundwork for the upcoming war. 71
Russia wanted an autonomous status for the 750,000 people of the Trans-Dniester
republic within Moldova, with accompanying guarantees regarding the right of the region
to determine its own form of government. 72 At the same time, Russia made it clear to
70
In 1993 Moldova's average population density was 340 persons per square mile. From
"Fact Sheet: Moldova," 1994 U.S. Department ofState Dispatch 5, no. 18, 2 May 1994.
71Steven Erlanger, "The Russians Have Come! When Will They Go?," New York Times, 21
May 1993, p. A4.
72Howard Witt, "Leninist Haven Means Troubles for Russians," Chicago Tribune, 24
October 1993, p. 1.
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Moldova that Russia would support the Trans-Dniester right to self-determination in the
event of any Moldovan move to reunite with Romania. In 1992, Trans-Dniester revolted
against the government in Chisinau and declared a semi-sovereign state, complete with its
own government, passports, postal system, and capital city in Tiraspol. 73 It refused to
recognize the authority of the Moldovan government, although it did not enjoy official
international recognition from a single world government, including that of Russia.
After months of argument, Russia's president Boris Yeltsin agreed only in principle
to a withdrawal of the 14th Army from the region. The efforts of Russia and Moldova to
work out a diplomatic solution, however, were occurring faster than other events in the
Trans-Dniester region. The local command of the 14th Army, with support from the newly
established Russian Ministry of Defense, and at times the open sympathy of a majority of
the Russian parliament, pursued its own policy of providing weapons and military
assistance to the Russian community in the Trans-Dniester region.
Fighting between Dniester Russians and Moldovans became worse in the spring
and summer of 1992. Yeltsin's government came under increasing criticism from the
military for its failure in defending the interests of Russians in Moldova. Protecting the
interests of ethnic Russians or "Russian-speakers" was one of the chiefjustifications
offered by Moscow for its involvement in the Trans-Dniestran war and remained a favored
argument among those such as Lebed who supported a continued Russian military
presence. OfMoldova's 560,000 ethnic Russians, however, fewer than a third actually
lived in Trans-Dniester. 74 Moldova was the first shot in Russia's claim to hegemony over
the Near Abroad in the name of protecting the 25 million Russian speakers outside Russia.
73Bruce D. Porter and Carol R. Saivetz, "The Once and Future Empire: Russia and the
'Near Abroad"' Washington Quarterlyll, no. 3, (Summer 1994): 72.
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B. LEBED APPOINTED COMMANDING OFFICER
In late June of 1992, then Major-General Alexander Lebed was appointed to
command the 14th Army, a force at the time of more than 10,000 troops75 It was believed
that appointing a hard-liner like Lebed could give the army more muscle to react to ethnic
conflicts along the many fringes of the former Soviet Union. 76 His nomination as
commanding officer of the 14th Army put him in charge of one of the largest former
Soviet arsenals, which could have been used in the event of an attempt to revive the Soviet
Union. Some Russian generals have explored the idea of selling arms from this depot in
the Balkans and the Middle East. 77
The appointment could have meant a change in the tactics of the Russian armed
forces in Trans-Dniester. The Russian newspaper Izvestia said, "So far, it is difficult to
say just exactly what will be changed." However, it is obvious that they [Russian armed
forces] will stop being "only on the defensive, only victims of sneak attacks and raids." 78
Lebed's appointment also came right after the meeting of the Presidents of Russia
and the Ukraine, and it was assumed that the two leaders agreed to coordinate the actions
of the 14th Army. 79 Lebed replaced Major-General Yuri Netkachev who held the position
75
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for only five months. Netkachev was believed to have been sympathetic to the idea of a
Moldovan army 80
Viktor Paramoshin, a retired colonel who served in military counterintelligence,
saw the 14th Army appointment as a calculated attempt to derail Lebed's career:
The decision on Lebed's further assignment was made very carefully. On
the one hand, he had to serve outside of Russia. On the other, in a place
where he would get 'burned' fast. According to our intelligence reports, we
expected the situation between Moldova and Trans-Dniester to break out
into armed conflict. It's likely that Grachev thought Lebed would actually
be a catalyst, instigating an international scandal, which would be his
undoing. This was a fatal mistake on Grachev's part. He gravely
underestimated the capabilities of his primary, future rival. 81
The fighting in Trans-Dniester grew more intense. Clashes in the town ofBendery
between 19-21 June took several hundred mainly civilian lives. The leaders of Russia and
Moldova finally agreed to have the 14th Army put a stop to it, and in a meeting where
Lebed was present, an agreement was signed on 6 July 1992 , 82 But fighting in the region
continued.
C. LEBED'S STAND AGAINST MOSCOW
The Moldovan crisis was deeply affected by the presence of Lebed. Shortly after
his appointment, in July of 1992, fighting along the Dniester River valley escalated to the
highest level since the conflict began. Lebed accused the Yeltsin government of
^"Major General Alexander Lebed, Commander 14th Army in Moldova," Jane's
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"wallowing in the mire of policies that were incomprehensible" and making concessions to
a fascist regime in Moldova that was engaged in acts of genocide against Russians there. 83
The statement, which was given prominent coverage by all of the press in
Moscow, represented, in the words of a commentator for the pro-government daily
newspaper Izvestia, both an act of insubordination to civilian authority and an ultimatum
to the Yeltsin government to abandon the current policy of negotiations with Moldova. 84
No official reprimand ofLebed was issued, however, and Lebed remained as commander
of the 14th Army. 85
During the same week, Lebed also accused the Moldovan government of being
"illegitimate." He referred to the Moldovan defense minister as a "cannibal" and
denounced the "shadow of fascism" hanging over Moldova. 86 In an extraordinary
outburst, Lebed accused the Moldovan president, Mircea Snegur, of being a fascist and
said he should be hanged. 87
This statement appeared the day after the presidents of Russia and Moldova agreed
at a CIS summit in Moscow, along with eight other presidents of former Soviet republics,
to send a multinational peace force into Moldova. 88 The Moldovan parliament
immediately demanded that Moscow send a commission to Moldova to investigate the
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consequences of Lebed's words because his allegations severely compromised the efforts
of Russian diplomacy.
Lebed's bold partisanship for the Trans-Dniesterians created a situation where
Russian troops were almost sent in as part of a force to keep other Russian troops under
his command from fighting the Moldovans. Worse still, his statement was published on
the day that another senior Russian officer, Major-General Vladimir Semyonov,
commander of Russian land forces, flew to Moldova to begin implementing the
peacekeeping plan. 89
That summer Yeltsin refused to sign the promotion of Lebed to lieutenant-
general. This was probably connected with the president's displeasure at Lebed's harsh
remarks at his first news conference as the 14th Army commander. 90 Lebed was the only
one of the top Russian generals recommended for promotion by the Ministry ofDefense at
that time to be passed over for promotion. Yeltsin later promoted Lebed in September of
1992. 91
D. LEBED ENDS THE CONFLICT
Lebed received intelligence in early July of 1992 that the Moldovans would soon
move their forces into Trans-Dniester, and he began to take precautions with his 14th
Army. When the Moldovan forces moved into Trans-Dniester, Lebed attempted to clarify
his role by contacting his immediate superior, General Grachev. According to Lebed and
to his top aide, Colonel Mikhail Bergman, Grachev could not be raised on any of the
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unreachable for an extended period of time. 93 In the meantime, the situation developed
rapidly.
News agencies began reporting that Trans-Dniestran forces had inflicted a
"crippling blow" on Moldovan units. 94 In fact, such Trans-Dniestran forces did not exist.
In reality, it was Lebed's 14th Army that launched three powerful artillery barrages against
the Moldovans. According to Russian journalist Alexander Zhilin,
One targeted an attempted river crossing, burning up most of the
Moldovan equipment. A second came down on a nearby area. At this point
the Moldovan defense minister, experiencing heavy losses, decided to
withdraw and concentrate the remainder of his forces in one region to
regroup and make another attempt in the morning. Another artillery
barrage was launched in the night in the same area. After this, the
Moldovan forces lost their will to continue the military drive. 95
Lebed ended the region's fighting in a single day with three barrages of artillery.
Trans-Dniester President Igor Smirnov and his defense ministry - seven men in all - took
credit for the victory, and Lebed kept his silence. Lebed demonstrated that he was willing
to use deadly force to protect what he believed was Russian national interest.
On 25 July 1992, Lebed set up buffer posts between Moldovan government and
Trans-Dniester forces by moving his Russian troops into Bendery. Lebed halted most
fighting between the two sides before the arrival of the full-scale joint peacekeeping force
the next week. 96 Three thousand people had already been killed and tens of thousands
were wounded in the war. This was the first Russian joint peacekeeping force on the
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for his role in stopping the civil war and imposing the cease-fire. 97 It turned out Russia
had a more muscular concept of peace keeping than in the West.
Lebed promised that if Russia's 14th Army was attacked, it would hit back: "I am
no Jesus Christ. If I am slapped, I will not turn the other cheek."98 The general also
remarked that "Russia has always helped and will continue to help Dniester," but
confirmed that, in regards to the Trans-Dniester republic's domestic problems, the 14th
Army remained neutral. 99 Lebed later claimed that, "My units stopped the war, and I
provided for the introduction of peacekeeping forces while the politicians made up their
minds, which they took an inadmissibly long time to do." 100
Newspapers picked up on Lebed's famous quotation: "We have done enough
running, like goats after carrots, it's time to get on with the task in hand." 101 With
conviction, Lebed began negotiations with the Moldovans. After Lebed's menacing
statements and artillery barrages the Moldovan leadership accepted fundamental
concessions. General Lebed earned the fame of a peacemaker and the title of "Man ofthe
Year" in Trans-Dniester.
Lebed was voted Man of Year in Trans-Dniester by readers of the Dniesterovsky
Meridian newspaper. Earlier, Lebed was granted honorary citizenship of Trans-Dniester.
The Russian newspaper Pravda claimed, "The war in Trans-Dniester ground to a halt with
Lebed assuming command of the [14th] army, because people on the other bank of the
Dniester realized this man will stand up for the people and will not allow any murder to go
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unpunished." 102 Admired widely by his troops, Lebed regained the morale and the
credibility of the 14th Army as a capable military force.
E. LEBED' S POPULARITY GROWS
"I'm a cat that likes to walk by itself." - Economist (London), 28 August 1993
All across the former Soviet Union, people began to hear about a tough,
incorruptible general who had saved the Trans-Dniester Republic and was prepared to
save Russia. Lebed seemed to promise that the empire would be restored and against all
odds "the great state would exist." 103 If presidential elections or another August coup
occurred, Lebed would have "entered the Kremlin on a white horse." 104
Lebed's troops were calling him Papa, and he became a rare symbol of military
vigor in a broken and demoralized Russian army. 105 More importantly, he became one of
the most forceful and effective champions of the millions of ethnic Russians stranded in
new states across the former Soviet empire.
During 1993, Lebed continued to speak out against the Yeltsin government, which
had begun negotiations with Moldova on a schedule to withdraw the 14th Army. 106 In a
speech in early January of 1993, Lebed suggested that the dismantled monument to Feliks
Dzerzhinsky in Moscow be replaced by one to US President George Bush, and called the
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US ambassador to Moldova, Mary Pendleton, "a mediocre woman" for having rejected his
invitations to visit the "Dniester Republic." 107
Defense Minister Grachev personally cautioned Lebed:
I have given additional written instructions to General Lebed indicating that
political statements in whatever form and at whatever forums they were
made are intolerable, whether addressed to the Moldovan leadership or to
Moldova, as a whole. As a commander of an army he must carry out his
immediate duties: maintain the combat readiness of this army and not to
allow provocations to happen especially the capture of materiel and
armaments. I attribute General Lebed's lapses to the difficult situation in
which he finds himself. 108
Lebed humiliated Grachev by sending messages to Moscow insisting he not
interfere with the business of the 14th Army. When the American United Nations
representative, Madeleine Albright, said that Washington wanted the 14th Army to
withdraw, Lebed responded, "It's time all those uninvited advisers got a boot in the
behind." 109
Lebed continued to foster the reputation for being blunt and outspoken. He
insisted there was a relationship between the military and politics, saying, "It is nonsense
to say the Army must stay out of politics. The housing problem is politics. Transferring
officers to other armies is politics. Transfer to a new post is politics. The relationship to
the Army in a number of regions is pure politics." 110
In the meantime, Moldova discontinued attempts to join Romania and instead tried
to stop the independence movement of the Trans-Dniester Republic. Trans-Dniester
officials insisted on retaining their own currency and army. They wanted an equal
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"confederation" with Moldova, while somehow becoming "an independent and sovereign
subject of international law." Moldovan officials regarded this idea as absurd. 111
Moldovan officials believed Lebed was the reason for Trans-Dniester's continued
drive for independence. Ion Botnaru, the First Deputy Foreign Minister ofMoldova, said
Lebed behaved like the governor of a Russian province, not like a general temporarily on
foreign soil. In the spring of 1993, Lebed even drafted young men from Tiraspol—
although they were no longer Soviet nor Russian citizens.
Lebed insisted there was nothing unusual about doing this, claiming that there had
been a Russian Army in the region for 200 years, and that 47 percent of his officers were
local.
112 With 8,000 troops, the 14th Army was far more combat ready than Moldova's
entire national army of 9000 men. 113 Moldovan officials were afraid that Lebed was
supporting the Trans-Dniester Republic not because it was an "historically Russian land"
but rather because it was an excuse not to move the 14th Army back into Russia. Trans-
Dniester became a starting point for Lebed's rise in politics, and a firm base for his
support.
Yeltsin once said that he wanted more tough, young generals like Lebed, who
were popular with their men. When Lebed, however, was asked to whom or to what he
owed his overriding loyalty, he did not give the obvious answer - to my supreme
commander, the president of Russia. Instead, Lebed would assert, "I'm a cat that likes to
walk by itself." He explained what this means: "Theoretically we are under the orders of
the commander-in-chief of ground forces in Moscow. In practice, we take decisions
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here." These decisions were guided by a simple principle: "Don't touch me, or the families
ofmy officers, and I'll do nothing to you. Touch me and I'll hit you — hard." "4
As an example of Lebed's concern for the welfare of his men, he began building
nine apartment blocks to give every officer in his army quarters. Families were able to
move into only two of the buildings, and the rest stood unfinished. Lebed said he received
only 3.8 billion rubles of the 18 billion rubles the government promised for housing
construction in 1995. 115 The rest of the effort was found locally. About 400 people, all
officers and their families, lived in the shabby buildings "teeming with cats and filled with
kitchen smells wafting through the corridors." 116 Two days a week no one in the buildings
had hot water, yet Lebed lived at the quarters himself with his wife and their dog. His
three-room apartment, though the most luxurious in the building was still cramped.
Besides providing his own food and shelter for his troops, Lebed's 14th Army
demonstrated their independence in other ways. Supposedly a peacekeeping force, the
army was not really neutral at all. They helped to prop-up the Trans-Dniester Republic,
perhaps to repay the local population for their assistance with quartering the army.
Vladimir L. Bodnar, first deputy chairman of the Trans-Dniester parliament, admitted, "It
deterred the Moldovan side and it helped stabilize this side." 117
Lebed became visibly bitter with the Moscow leadership. During this time he said:
Politicians start wars, but it's young men who wash themselves with blood
because of the politicians' shortsightedness. Now, everyone thinks he's a
strategist, and 10 years later, all the strategists who were never there and
never saw action or ate putrid goat think it was simple. But history turns in
one direction only, and you can't get it back. You can only draw
conclusions.
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Lebed's distrust in the civilian government he was supposed to be supporting
became readily apparent, but the leadership feared taking action to replace him. During
these infant days of Russian democracy, Yeltsin desperately wanted to appease the
military. If he had dismissed the popular Lebed the conservative backlash might have
buried the president.
Lebed's reputation for integrity grew. Moldova's Ambassador to Moscow, A.
Tsarak, said in May of 1993, "As for General Lebed, ... he seems to have a very strict idea
of an officer's honor. I do not believe that he is acting at somebody's bidding. He is not the
sort of man that can be made to act against his convictions." 118 Lebed created an image of
himself as a man who was extremely honest and not afraid with "soldier frankness" to tell
the truth to anybody. 119
Quickly, Lebed developed a reputation as a crusader for justice. Lebed sensed this
and tried to strengthen it. He openly struck out at what he saw as corruption among
Trans-Dniester authorities. He regularly exposed the questionable dealings that involved
the republic's ministers, and even its president, Smirnov. 120 He claimed he was really trying
to prevent corrupt officers from selling offweapons to Middle Eastern terrorists. 121 For
ordinary people in the post-Soviet era, who saw themselves as being robbed by everyone
from the government and the police to speculators and the Mafia, the idea of social justice
was very attractive. This was one source of Lebed's growing popularity.
Lebed was a demanding general who was known to emphasize problems he saw
with the forces being constructed in Moldova. "The Moldovans are forming an army, but
things don't get ahead. The soldiers booze or are 'on the run.' Their army simply lacks fuel.
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The Popular Front has lost its positions. By contrast, I keep my army in intense training —
there will be no repetition of those events." 122 To Lebed, his reputation as a strong leader
depended on the success of the peace agreement.
Throughout this time, almost all Western accounts of the Trans-Dniester Republic
described the Russian 14th Army as a maverick force acting without authority from
Moscow. Lebed was portrayed as a loner who was using the conflict in the Trans-
Dniester region as an excuse not to remove his forces to Russian soil. 123 Russian officials
did not offer anything else to Western reporters to change their opinions.
The overwhelming evidence in statements and interviews seems to show that
Lebed was acting like a maverick and independent. Evidence surfaced, however, that the
14th Army may have been acting from the beginning under orders from its superiors in the
Russian military and with the unconfirmed approval of Yeltsin's government. Lt. Gen.
Valerii Manilov, the military spokesman for the CIS command, early in 1993 informed a
Western audience that the 14th Army had not taken "a single step" without explicit
approval from Moscow. 124 In August, when Lebed announced his candidacy for the
Trans-Dniester Supreme Soviet, he made the announcement in Moscow, while in town for
meetings with the Defense Ministry. And in October, as directed by a decree signed by
Yeltsin himself, nearly 200 servicemen from the 14th Army were honored with official
medals of the Russian Federation at a ceremony attended by Lebed. Most recipients of
the awards were veterans of the 1992 operation against Moldova. 125
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Contrary to what these reports might suggest, Lebed was not waiting for guidance
from Yeltsin's government. In effect, during 1993 and 1994, Lebed privatized the 14th
Army. He became tired of the constant uncertainty of dealing with Moscow. Lebed
began to decide what his army did and made himself responsible for its welfare. 126
Throughout the Russian armed forces during this time, the main task of commanding
officers became not to train for future wars or necessarily to obey orders from above, but
to feed and pay their men.
F. LEBED ELECTED TO TRANS-DNIESTER LEGISLATURE
Lebed had become extremely popular locally, and became the kingpin of political
life in the Trans-Dniester Republic. Thanks to a locally-promulgated "law" enabling a
Russian citizen resident in Moldova to be a candidate for office, Lebed even ran for its
parliament in September 1993. He won 88 percent of the vote on a platform openly
advocating that Trans-Dniester be removed from Moldova and transferred to Russian
control. 127
The region's Russian-dominated population regarded Lebed as their protector.
Moldova's foreign ministry immediately filed a complaint with the Russian government 128
The deputy speaker of the Moldovan parliament, Victor Puscasu, said, "This is an
abnormal phenomenon which has no precedent in world practice...We view the 14th Army
as a foreign army." 129
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Lebed ran for the parliament position because he said he wanted to take an active
part in Dniester's political life. 130 He won an overwhelming victory because of the
popularity he gained in forming the peace deal between the Dniester forces and the
Moldovan government.
During the rebel actions at Moscow's "White House" parliament building in
October of 1993, Lebed was the only senior officer to publicly express doubt in Yeltsin's
ability to override the crisis as he did. 131 Lebed only suggested, however, that Russia's
regional leaders should take power in their own hands.
Lebed continued to show signs of political independence, confident in his own
power. When President Yeltsin issued his decree of 21 September 1993, the dissolved
Supreme Soviet invited Lebed to be its new Defense Minister. Lebed, however, refused. 132
He said that he considered the idea of armed resistance to the president and parallel power
structures to be crazy. 133 He also did not accept the invitation of some representatives of
Yeltsin's team to come to Moscow.
Lebed firmly refused to take sides with either the Yeltsin government or the anti-
Yeltsin forces. He probably believed he could pick up the pieces as a third party if the
crisis developed further, which suggests his ambition was stronger than his devotion to
ideals.
On 13 October 1993, Lebed charged explicitly that Trans-Dniester officials sent
men and weapons to the Russian parliament during the anti-Yeltsin rebellion. 134 Lebed
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produced documents which confirmed that 50 sub-machine-guns had been sent to
Moscow at the initiative of two Trans-Dniester generals. Lebed said the registration
numbers of the sub-machine-guns were discovered in Moscow. He also said that
Dniester region generals had given sniper's rifles and pistols to some former Russian
deputies and that an adviser to the Dniester region state security minister had been
detained in Moscow. According to Lebed, the Dniester region's official authorities were
denying the fact that citizens from there had taken part in the defense of the "White
House." Lebed said that if the defense and security ministers of the Dniester republic were
not punished for having dispatched fighters to Moscow, it would be a serious blow to the
republic's prestige.
135
Lebed denounced Alexander Rutskoi, another Afghan war hero and nationalist,
who led the Parliament's armed insurrection against Yeltsin. Similar to his own criticism,
Lebed called the former vice-president a "half-Napoleon, half-Caesar:" "He never has any
doubts about anything, he is always right, what a happy man. I always have doubts but he
doesn't have any." He said Rutskoi, who later ran for the Duma and the presidency at the
head of his own "Derzhava"(Great Power) movement, was a "political corpse" after he
promised to bring back the Stalinist GULAG system of slave labor camps136
Lebed disapproved of Rutskoi's role in the events that led to the shelling of the
house of Parliament. 137 In his opinion, Rutskoi should have stood his ground to the end
instead of seeking political asylum at foreign embassies and finally surrendering to the
authorities. Lebed objected to Rutskoi's actions not because they were wrong for
democracy, but because he acquiesced so easily. In Lebed's view, Rutskoi's behavior
forever deprived him of the moral authority to be a credible political leader.
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G. LEBED RESIGNS FROM TRANS-DNIESTER LEGISLATURE
Relations between Lebed and the Dniester Republic leadership began to
deteriorate. Lebed resigned as a lawmaker of the Dniester region on 14 October 1993,
only one month after gaining office. He told the local parliament that a "wall of mistrust"
had emerged between him and the legislature. 138 The conflict began after two Dniester
security and interior ministers categorically rejected Lebed's accusations that they had sent
arms and militants to defend the Russian parliament building in Moscow. "Time will judge
us," Lebed said and left the session of the parliament. 139 Lebed continued to support
Dniester demands for autonomy, but considered the republic's leadership had completely
discredited itself. 140
Lebed learned of the massive corruption and embezzlement for which the Trans-
Dniester leadership was famous. He stated loudly to the parliament that he would "not
travel along with thieves," and called upon the state to "make everybody feel its gentle
embrace." 141 The army and Russian society at large took notice. Many interpreted this
statement as aimed at the Yeltsin administration and Grachev's Defense Ministry, both
widely regarded as corrupt.
Moldovan foreign minister Nicholaeciu at the UN General Assembly that same
month described the 14th Army in Moldova as the main source of instability in the Trans-
138
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Dniester region and demanded its immediate withdrawal. 142 After this speech, Lebed
immediately departed for Moscow for participation in a meeting at the Russian Defense
Ministry. They summoned Lebed for consultations concerning the situation in the
Dniester area, which worsened after the October events in Moscow. 143 Lebed stressed that
the 14th Army would stay in the region as long as it is necessary.
During 1993 and 1994, the Russian army gained the image of being capable of
both crushing a parliament and of questioning commands. Lebed became a symbol of the
army's uncertain role, and he was straightforward in his criticism of drawing the army into
the conflict. He said,
I believe that a grandiose crime has been committed. You could do
anything, but not drag the army into this affair. Can you imagine the
situation of the soldier who comes home today to Tula or Ryazan, and old
women spit in his face? It all happened before, in 1917, when the nation
split into White and Red. History teaches us nothing. 144
Lebed accurately used the lessons of history to boost his impending political
career. The lesson is that a huge army that suddenly loses its mission and political
guidance, distrusted by its people and denied support, will inevitably be drawn into
politics.
145 The Russian newspaper Komersant Daily correctly observed, "Russia's long
history shows clearly that the ones who come out on top in political disputes are the ones
142
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who have the army on their sides." 146 Restoring the status of the Russian army was a key
characteristic of Lebed's political platform in his campaign for parliament and for
president.
H. LEBED RESIGNS FROM THE ARMY
"Lebed is afraid of nobody and nothing. He didn't look to Moscow for solutions. He only
acted as he thought best.
"
-Wife of a retired 14th Army major, Moscow Times, 17 June 1995
After Lebed left the Trans-Dniester parliament, he could no longer associate
himself with the republic's leadership. He decided they were "bandits" and he was the last
"great man."
147 As Lebed's political base in Moldova began to deteriorate, he decided to
cross the small republic and enter Russian politics directly. Fearful of their subordinates
rising popularity, Grachev and Yeltsin now tried to undermine the ambitious general's
future.
In 1994, Grachev began pushing for reduction of the Russian forces in the Trans-
Dniester region. He called for bringing the 14th Army and its arsenal back to Russia
proper and demanded both the removal of the Army commander and a dramatic reduction
in the 14th Army's manpower. 148 When Grachev first ordered the downsizing of the officer
corps of the Russian 14th Army in Moldova in the summer of 1994, Lebed stated the
shrinkage would allow criminals or opposing factions in the Dniester republic to seize the
army's large weapons stores. 149
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Grachev ordered Lebed to report to Moscow in July 1994, where Prime Minister
Victor Chernomyrdin offered him the post of Defense Minister of Tajikistan, a Central
Asian state in the throes of civil war. Lebed declined because he did not want to involve
himself in another civil war. Yeltsin finally intervened150 and Grachev reversed his
decision, 151 but Lebed had to fight repeated attempts by Grachev to remove him from
command of the 14th Army during the following months. Lebed refused to withdraw the
14th Army and continued to sit on the largest arsenal of weapons in southeastern Europe
until his resignation in May 1995.
Although Yeltsin intervened to keep Lebed in place when Grachev tried to remove
him, Lebed became increasingly critical of Yeltsin's administration. He harshly attacked
Yeltsin openly in the media, and offered his own vision of Russia in the present world. 152
He addressed its national interests, as well as a program of radical and pragmatic reforms
for the Army and the rest of the country.
Lebed claimed there were three reasons why the 14th Army should stay in
Moldova: (1) if the Army was moved, the ethnic conflict would start again; (2) both the
Trans-Dniester Russians and Moldovans wanted the Russian Army to stay; and (3)
moving the army with its weaponry would be dangerous. In the event of withdrawal, he
warned, the arms would be seized by the Trans-Dniestran Russians, who would sell them
or use them to fight Moldovans. 153
It was often argued that Lebed did not enunciate the fourth, and most important,
reason: According to a leading Russian military commentator, for Russia to keep the huge
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151
Alexander Minkin, "Alexander Lebed pobyval v Moskve s kratkosrochnym
visitom," Segodnya, 25 August 1994, p. 1.
152Vladimir Shlapentokh, "The Enfeebled Army: A Key Player in Moscow's Current
Political Crisis," European Security 4, no. 3 (Autumn 1995): 429.
153
Ariel Cohen, "General Alexander Lebed: Russia's Rising Political Star," Heritage
Foundation Reports, 26 September 1995, p. 1.
44
arsenal in Moldova made sense only if the former Soviet Union was to be put back
together again. To do this would require a large army close to the Balkans and in
Ukraine's rear, hundreds of miles away from the Russian border. 154 Looking at the USSR's
pre- 1992 borders, it would make perfect sense for Lebed, a Russian "great power patriot,"
to keep the huge arsenal in Moldova indefinitely, until such time as a new Soviet Union or
a larger Russia could be created.
Lebed's anti-government statements increased as pressure for the 14th army's
downsizing grew. This prompted Grachev to tell Lebed to decide between the army or
politics. Defense Ministry officials again called him to the capital and told him to accept
drastic cuts in his army or resign. Lebed chose to resign, ending a 26 year career in the
army.
In late May of 1995, Grachev passed Lebed's resignation on to Yeltsin, who
continuously supported Grachev despite his unpopularity among the troops and his
mistakes in Chechnya. 155 Yeltsin, as commander-in-chief of the Russian armed forces,
hesitated over the decision for a full two weeks. Yeltsin claimed he put off a ruling until a
special commission investigated the debate over the 14th Army.
Yeltsin most likely turned down the resignation because it would be difficult for
Lebed to make any definite political moves while still a commander in the army. 156 Yeltsin
finally accepted Lebed's resignation in June of 1995. Months of conflict between the two
leaders finally came to an end.
When Lebed left Moldova, over 100 women calling themselves the Union to
Defend Trans-Dniester lay on the airport runway in protest. They prevented his
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replacement, Major General Valery Yevnevich, from landing and temporarily frustrated his
plan to take over from Lebed. 157
In an interview with the Moscow Times, Lebed said that he was "kicked out like a
drunken warrant officer," but he was past getting offended. "You can only get offended at
decent people. With those despicable people all you can do is drive them out of power and
the only legitimate way to do it is through elections." 158 Lebed apparently recognized the
legitimacy of democracy in Russia, but at the same time pressed for a change in the
leadership.
Lebed did not offer any advice to Yevnevich on how to administer the 14th Army:
"My attitude to anyone who used Russian tanks and Russian soldiers in the Russian capital
to shoot at the Russian parliament is extremely negative. And it's 10 times as negative to
anyone who picked up a medal in the process." 159 Lebed was referring to Yeltsin's
honoring Yevnevich for his role in the 1993 suppression of the parliament. Many officers
in Lebed'sl4th Army agreed.
The locals believed that Lebed's removal meant war for their troubled region and
residents made a run on food stores, clearing them out of flour and salt. Lebed inspired
blind devotion in many of his men. Some of the officers tendered their resignations at the
same time as their commander, and were immediately discharged. A major who served
with Lebed said he would not serve under anyone but Lebed, and would go wherever
Lebed went and "do what he tells me to do." 160
157
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division in shelling the rebellious Russian parliament for Yeltsin in October 1 993 . He was
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Lebed did not leave quietly. He berated Grachev and Yeltsin for the bloody drive
to crush secessionist Chechnya. In a comment that received widespread popular approval,
Lebed said he would only go to Chechnya if he could take the sons of the political elite in
Moscow into battle with him. 161 By the time Lebed left Moldova—after several times
refusing direct orders by his superiors to depart—he had become, like Aleksandr
Solzhenitsyn, a fire-breathing advocate of that fading ideal: glorious Russia. 162
I. THE AFTERMATH
The long feud between Grachev and Lebed continued into 1996. Shortly after
Lebed's resignation, Grachev dismissed Lebed's right-hand man, Mikhail Bergman, then-
garrison commandant in Trans-Dniester's capital of Tiraspol, and several other officers. 163
A Russian military court attached to the Russian military contingent in the Trans-Dniester
region, however, ruled that they all should be reinstated, and then in March of 1996
accused Grachev of refusing to obey its decision. The court accused Grachev of
"purposefully deviating from the implementation of the court's decision," and regarded
Grachev's lack of action as purposeful evasion from implementing the ruling. 164
With the end of the Soviet Union, a large part of the Russian army was stranded
outside the boundaries of the Russian Federation. American officials estimated that at least
200,000 Russian troops were based outside Russia, compared with 1.25 million inside. 165
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Most of them were in the Near Abroad. Without the communist party, the degree of
control Moscow exercised over the troops became uncertain, and the uncertainty paved
the way for generals like Lebed. Yeltsin demonstrated his lack of control during the
October 1993 political crisis in Moscow, when he needed the support of the generals and
was reluctant to contradict them.
An analyst with the military newspaper Krasnaya Zvezda (Red Star) said Lebed
could not help getting caught up in the tumultuous world of politics in Moldova and
Russia. The army plays such a vital role in many former Soviet republics that it is
inevitable that the military will mix with politics. 166 Lebed's role in Moldova was actually
to make sure people were not killed there during a purely political, ethnic conflict. He
succeeded in stopping the bloodshed, but the end result was just another difficult position.
Lebed was ordered by the Yeltsin administration not to get involved in politics, but for
Lebed getting involved in politics was inevitable.
A paradoxical development evolved in Russia during Lebed's command of the 14th
Army in Moldova. While the military power of the Russian Army declined, and the
demoralization of its officers and generals continued, the political role of the Army was
quite high.
167 The Army became the most powerful factor in internal political struggles. A
year later, Yeltsin's "power structures" were eventually able to thwart the potential
hostility of the Army toward his regime, but not without forming a strategic alliance with
the man who would catapult him into a second term.
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IV. AFTER THE ARMY: LEBED CONQUERS MOSCOW
A. THE PARLIAMENTARY CAMPAIGN: VICTORY WITHOUT SUCCESS
"I was not just brought into politics. I was driven in ."'-Literatumqya Gazeta, 17 May 1995
Lebed's popularity in Moldova grew as his stance against Yeltsin intensified, and
his independent nature became clear. After he resigned, Lebed strongly opposed the
Russian leadership's prosecution of its war in Chechnya and won broad popularity among
the military with his vocal support of the dream of a powerful, well-funded army that is
respected at home and abroad. Stern-looking with a deep bass voice, Lebed, however,
appeared less formidable in a suit than he did in a uniform. 168 His campaign continued to
gather support, perhaps because he had the reputation of a man who can keep his promise
to restore order to crime-plagued Russia because he kept strict order in the 14th army.
Lebed wanted Russians to believe that he brought courage and purposefiilness to the
political arena.
Lebed tried to define himself as a Russian patriot who appealed to both
communists and nationalists. In media interviews published in 1993-1995, he attacked
Russia's current leadership, charging that "Yeltsin is nothing but the first [Communist
Party] secretary of Sverdlovsk, infamous for the destruction of the building where the last
Russian czar and his family were incarcerated before their execution." 169 He also publicly
said he was reading the memoirs ofWhite Russian generals Anton Denikin and Peter
Krasnov from the Russian Civil War era (1918-1921), which suggested support for the
nationalist right wing. In the same interview, however, Lebed showed sympathy for
communism. He declared himself an atheist and defended keeping a large bust of Lenin in
168
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his headquarters, complaining, "they threw the old fetishes to the junkyard, but did not
give us new ones, therefore Lenin stays." 170
The general belief is that Lebed entered politics at the same time he was discharged
from the Army, but while he was still an army commander, democrats from Russia's
Democratic Choice, Communist patriots, and politicians who simply wanted to play the
patriotism card all tried to attract him to their side. When he left the army, Lebed was at
the top of the political approval rating charts. According to surveys by the All-Russia
Center for the Study of Public Opinion, in June 1995 he moved into first place among "the
most acceptable candidates for the post of President of Russia." 171 At that time, his rating
was only 7.9%, but Yeltsin himself held the tenth place position, with a ranking of 2%. 172
Lebed stayed in first place until autumn.
As the Duma election campaign intensified, Lebed was drawn into the company of
the Congress of Russian Communities (KRO), a political coalition founded in 1993 to
support millions of ethnic Russians who were left behind in other republics after the
collapse of the Soviet Union. Lebed soon joined the organization, and it was from the
KRO that Lebed gained his initial political support. In the 1995 parliamentary elections,
the KRO failed to cross the 5 percent threshold required to get any of the 225 State Duma
seats allotted to party lists, and that failure was considered a major upset for the party's
high-profile leaders. 173 Lebed's political partners, however, discovered that his loyalty was
not an absolute. Just as the KRO was using Lebed, Lebed was using the KRO, and Lebed
found it was time to move on. Three months before the presidential election, he joined a
coalition of political centrists called Third Force.
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1. Congress of Russian Communities
The KRO was a political party run by moderate nationalists and economic liberals.
It was an umbrella organization for several influential groups of Russian businessmen. 174
Lebed's economic program was drafted by Russian free-market economists close to these
groups and centered around Vitaly Naishul. Naishul promoted the concepts of "self-
reliance" and "self-governance," which meant delegating power from the central to the
local governments and rejecting foreign aid. 175
The leaders of the KRO were very different people. Besides Lebed, the other chief
figures in the party were experienced Moscow politician Yuri Skokov and the Duma
member Sergey Glazyev. Skokov was a skilled operative who was Yeltsin's National
Security Council chief until 1993, and who had close ties with Russia's military-industrial
complex. Glazyev was chairman of the State Duma Committee on Industrial Policy and
the youngest of the major Russian economists. 176
The first person to bring Lebed from Moldova into Moscow politics was a fighter
for the rights of "Russians in the near abroad" ~ Konstantin Zatulin, Chairman of the Fifth
Duma's Committee on CIS Affairs. Right before Lebed was removed from the post of
army commander, Zatulin organized Duma hearings on the fate of the 14th Army. The
hearings had wide political repercussions and added to the image Lebed and his followers
wished to create. At the time, Lebed was already a member of the KRO's council. Lebed
stated at the Duma hearings that he would not let the 14th Army's weapons be stolen. He
said if he had to "twist off someone's head, I'll twist it off with this very hand," and he
174These groups included the Federation of Russian Producers, the League ofRussian
Entrepreneurs, and the Movement of Owners (also known as the Stolypin Society, named
after the reformist interior minister of Czar Nicholas II who was assassinated in 191 1.) See
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brandished his weighty fist. From that time on, the prevailing image of the general was that
of the fist.
Skokov immediately made two mistakes when he teamed up with Lebed. Believing
he would be the primary candidate, Skokov made the potentially charismatic Lebed the
KRO's second candidate for the Duma election, thereby giving rise to a profound internal
conflict in the KRO. As a man of military-style loyalty, Lebed observed the rules of the
game until the elections, but the KRO itself did not reinforce his stance. Skokov's second
mistake was his attempt to capitalize on nostalgia for a "strong hand." But the KRO's
advertisements were too military in appeal, and the future justice that they advertised
evoked unpleasant associations with the unforgettable "troikas," or extra-judicial three-
man tribunals, used to condemn Stalin's victims. 177
The KRO was also damaged by suspicions of Great Russian chauvinism, caused by
the KRO's idea that "Russian communities" must be formed everywhere, even in the
workplace. Obshchinnost, or "communality," as understood by the KRO, struck voters in
December 1995 as a far more abstract idea than concrete social and economic problems.
Lebed never voiced any objection to this idea before the election. 178
The striking feature of the KRO's program, and maybe a cause for the party's
failure in the parliamentary elections, was that there was no distinct ideological
framework. It was not a radical nationalistic program like Zhirinovskiy's Liberal
Democratic Party, and it was not a liberal reform party like Grigory Yavlinsky's Yobloko
bloc. It certainly did not have the strong, well-known ideology of the communist party.
The KRO was not orientated towards some specific social class or group of the population
(for example, peasants, entrepreneurs or workers), not oriented towards a specific
177Georgy Bovt, "Personnel Reshuffle in the Kremlia" Kommersant-Daily, 19 June 1996,
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ideology (liberalism, Marxism, social democracy, nationalism, etc.), but simply towards
what Lebed called "problems and situations." 179
Before the parliamentary elections, political analysts warned Lebed that his allies
only wanted to use his image to get seats in the Duma. His one-time ally Skokov, after
failing to win a Duma seat, changed the tactics of supporting Lebed to trying to strip him
of all political prospects. Skokov put his personal ambitions above the will of the party,
which had nominated Lebed as a candidate for presidency. 180 Jealous of his ally's rising
popularity, Skokov instructed KRO regional leaders against canvassing signatures to
support Lebed or financing his election campaign. 181 During Lebed's parliamentary and
presidential campaigns, Skokov remained a member of the KRO but became politically
ineffective.
2. The Campaign For Parliament
Russian politics became more a clash of personalities than a choice of ideology,
and in 1995 Lebed stood out. 182 With his charismatic personality, he promised to return
Russia to greatness. A nationwide survey in July by the International Foundation for
Electoral Systems showed that Lebed had the highest positive ratings among all leading
Russian politicians and was the top choice for president if the election were then. 183 But
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even so, Lebed commanded only 14 percent, a sign of the deep fragmentation of the
electorate.
By December of 1995, Lebed was the most widely discussed figure in Russian
politics. He ran for a seat in the Duma, the lower house of the Russian Parliament. Lebed
and the KRO conducted one of the most expensive election campaigns, a fact that was
very visible to most Russian voters. They had the most bumper stickers, posters and
pamphlets of all, the widest variety of television ads and clips, and the most paid radio and
television air time. 184 Almost everyone expected his party to do well in the parliamentary
elections. Experts predicted that he would be a strong candidate in the presidential
elections.
185
Television commercials showed Lebed and the KRO's other two leaders striding
down a broad tree-lined path. Their program was vague on economic policy, but included
promises of a crackdown on corruption and crime and a strong army. 186
Lebed won a seat in the Tula constituency, a city of arms factories south of
Moscow, where he once commanded an airborne division. He was the only man from his
party to be elected to the State Duma. Although he won a seat in Parliament without any
problem in a head-to-head race, his party did not even gather the five percent necessary to
enter as a bloc.
187
Pre-election polls predicted the KRO to finish just behind the
Communists, but the party finished far behind in actual balloting with just 4.3 percent of
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the vote. 188 Analysts believed Lebed would ride into the Duma on the crest of a patriotic
tidal wave, but instead he led the KRO to a major humiliation.
It became clear the party was damaged by the personality feud between Lebed and
its co-leader, Yuri Skokov. Overnight, the general lost his impeccable status, and it looked
as if Russians would no longer be treated to endless television interviews in which they
marveled as much at his astonishingly deep voice as his politics. 189
Observers have said Lebed would have been better-off if he could have hung on
longer in Moldova. 190 In Moldova, part of his charm was as a leader on the periphery
blasting the central government. Later, during the 1996 presidential campaign, much of
his appeal might have vanished because of the Moscow political scene. Moscow was a
very different environment for Lebed, and he was no longer an outsider. He said, "Earlier
I was a soldier and everything was clear to me, but now I live in a different world." 191
B. THE PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN: SUCCESS WITHOUT VICTORY
1. The Third Force Emerges
Lebed insisted a difficult choice between communists and the Yeltsin government
was being imposed on the Russian people. At the same time, there was a "sensible force
in the political spectrum, supported by at least 60 per cent of the Russian electorate."
Lebed began negotiations with Duma deputies Svyatoslav Fedorov and Stanislav
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Govorukhin and the Yabloko party leader, Grigoriy Yavlinskiy. He believed that united
they could become such a force.
In March of 1996, a new coalition of Russian centrists and hard-liners emerged,
ambitiously calling itself Third Force. Initially, it was announced that it would back Lebed
for the presidency. 192 The coalition was founded by well-known eye-surgeon Svyatoslav
Fedorov, film director Stanislav Govorukhin, ex-Yeltsin minister Sergey Glazyev and
conservative Sergey Baburin, leader of Russia' s All-People's Union (ROS). Konstantin
Zatulin, at the time a leader of the KRO, was an architect of the coalition. Zatulin
explained, "We want to unite the voters who do not wish to choose between the two
major rivals for presidency - communist Gennadiy Zyuganov and Boris Yeltsin," 193
Officially, Lebed remained head of the KRO Moscow regional branch, but counted
primarily on the Third Force coalition to gain political support. 194
Lebed, Yavlinsky and Fedorov became the outspoken candidates of the Third
Force, but their political differences proved difficult to resolve. Fedorov was eager for a
coalition on any terms, but both Lebed and Yavlinsky were unwilling to relinquish
leadership to the other. The assumed alliance between Yavlinsky and Lebed was peculiar
in the large field of Russian political parties. Yavlinsky was an American-educated
economist who wanted to keep Russia on the path of democratic reform, while Lebed was
seen as a recently retired army general who promised to restore order in Russia and coerce
the rest of the government to his desire. For Yavlinsky, political ambition was more
important than preservation of reform. His views on most issues were much closer to
those of Yeltsin than to those ofLebed
Even ex-USSR President Mikhail Gorbachev called for a general democratic
alliance to rule out choosing between "two evils" ~ Yeltsin and Zyuganov, but Lebed
192Tamara Zamyatina, "New Russian left-of center coalition to back former commander
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openly rejected his support. 195 Lebed viewed Gorbachev as a leader who failed his people
and gave up an empire. Lebed's response to Gorbachev's attempts to join Third Force
was, "Mikhail Sergeyevich is constantly trying to turn himself into my daddy - and I am
constantly trying to stay an orphan. He has gone out on deck, but there's no deck there.
So I don't need that sort of political experience." 196
Lebed maintained a strong, independent political stance. In an interview by Global
Viewpoint months before he joined Third Force he asserted that he had "mainly centrist
beliefs:"
What is being presented to us as democracy is actually ersatz, an attempt to
make someone else's experience our own. Like Gorbachev, who
inappropriately tried to grow cactus at his summer dacha, we have grown
an ugly plant not suited to Russia. Today, the so-called democrats are, in
their present shape, not acceptable, and it is not possible for the
Communists to rule. So we must seek a place in between. No matter how
long you strive to seek the horizon, you never reach it. But we need to live
today with what we have. 197
Lebed ruled out his participation in a shadow cabinet of the "left-wing and
popular-patriotic coalition" headed by Zyuganov: "There will never be a place for me in
the government of either President Yeltsin or Communist leader Zyuganov." 198 Lebed said
he had developed an "allergy to the members of the Soviet Communist Party Central
195Gorbachev said that he was ready to lead the Third Force and that he would discuss the
principles of cooperation and role-sharing in the Third Force team with the leaders of the
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Committee who first broke up the country and now are trying to create a new state and
form a government on its ruins." 199 Often rejecting the idea of serving in another
administration, Lebed painted himself as an independent military leader led only by a sense
of duty to the Russian people.
The Third Force never really materialized. Their alliance, after all, was not about
any common political philosophy. It was about a common desire to gain ground in an
election that appeared to be turning into a two-man race between Yeltsin and Zyuganov.
2. The Campaign For President
"It's not the generals who are running for election that you have to worry about,
it's the ones who aren't." - Lebed quoted in the Ottawa Citizen, July 6, 1996
If success in the 1996 Russian presidential campaign depended on the clarity and
brevity of a candidate's message, than Lebed was the winner. The Russian press, friend
and foe alike, agreed that he spoke directly to Russia's wounded pride. He supported the
cause of the Russian "colonials" living outside Russia in the newly independent states; he
considered the collapse of the USSR a disaster and wanted to renew the old links between
Moscow and its neighbors; he warned the expansion ofNATO could lead to World War
III; he wanted the government to regulate the economy more closely; and, above all, he
declared war on crime and corruption. 200
Initially, the nationalist field in Russian politics was crowded. The Financial Times
stressed that the principal candidates had much in common, namely a variety of
nationalism between Cold-War resentment and the pro- western euphoria that marked
Russia's policies following the break-up of the Soviet Union. 201
199
Ibid.
^S. Frederick Starr, "A Russian Politician to Reckon With," Christian Science Monitor,
15 December 1995, p. 19.
201M. Podkopayeva, "Russia And Pinochet," Zavtra, p. 2, in Russian Press Digest, 3 July
1996.
58
The Canadian Globe AndMail summed up by insisting that "nationalism is the
main theme of the Russian election." 202 In its opinion, all five leading candidates were
nationalists in one way or another. According to its classification, Yeltsin was a populist
nationalist, Zyuganov was a Communist nationalist, Yavlinsky was a liberal nationalist,
Zhirinovskiy was a xenophobic nationalist, and Lebed was an ethnic nationalist. For
Lebed, the label of "ethnic nationalist", however, was probably not correct, since he
actually spoke of uniting all the native Russian "nations" and religions. 203 All the
nationalist candidates attempted to become the "most patriotic" leader.
Historically, Russian nationalism was always subordinate to a larger imperial idea,
since Russians have never lived in a state that was anything but an empire. The Soviet
Empire, just like the czars' empire, provided international prestige for the regime and may
even have served as a source of its legitimacy. 204 In this sense, Lebed wanted to create a
strong sense of Russian identity, yet he did not want to discriminate against those with
other origins. According to Peter J. Stavrakis, in a statement to a congressional
committee on human rights, Lebed "remained virtually the only candidate in the nationalist
camp who did not base his campaign explicitly on ethnic themes." 205
Lebed did not begin his presidential campaign with fervor, which made his strong
finish that much more surprising. At first, many of his audiences could not understand
™Globe AndMail quoted by M. Podkopayeva, "Russia And Pinochet," Zavtra, p. 2, in
Russian Press Digest, 3 July 1996.
^There was an important element of "union" and "empire" in Lebed's thinking. In his
autobiography, Lebed lists the native religious traditions as "Russian Orthodoxy,
Catholicism, Islam, Buddhism, Judaism, and many sects [a term usually applied to
Protestants]." See Jack F. Matlock, Jr., "The Struggle for the Kremlin," New York Review
ofBooks 43, no. 13, (8 August 1996): 33.
^Rebecca V. Strode and Colin S. Gray, "The Imperial Dimension of Soviet Military
Power," Problems ofCommunism (Nov-Dec 1981): 9. See also Sergei Maksudov and
William Taubman, "Russian-Soviet Nationality Policy and Foreign Policy: A Historical
Overview of the Linkage Between Them" The Rise ofNations pi 8.
^Peter J. Stavrakis, testimony before the House Committee on International Relations
Subcommittee on International Operations and Human Rights, 27 February 1996.
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why he was called "the most charismatic politician in Russia." 206 He started wearing his
lieutenant-general's uniform again hoping to impress his audiences. Lebed would arrive
late at election rallies, stand stiffly "at ease" and deliver - without notes and without much
coherence - long rambling denunciations on a number of general topics. His elderly,
working-class and embittered audiences still were not impressed. 207
Than changes began to occur. Lebed did not become any more educated or better
prepared for the campaign, but instead was joined by a group ofyoung talented electoral
technocrats. Lebed learned the art of the sometimes witty, but usually sinister, sound-bite,
and acquired policies written for him by a pro-market, but pro-autocracy economist. 208
They gave him a new hairstyle to appear less aggressive, and stylish Western suits and
ties.
209 They even taught him how to effect something approaching a smile. 210 His political
advertisements also became more competently put together.
During the presidential campaign Lebed released a document entitled, "Ideology
and Common Sense" which outlined his electoral program. His slogan was "Truth and
order" promising to "put things in order both in the economy and in the country in
general." Lebed stressed at the same time that his chief target was to "create order out of
the chaos existing in Russia today." 211
Interestingly, Lebed claimed that he would never agree to be a defense minister
under President Yeltsin. He described the Yeltsin regime as a democracy which was
206Ann Leslie, "Whatever Russia's Election Result, Lebed is the Man to Watch," Daily
Mail, 4 July 1996, p. 24.
""Ibid.
""Ibid.
209Ron Popeski, "'Kingmaker' Lebed Meets Yeltsin. Launches Bid for Job," Renter
European Community Report, 17 June 1996.
2l0Moscow Times, 9 July 1996.
211
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"totalitarian in essence"
212 He also told Moscow television that he would have "climbed
the notorious tank back in 1991" if he had wanted to be defense minister, referring to
Yeltsin's standing on the tank during the attempted coup. 213
Lebed's audiences grew as his message became more focused. He stressed that he
was not going to withdraw his candidacy and informed President Yeltsin about his
decision during their meeting early in May of 1996, saying, "I oppose any deals in
principle." 214 His slogan of "Truth and Order" and promise to purge corruption and crime
appealed to many Russians. He blasted the Communist past and the "even greater vileness
and lies" of Yeltsin's administration.
On the one hand, Lebed continued to show the West that he was not the democrat
that could someday replace Yeltsin. If elected, Lebed intended to review the Russian
constitution adopted in 1 993 . In particular, although the State Duma already has few
powers, he believed it would have been expedient to transform it from an elected body
into a body appointed by the president.
On the other hand, Lebed showed some faith in Russia's fledgling market
economy: "In theory, government officials should not meddle in the affairs of the market.
There is the market in which everything is determined by the price, by supply and demand,
by trade. Those who engage in trade do not meddle in affairs of state administration."215
The Lebed phenomenon was even confirmed in rock music. One of the hottest
songs on the Russian rock scene during this period was "Kombat," an anthem to an army
212
"Gen Aleksandr Lebed Confident ofWinning Presidential Election," Russian Television





"Third force" Close to Collapse - Presidential Candidate Lebed," ITAR-TASS news
agency (World Service), Moscow, 13 May 1996 in BBC Summary of World Broadcasts
13 May 1996.
215
"Press Conference With Alexander Lebed," Official Kremlin Int'l News Broadcast, 13
May 1996.
61
commander who defends Moscow amid crashing planes and burning tanks. While the rock
group Lyube did not name the hero, few people doubted that it was Lebed. 216 The
commander was even identified as Lebed by the ultra-nationalist politician Vladimir
Zhirinovskiy at a Duma press conference. 217 Although the song was recorded months
before Lebed's burst in popularity, the fact that everyone was talking about him as the
mysterious commander proved how much he caught the popular imagination.
Russian democracy passed a monumental milestone in the 1996 election. For the
first time in a thousand years, Russian citizens — not royal families, politburos or Mafia-
cartels — decided who should rule their country. Alexander Shokhin, first deputy
chairman of the lower house of parliament said the triumph of democracy was the fact that
the elections even took place, and that they were held without fraud. 218 Although, the
effect was dulled by Yeltsin's hesitating about declaring a dictatorship as he feared defeat.
Despite calls by Russian bankers and some of Yeltsin's own advisers to postpone the vote,
Russia's presidential election took place as scheduled.
The question still remained: Would the system sustain a change of power? In the
first election Yeltsin received 35 per cent of the vote, Zyuganov 32 per cent and Lebed
came a distant third with 14. 7 per cent. Lebed's support was much higher than expected,
and immediately his impact became known. Nowhere was Lebed's influence more
apparent than with the military vote, where he polled 47 per cent. Yeltsin drew only 29
per cent with the armed forces, Zhirinovskiy 14 per cent, and Zyuganov as little as 8 per
cent.
219 The startling popularity ofLebed was confirmed, and the world took notice.
216Alan Philps, "The Army's Rasputin Casts His Spell Over Russian Hearts," Daily
Telegraph 10 July 1996, p. 14.
217Owen Matthews, "Buzz-Cut Crowd Says Lebed's Just 'Cool'," Moscow Times, 6 July
1996.
218Lee Hockstader "Russian Democracy Gets Another Chance; But Potential for New
Kremlin Conflicts Remains After Ailing Yeltsin's Victory," Washington Post, 4 July 1996,
p. AOL
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Of all the candidates, Lebed conducted the most coherent campaign, and, except
for Yeltsin's, the most effective. A summary of his campaign platform appeared in the
mass-circulation newspaper Argumenty ifakty in May, 1996 and was referred to as "a
model of issue presentation." 220 Even Lebed's longtime nemesis, Defense Minister Pavel
Grachev agreed that Lebed's election program would be good for Russia. 221 It was
concise, detailed, with general principles backed up by specific proposals. It placed heavy
emphasis on restoring law and order, in particular strengthening the court system,
protecting witnesses, and providing much greater transparency to government finance and
administrative operations.
Clearly, Lebed had what every Russian politician but Yeltsin so glaringly lacked:
star quality. He was photogenic, tough, and skilled in the art of sound bites. Lebed
became an instant sensation on the strength of his 11 million votes. But toward the end of
the initial campaign, there were clear signs that Lebed's campaign was being run in tandem
with Yeltsin's, although this was not publicly acknowledged. 222 From late May, 1996,
Lebed suddenly had an infusion of campaign money - rumored to have come from
Yeltsin's supporters. Lebed also seemed to enjoy the support of Yeltsin's sophisticated
advisors, which might have helped him reach the strong third place finish. In the
presidential election Lebed received nearly double the votes for Third Force partner
Yavlinsky, who placed fourth.
Lebed's rapid rise, however, also underlined the flaws in Russia's infant democracy.
In the absence of established parties, Lebed was able to convert meager finances,
resourceful campaign aides and assistance from the Kremlin into instant power in the
27
°Argumentyyfakty, Number 22 (May 1996), p. 5.
221
"Former Defence Minister Grachev Votes; Says Lebed Settled a Score With Him,"
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^Jack F. Matlock, Jr., "The Struggle for the Kremlin," New York Review ofBooks 43, no.
13, (8 August 1996): 30.
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space of a few weeks. 223 If anything, Lebed's spectacular rise to power demonstrated two
things: post-Soviet Russia still has no effective multi-party systems, and politicians can
quickly use back door deals to manipulate the public.
C. APPOINTMENT AS SECRETARY OF SECURITY COUNCIL
"I'm something never seen in the Kremlin. I'm fresh blood." -Associated Press, 6 July 1996
Lebed was now a powerful, political figure, and Yeltsin took full advantage of his
popularity. Lebed's strong third-place finish in the first round of the presidential vote on
June 16 prompted Yeltsin to name him his national security adviser and secretary of the
security council. The appointment was a blatant political move by the Yeltsin
administration to consolidate Lebed voters to ensure that Yeltsin won the run off election
against his Communist challenger Zyuganov.
Yeltsin's slim advantage over Zyuganov made it necessary for him to form a
strategic alliance. Undoubtedly, Lebed's potential electorate, by its psychology and social
makeup, was very close to those ofZyuganov and Vladimir Zhirinovskiy. 224 Lebed's
success decreased Zyuganov's chances of winning and increased Yeltsin's chances of
winning tremendously.
Yeltsin's deal with Lebed turned out to be a brilliant move. Lebed was in the best
position to attract votes that otherwise might have gone to the Communists. The Yeltsin-
Lebed alliance was seen as the best possible union of the two men as far as the
practicalities of the election campaign were concerned. Even if a sizable portion of
Lebed's electorate was lost in the second round, the alliance was capable of drawing
223Lee Hockstader "Russian Democracy Gets Another Chance; But Potential for New
Kremlin Conflicts Remains After Ailing Yeltsin's Victory," Washington Post, 4 July 1996,
p. A01.
224Andrei Piontkowsky, "A Guide to Lebediana," Moscow Times, 9 July 1996.
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absentee voters from the first round into voting in the second. For many of Lebed's
followers his joining the President's team was a sign of Yeltsin's trustworthiness. 225
Lebed quickly became the Russian political figure to watch. His strong showing in
the first round of voting, and his subsequent elevation to the top security position in
Yeltsin's administration, put him in line to be the likely successor of Yeltsin, who was
having serious health problems.
Suddenly, around the world, everybody wanted to know who Lebed was. He
became known as a king-maker and a proclaimed czar-in-waiting. At the end of the first
round, both Yeltsin and the Communists attempted to win Lebed's favors and his eleven
million votes. But questions soon arose. Why did Yeltsin, who once forced Lebed into
early retirement from his army command for his outspoken views of the administration
suddenly suggest that Lebed was his favorite political "son" and his apparent successor?
Why did even the Communists, whom Lebed had, in the past, denounced as "imbeciles,"
offer him the post ofPrime Minister if they won?
Many asked Lebed why he decided to support Yeltsin, whom he often criticized.
Lebed described communism - the politics of Yeltsin-challenger Gennady Zyuganov - as
an old idea that has cost millions ofRussian lives. In contrast, Lebed said, "I support the
idea by which the whole world lives," meaning the free-market economy. 226
Lebed also made it clear that he was different from the other officers who had
political ambitions. He suggested his agreement with Yeltsin was a way to achieve his
greater goal of reforming the once-mighty Russian army. He said, "I tried to change
something from the bottom," referring to his efforts to reform the military from within.
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Lebed's arrival in the Kremlin was dramatic. He took the job of Secretary of the
National Security Council not only with confidence, but with a certain degree of
arrogance. Lebed quickly grabbed center stage, boldly asserting his strong views on
national security, privatization, banking, tax policy and religion, raising some doubts about
his reputation for reform and tolerance. 228 The presence of a loose cannon in the Kremlin,
however, did not bode well for political stability in Yeltsin's new presidential term. 229
Even after Lebed joined the Yeltsin team as the president's national security
adviser and the head of the Security Council, his campaign headquarters had an anti-
Yeltsin flavor. One poster read, "Yeltsin equals freedom without order, Zyuganov equals
order without freedom. Lebed equals freedom and order."230
There is no doubt that Lebed's sudden rise in politics fundamentally upset the
balance between President and power structures, in place since early 1992. 231 So what
exactly were Lebed's new responsibilities?
The National Security Council, according to Yeltsin's new decree, was responsible
for implementing the president's authority relating to securing the freedom and rights of
citizens, the protection of sovereignty and the independence and integrity of Russia. 232 In
228
Ibid.
^Thomas de Waal "Autocratic Rule Carries Risk of Political Chaos," Times (London), 4
July 1996.
230Michael R. Gordon, "A Sharp Struggle for Power Erupts Among Yeltsin's Aides,"
International Herald Tribune, 6 July 1996.
^"Ruthless moves head off communist revival," Jane's Defence Weekly 26, no. 2, 10 July
1996, p. 8.
^The council was created by Yeltsin in the summer of 1991 as a central consultative
body. From the beginning its authority was wide-ranging and
covered nearly all aspects of politics. The secretary of the council reports only to the
president and proposes to him the names of the members. The chairman of the National
Security Council is the president himself. Lebed as secretary was in charge of day to day
business. The council has the authority to make suggestions for all measures affecting the
security of the individual citizen, the society and the state. According to the Moscow
Interfax news agency, the council also drafts operative decisions to prevent social,
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the United States, the Security Council deals with foreign policy, and the national security
adviser is an insignificant figure in domestic politics. In Russia, the Security Council
includes the heads of the police as well as the military, and it is far more involved in
domestic security issues and foreign policy toward the former Soviet republics than
foreign policy toward the West.
Lebed's appointment displaced both the National Security Advisor to the President
and the Secretary to the Security Council. Lebed was also given virtually all control of the
"power structures" - the ministries of defense, internal affairs, federal security service, and
Federal Border Service. 233 Although almost immediately, Yeltsin created a defense council
to keep Lebed in check.
Lebed's appointment was confirmation not only of his growing influence but also
of an authoritarian tendency within a political system that, elections notwithstanding,
remained a curious hybrid of authoritarianism and democracy. 234 The US treated the
Russian election as a struggle between good and evil, between reform and a return to the
past, and treated the Lebed -Yeltsin alliance with optimism.
With his look of a cool and professional soldier, Lebed captured the public's
imagination. After winning the vote for Yeltsin, he was dismissed just four months after
his appointment. Still, Lebed stood to become the most politically viable presidential
figure for the Russian electorate in the 21st century. 235
economic, military and ecological crises. It is further charged with defining the vital
interests of the society and the state. Sessions of the National Security Council are
attended by the Prime Minister, the Ministers for Defense, Interior and Foreign Affairs, the
domestic intelligence chief and the foreign espionage director. See Deutsche Presse-
Agentur, 10 July 1996.
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D. THE GREAT PURGE OF 96
"God created people big and small. Colonel Colt invented his revolver to even things
out." - Lebed on Mayak Radio Network, Moscow, 24 June 1996.
Yeltsin paid a high price to convince Lebed to join his team. For some incumbents
in Yeltsin's administration, the appointment of Lebed as National Security Advisor was
disastrous. Within two days after arriving in the Kremlin, Lebed took a leading part in a
broad reorganization of the government. With Yeltsin's approval, he fired the head of the
Federal Security Service, the defense minister, the head of the presidential guard, a top
aide and seven army generals. Lebed dismissed the leading members of the inner circle that
the President had assembled around him since August of 1991 . All of them resented any
intrusion by Lebed into their domain. 236 The first sacrifice to appease Lebed was the
removal of his old rival Defense Minister General Pavel Grachev.
Lebed's reason for Grachev's dismissal was that he had allegedly attempted to
mount a "third coup" during the night of 17-18 June with the help of some of his close
confidants. The claims of a coup were doubted by Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin
and a number ofDuma deputies, including former Foreign Minister Kozyrev. 237 Grachev
himself said that Lebed "clearly tried to settle a score with him." 238
Whether Grachev was involved in a coup plot or not, the Russian press quickly
announced the dismissal by Lebed of a group of Grachev's "friends." 239 The seven generals
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worked closely with the defense minister, and they complained that the dismissals were
carried out without being told why they were being fired. Defense Ministry staff argued
that the action was reminiscent of the purges perpetrated by Stalin and Khrushchev. 240
The post-election purge was not confined to Grachev's entourage. The hard-line
Chief of the Main Security Guard Directorate, Col Gen Alexander Korzhakov, was also
removed, along with his friend
,
Director of the ex-KGB internal security service (now
known as the Federal Security Service) Army General Mikhail Barsukov. 241 The last to go
was First Deputy Prime Minister Oleg Soskovets, in charge of the military industrial
complex and nuclear energy. These leaders were extremely unpopular with the Russian
public, which largely blamed them for instigating and prosecuting the war in Chechnya. 242
After removing the likely trouble-makers among Yeltsin's Kremlin circle, Lebed
announced his intention of carrying out "a serious reorganization of the apparatus of the
Security Council". 243 Lebed said he was "free of megalomania", but he planned to institute
coordinated policies to replace a system "whereby each power ministry used to act
seemingly independently, but if martial law or a state of emergency was introduced, the
whole system turned into a single fist". 244
Col Gen Vladimir Shulikov, Deputy Commander-in-Chief (Armaments) Ground Forces.
Another close associate of Gen Grachev who subsequently became a casualty was Lt. Gen
Sergei Zdorikov, Chief of the Main Directorate for Educational Work.
^Igor Chernyak, "Platoons Of Generals Will Be Fired," Komsomolskaya Pravda, p. 2, in
Russian Press Digest, 2 July 1996.
241The removal of Gen Korzhakov coincided with a reorganisation of the Main Security
Guard Directorate. A Presidential decree redesignated the former Main Security Guard
Directorate as the Federal Security Guard Service, and appointed Lt Gen Yury Krapivin
its first head. Col Anatoly Kuznetsov replaced Gen Korzhakov as the President's personal
bodyguard. "Ruthless moves head off communist revival," Jane's Defence Weekly 26, no.
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Lebed regarded purging corruption within the power structures as merely the first
step towards reform. In addition to wanting to maintain the 'single fist', Lebed also
visualized "a single system for the country's defense". 245
Emphasizing his growing thirst for power, Lebed suggested that the constitution
be amended to make him Vice President. Lebed's new appointment and Yeltsin's promise
to incorporate some of Lebed's ideas into his program created the suspicion that Lebed
was serving as an informal Vice President already. Although Lebed was not officially in
the line of succession to Yeltsin, he obviously thought he had the support to make this
happen in due course. 246
Lebed's strategy for expanding his power was both combative and cunning, not
surprising since boxing and chess were always his favorite pastimes. 247 He demanded
control over the "power structures" and formation of a government, but this was authority
that previously only belonged to the President and the Prime Minister.
He repeated his earlier demands for a large role in economic affairs, saying he
wanted to have a say in virtually all aspects of national policy. 248 Lebed maintained he
deserved a role in economic policy because it affected national security, but Alexander
Livshits, Yeltsin's chief economic aide, insisted that full responsibility for economic
matters would remain with Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin.
Recruiting Lebed was Yeltsin's last ditch method of salvaging his political career.
Yet immediately after the election, Yeltsin had to deal with this minister whose popularity
and ambition quickly became a liability.
'"Ibid.
^Mikhail Leontyev, "Coalition Of Presidents," Segodnya, p. 1., in Russian Press Digest,
19 June 1996.
^"Lebed Attacks Power Transfer, Says Yeltsin Should Step Down During Illness," New
York Times, 29 September 1996, A2.
248AP Worldstream, Moscow, 9 July 1996.
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E. LEBED MAKES PEACE IN CHECHNYA
Although it was difficult to categorize Lebed's political philosophy, he was an
outspoken critic of the Chechen war from the beginning. Lebed was the nation's most
famous politician to denounce the conflict. After Yeltsin chose Lebed as his chief military
and security official, many thought the best hope for peace yet had arrived. Even skeptics
assumed the fighting could finally stop. 249
While some said he was a nationalist who believed in an expansive Russia, Lebed
was unflinching in his calls for the war to end. 250 So not surprisingly, as one of the first
actions as Yeltsin's national security adviser, he traveled to the war-torn region to make
peace. It was a mission that was expected to bring discredit upon him. Just as Lebed was
supposedly sent to Moldova to flounder in an ethnic conflict as a check to his mounting
political appeal, he was given the task shunned by every government official in Moscow.
As in Moldova, he did not fail.
Lebed successfully concluded a peace pact with the Chechen military chief of staff,
Asian Maskhadov, that ended more than 20 months of bloodshed. Without committing
Moscow to granting Chechen independence, the settlement called for demilitarization of
the shattered republic and a "cooling-off' period of as long as five years before the
sovereignty question was decided. 251 The agreement was greeted around the world with
approval, relief, hope and even jubilation. It boosted his popularity among Russians but
met with harsh resistance in Moscow from politicians who accused him of selling out the
Russian army. 252
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Lebed was effective in Chechnya because he was the first senior Russian leader to
admit what was obvious to anyone who had been in the region: the Russian Army was
being decimated by dedicated Muslim guerrillas. 253 Since the war began, Lebed was one of
the few Russian generals who had the courage to condemn it. More than 50,000 people
were killed during this Yeltsin-backed war and 300,000 made homeless in a region with a
total population of about a million. 254 As an army airborne commander in Afghanistan he
had seen it all before, and in September 1995 he prophetically vowed, "I am the man who
can stop the war." 255
Lebed once called the military operation a "national disgrace." Comparing the
Russian Army to the United States, he said, "By American standards, losing 20 per cent of
the hostages in an operation is considered unsatisfactory... It is interesting - what standards
operate here?" 256 The war itself convinced many people that a Yeltsin victory was
impossible. In February, 1996 Yeltsin said publicly that unless he found a way to end the
ruinous conflict, he would never win re-election. Shortly afterward he declared a cease-
fire, although fighting actually increased. 257
Lebed frequently told foreign reporters that he would not mind seeing Chechnya
attain its long-stated goal of becoming a separate country. With the Russian news media,
^Michael Specter, "Shake-Up in Russia: The Overview; Yeltsin Angrily Announces
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1996, p. Al.
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however, he sounded more like Yeltsin, saying it made little sense to separate Chechnya
from the rest of the nation. 258
In negotiating the peace agreement, Lebed obviously benefited from his experience
as a commander of Soviet forces in Afghanistan. As a military man, he could not help but
see that Russian troops could never achieve any military success in the war. 259 He believed
that Chechens should have a right to determine their own statehood by referendum. He
also insisted that Yeltsin should pull out Russian troops and cut Chechnya out of the
budget. 260
Chechens and Russians alike cheered Lebed for negotiating the settlement for the
shattered republic, but some observers warned that his political fortunes were riding on
the success ofwhat could prove an unmanageable agreement. According to Dzhabrail Z.
Gakayev, director of the Chechen Cultural Center in Moscow and a professor of
anthropology, "Lebed may have achieved peace in Chechnya too fast and too simply for it
to last."
261 Once he achieved the peace, all the elites in Moscow turned against hirn—
Lebed had betrayed the Russia they saved.
F. LEBED IS DISMISSED
"I don't know how to bow down to power." - CNN, 17 October 1996
Yeltsin's decision to distance himselffrom the man who almost by himself managed
to bring the ruinous war in Chechnya to a halt, and who polls showed was Russia's most
^Ibid.
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popular politician, had become almost inevitable. 262 In a nationwide survey in September
1 996, Lebed was called Russia's most trusted politician with more than twice the rating of
Communist leader Gennady Zyuganov, who came in second. Yeltsin was a distant fifth. 263
After his appointment, Lebed clashed frequently and publicly with Prime Minister Viktor
S. Chernomyrdin and the presidential chief of staff Anatoly B. Chubais, with whom he had
been running the country in the absence of the ailing President. 264
Therefore, just four months after publicly embracing him as a political heir, Yeltsin
angrily appeared on national television and dismissed Lebed. Yeltsin said his behavior and
outspokenness were damaging to the country. 265 In his address to the nation, the President
said Lebed had made "several mistakes" which were "inadmissible and detrimental to
Russia. " 266 He criticized Lebed for his inability to establish and maintain good contacts
with other key government officials and work together in a team.
Yeltsin also expressed his displeasure with the fact that a situation had developed
as if an election race were going on already, although the next election was four years
away. Even Prime Minister Chernomyrdin accused Lebed of possessing a "Napoleon
^^chael Specter, "Shake-Up in Russia: The Overview; Yeltsin Angrily Announces
Dismissal of Aide He Hailed as a Likely Political Heir," New York Times, 18 October
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complex," 267 incorporating "irresponsibility and incompetence that are clearly brimming
over, especially lately." 268 In fact, Lebed attempted to resign weeks before, but at the time
Yeltsin "urged him to be patient and learn to get along with others. M269
Yeltsin accused him of excessive ambition and complained that Lebed made
decisions without consulting the president and the rest of the government. 270 "There has to
be a united team" to govern the country. "The team should pull together, work like a fist.
But now we have a situation whereby Lebed is splitting the team apart. This is totally
unacceptable." 271
Most likely, one of the biggest factors in Lebed's dismissal was Yeltsin's health. At
the time, an ailing Yeltsin was awaiting a serious and much-postponed heart operation,
and the struggle to succeed him became intense. This battle—mainly between
Chernomyrdin, Chubais, and Lebed—made coherent government impossible. It also
ensured a bitter struggle to control the security forces, whose support in the event of
Yeltsin's death would have been very important. 272
The President was also displeased at Lebed's contacts with his former chief
bodyguard Alexander Korzhakov. 273 Korzhakov had accumulated unprecedented power
^^Michael Specter, "Shake-Up in Russia: The Overview; Yeltsin Angrily Announces
Dismissal of Aide He Hailed as a Likely Political Heir," New York Times, 18 October
1996, p. Al.
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and influence inside the Kremlin until he was removed in the purge before the run off
election. In his televised address, the President mentioned their recent joint appearance at
a public ceremony in the city of Tula with visible outrage. 274
On the one hand, Lebed may gain much support from his dismissal. The Russian
people, while extremely weary of politics and elections, are always attracted to principled
leaders who have been sacrificed by their bosses. 275 His dramatic dismissal could energize
voters and allow Lebed to rally public discontent and disgust over government-as-usual. 276
Yeltsin knows that better than anyone, because he was in the same position in 1987, when
Mikhail S. Gorbachev purged him from the ruling elite of the Communist Party. This act
solidified his popularity with the type of average voters who later said they supported
Lebed.
On the other hand, Lebed lost an important platform for his statements and ideas.
As secretary of the Security Council, he got a lot of press coverage when he criticized the
government. As an outsider, he will continue to get coverage, but not as extensive as he
used to get.
Lebed made it clear Russia had not seen the last of him. He said he will come to
power in the next election so he can clean up the mess this country's in. 277 Lebed said, "I
honestly tried to do all I could to stop the war, to carry out military reform, to organize a
war against crime, but it's useless when people with rotten cores head law enforcement
structures."
278 Lebed was also free to attack the economic program of Chernomyrdin and
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Chubais, since he detested them both and felt they helped create a climate where cronyism
and corruption were as common as capitalism and commerce. 279
Lebed's dismissal was anything but unexpected. He was taken into Yeltsin's team
to ensure victory in the elections. After he served that purpose, he was dismissed. No
other figure in Yeltsin's administration had anything approaching Lebed's appeal to the
public as an incorruptible outsider in Kremlin politics. 280 No other figure had his potential
to forge a nationalist and ex-communist coalition, without directly threatening the big
private economic interests. 281 Lebed became just too dangerous to keep anywhere near
real political power.
G. ALLIES AND ENEMIES
"Yes, I have many enemies. Many enemies adorn a man."
-Die Woche (Hamburg), 1 December 1995
The extraordinary rise of Lebed, like all politicians, would not have been possible
without the strong support of close friends and associates. Likewise, his adversaries also
played an important part in defining the role that Lebed would play for the Russian people.
An analysis of his allies and enemies is especially relevant after the bitter political struggle
that erupted soon after his appointment to Yeltsin's administration, ending in Lebed's
dismissal.
1. Bergman, Krivilev, and Skokov
Lebed actually began his political career when he was commander of the 14th
Army stationed in Moldova. At that time, he relied mostly on a group of senior officers of
his army. The most valuable of these officers was the region's military commandant at the
279Michael Specter, "Shake-Up in Russia: The Overview; Yeltsin Angrily Announces
Dismissal of Aide He Hailed as a Likely Political Heir," New York Times, 18 October
1996, p. Al.




time, Colonel Mikhail Bergman. Under Lebed in the 14th Army, Bergman and other
officers supplied materials compromising Trans-Dniester President Igor Smirnov and
Security Minister Vadim Shevtsov. 282 On the basis of those documents, Lebed attacked
the local authorities, accusing them of corruption practices and other wrongdoings. They
protested, saying Lebed interfered in the domestic affairs of a foreign state. 283 But Lebed
persisted and soon he became known across Russia as an intrepid corruption fighter.
Following his forced resignation from the army, Lebed started exploiting the newly
acquired image of a victim of anti-corruption activities and a staunch "fighter for the
truth." In August 1995, he set up a new movement called "Honor and Motherland." At
the movement's founding conference, his close associates formed a team which included
several 14th Army officers and some Moscow friends. 284 At the head of the team was
retired General Vladimir Krivilev, whom Lebed met three years earlier during a military
exercise. Krivilev became Lebed's chief policy adviser. Eventually, that team became the
backbone of Lebed's parliamentary and presidential campaigns.
Soon Yuri Skokov, leader of the Congress of Russian Communities (KRO), gained
the support ofLebed and his Honor and Motherland movement. The later split between
Lebed and Skokov eventually resulted in KRO's crushing defeat at the December
parliamentary elections. The only reason Lebed was elected as a Duma member was
because of his decision to run simultaneously on an individual ticket. Krivilev asserted
that Skokov plotted with foreign and home intelligence services to remove Lebed from the
political scene because he was the "carrier of the Russian national idea." 285
282







It is quite possible that this was the real reason intelligence and security service leaders
Korzhakov, Barsukov and Soskovets were dismissed in the purge after Lebed's arrival in
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In the wake of the KRO fiasco, Lebed said that he would "try to make a pact" with
the Communists, who had swept the election. 286 The fact that Lebed apparently seriously
considered an alliance with the victorious Communists in December 1995 suggests that his
main operating principle when it came to allies was flexibility. Adaptability, and not
democracy, was indeed one of his stronger attributes throughout his rise in politics.
2. Role Models: Lenin, De Gaulle, and Pinochet
Lebed's role models are also questionable to those who are looking for a leader
who might follow in Yeltsin's footsteps. Interestingly, Lebed admires the founder ofthe
Soviet state, V. I. Lenin: "Lenin was the only man in our history who combined theory and
practice in Russian politics." 287 Evidently, Lebed venerates him despite numerous
revelations in the Russian media about Lenin's personal involvement in hostage executions
and the mass murder of Russian peasants, military officers, clergy, and intellectuals during
and after the Russian Civil War.
Other leaders whom Lebed admires include Charles De Gaulle and former Chilean
dictator, General Agusto Pinochet. 288 On who he would like to emulate, the most frequent
leader Lebed cited was Pinochet. He once expressed admiration for how General
Pinochet brought order to Chile while having to kill "only 3,000 people." 289 Lebed himself
was often called a possible "Russian Pinochet" by the Moscow media, although after
entering politics ne adhered neither to Pinochet's free-market policy nor to his anti-
286Jonas Bernstein, "The Making Of Russia's Star General In Kremlin," Moscow Times, 28
June 1996.
287Svetlana Gamova, "Alexander Lebed: sama zhizn zastavliayet generalov zanimat' sia
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Herald, 4 July 1996, and Ann Leslie, "Whatever Russia's Election Result, Lebed is the
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communism. Slowly, however, Lebed came to appreciate a free market economy and has
spoken out against communism.
Lebed's role model from the West was another general-turned-politician, Charles
De Gaulle, because he "restored France from the ruins." 290 Although he occasionally
resented the West, he also appreciated comparisons to American General Colin Powell.
Lebed met General Powell when the former chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff
visited Lebed's elite paratrooper division in Tula in 1991. In an interview he said that it
would be "fantastic," if they ended up on opposite ends of the Kremlin-White House hot
line. He explained, "We are both patriots and professionals, and we understand what war
really means."
291
The fact that both men were generals was about the only semblance between the
two, but Lebed respected that fact a great deal: "Powell knows the price of life and the
price of blood. As professionals, we hate war most of all. All wars are started by people
who never had to serve, by people who know their children and their grandchildren would
not be participating." Maybe the common link is that Powell and Lebed, according to an
American journalist, both "project incorruptibility to two societies that have come to
doubt the morality and honesty of their political leaders." 292
3. Dyushin, Berezovsky, and Golovkov
During the presidential campaign, new allies emerged. They were government
officials and financiers, the most prominent being Viktor Ilyushin, President Yeltsin's chief
aide, and Boris Berezovsky, President of the powerful LogoVAZ group and owner of a
huge share of the Russian ORT Television Network. In 1993, the company's turnover
amounted to 250 million dollars, and it was Berezovsky who actually financed Lebed's
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election campaign. 293 After Lebed was dismissed, he turned on Berezovsky, accusing him
of conspiring to get him out of the way. 294
Soon, a group of professional image-makers was hired to work on Lebed's new
image. The group was headed by Alexei Golovkov, the Duma member who organized
campaigns for Russia's Choice in 1993, presidential campaigns in Tajikistan and Belarus
and governor elections campaigns in some Russian territories. Director of the Institute for
a National Model ofEconomy Vitaly Naishul wrote Lebed's presidential election platform,
called "Truth and Order." In it, Lebed was presented as a "general-politician capable of
putting an end to the current mess in the country. " 295 Journalist Leonid Radzikhovsky
coined Lebed's catchy slogans which soon became very popular across Russia. Campaign
manager Yulia Rusova headed Lebed's propaganda department. 296 Joint efforts by all these
people resulted in boosting Lebed's rating dramatically.
When Lebed was appointed Secretary of the Security Council, Golovkov's team
stepped aside. Policy decision-making became the responsibility of a group of advisers
headed by General Krivilev. 297
4. Grachev
No analysis of Lebed's allies and enemies can be made without mentioning the
name of army general and former defense minister Pavel Grachev. The rivalry between
Lebed and Grachev was not just conflicting political ambitions. More than that, it
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involved a clash of personalities that was played out in a stylized drama upon the hearts
and minds of Russia's armed forces. 298
Early in their careers, Lebed and Grachev were inseparable. In the early 1970s,
Lebed was Grachev's deputy at the Ryazan paratrooper school. Lebed and Grachev were
mobilized together to fight in Afghanistan, and both were honored as Heroes of the Soviet
Union. When Grachev moved up the ranks to command Russia's airborne forces, again
his deputy was Lebed.
After the August 1991 coup, when the emergency committee tried to seize power
from then Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev, Lebed and Grachev became bitter enemies.
They began feuding in private and public until the day Lebed was able to take final
vengeance and force Grachev from the Kremlin. Their first disagreement was on what to
do with Lebed's airborne division that Lebed had ordered to surround the Russian
parliament building. For years, Lebed claimed that Grachev wavered in his decision to
defend the building. After the failure of the coup, Grachev entered the circle of those
close to Yeltsin, and by the spring of 1992 he was appointed defense minister of the new
Russia.
The new commander of the airborne forces should have been Lebed, but for some
reason, he was not appointed. 299 Instead, Lebed was sent to command the 14th Army in
Moldova, where a civil war was beginning. Most likely, his new assignment was
Grachev's deliberate attempt to end Lebed's career. Grachev probably thought Lebed
would fail miserably trying to make peace in Moldova, and would start an international
scandal that would ultimately be blamed on Lebed. A Russian retired colonel who served
in military counterintelligence said, "This was a fatal mistake on Grachev's part. He
gravely underestimated the capabilities of his primary, future rival." 300
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Eventually, Grachev forced Lebed to resign in 1995. But Lebed's new career as a
politician was even more stunning. With a strong third place showing in the presidential
election of 1996, he was able to dictate terms in order to join Yeltsin's campaign for the
second-round vote. When Lebed came to the Kremlin, he not only had Grachev
dismissed, but the officers he had advanced within the Defense Ministry. Lebed had
achieved the final revenge.
5. Yeltsin
President Yeltsin served as both an ally and enemy throughout Lebed's rise in
politics. In both roles, Yeltsin boosted Lebed's popularity and political career. Lebed's
disagreements with Yeltsin are well known, the most popular being over the working
relationship Lebed had with the president and the rest of the government which ended
when Yeltsin fired him. But before his appointment to Yeltsin's administration, Lebed
appeared highly unlikely to ever reach satisfactory working terms with the President. On
final analysis, it was Yeltsin's decision to give Lebed power in the Russian government,
and it was Yeltsin's decision to take that power away.
After being promoted to lead the 14th Army in Moldova, Lebed did everything in
his power to undermine the new government there, often acting in defiance of his
superiors in Moscow, Defense Minister Grachev and Yeltsin. While still in the army, he
often referred to Yeltsin as "a minus." 301 In October 1993, when Yeltsin confronted a
mutinous parliament, he sided with Yeltsin. But as he watched the once-proud Soviet
Army collapse around him, Lebed became a bitter critic of Yeltsin's new Russia.
Lebed attacked Yeltsin's economic policy, foreign policy, and failing democratic
reforms. His dramatic rise to power, however, was similar in some ways to Yeltsin
himself. Similar to Yeltsin, Lebed was not a party politician and liked the roles of rebel
and independent. Journalist Carey Scott stated in the Sunday Times (London), that
Lebed's stubborn contempt for inept bureaucrats was strongly reminiscent of Yeltsin in an
earlier day:
^Larry Ryckman, "Russia's Most Outspoken General To Be Sacked," AP Worldstream, 4
August 1994.
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Many believed that Yeltsin teamed with Lebed because he saw so much of
himself in him. Both came from the provinces, growing up believing in
communism but later rejecting it. Both their fathers were caught up in
Stalin's purges and imprisoned in labor camps. Yeltsin's father was
imprisoned after he complained about canteen food, and Lebed's for twice
arriving late to his work as a carpenter. Both enjoyed a man-of-the-people
image, Yeltsin preferring Moscow trolley buses instead of limousines in the
early days of his rise to power and Lebed happy to let everyone know that
he lived in a deteriorated block of apartments rather than an exclusive
government compound. 302
The political alliance between the two was simply convenient for votes, and
destined for trouble. Both men were direct, stubborn and unaccustomed to sharing
power. 303 Yeltsin used Lebed to beat Zyuganov, and with that accomplished, Yeltsin made
the momentous decision to destroy him. The decision may backfire, because just as
Yeltsin once became Gorbachev's principal political rival, Yeltsin became Lebed's main
political competitor.
6. Chernomyrdin, Chubais, and Kulikov
Lebed's other enemies were the principal players in Yeltsin's administration—Prime
Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin, Yeltsin's chief of staff, Anatoly B. Chubais, and Interior
Minister Anatoly S. Kulikov, one of the two top Russian generals leading the war in
Chechnya.
Kulikov, one of the architects ofMoscow's brutal military campaign in Chechnya,
was almost as disruptive a force in Moscow as Lebed. 304 Two months after taking office
as national security chief, Lebed demanded the dismissal of Kulikov, arguing that Russia
could not afford to continue its costly offensive in Chechnya. Yeltsin instructed General
Kulikov he would stay in the administration. 305 Kulikov, as head of Yeltsin's Defense
Council, represented a critical balance to Lebed's power.
^Carey Scott, "Lebed Reaches for the Reins," Sunday Times (London), 7 July 1996.
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A day before Lebed was fired, Kulikov charged that Lebed was planning to use a
new elite group as a private army to stage a coup. It was a preposterous charge from one
of Lebed's most hated enemies, a man who repeatedly referred to Lebed's peace settlement
in Chechnya as "high treason." ^ Lebed denied the accusation and said he would soon
release evidence that Kulikov was personally responsible for mass murder while he
commanded Russian troops in Chechnya. 307
The Kremlin, Lebed told reporters, was not big enough for both him and Kulikov
and Yeltsin would have to choose between them. This was the second time that Lebed
made such a challenge, and the President could not ignore it. 308
Lebed also despised Chubais, the skillful bureaucrat who orchestrated Yeltsin's
1996 re-election. Chubais used Yeltsin's access to almost unlimited state and private
financing and control over Russian media to keep his rivals off balance and out of the
limelight.
309 Lebed maintained that Chubais had masterminded his fall from grace because
he "wants to be President." 310 Though it is unlikely that the deeply unpopular Chubais will
ever run for elected office himself, he surely will try to use his power and experience to
keep Lebed from ever ruling the country. 311 Chubais remained a strong influence behind
the scenes of government after Lebed's dismissal.
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Late in his tenure in the Kremlin, Lebed formed an alliance with Yeltsin's former
chief bodyguard, General Alexander Korzhakov. Korzhakov, who was Yeltsin's long-time
confidante, gave Lebed access to "compromising material" that Korzhakov once
threatened to disclose. 312 Korzhakov had gathered the material on his enemies during his
eleven years as Yeltsin's aide313
Yeltsin referred bitterly to Lebed's new political ally in his speech announcing
Lebed's dismissal, saying "He [Lebed] took Korzhakov to Tula." 314 In Tula, Lebed
presented Korzhakov as his future successor in the Duma. But the night before, Lebed
supposedly had a serious talk in the Kremlin, during which he promised not to make
friends with Korzhakov. 315 The well-connected and KGB-informed Korzhakov retained
considerable power and influence around the country ~ the kind Lebed felt he needed in a
presidential race. 316 But Korzhakov, unlike Lebed, was hardly a symbol of reform and
opposition to corruption. It was Lebed's tight contacts with the military and the dismissed
General Korzhakov that were believed to be last straw that compelled Yeltsin to fire
him. 317
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V. LEBED'S VIEWS AND POLICIES
IfLebed does become Russia's next president, just what does he stand for? During
his rise in politics, Lebed defended law and order, integrity, and a strong state. But this
does not help predict the kinds of policies he is likely to favor.
Does Lebed strongly believe in democracy? Not really. He once said he "could not
care less for democracy," and the ideas of his closest advisers suggests that the democratic
process remains low on his list of priorities. 318 He is convinced that Russia must be ruled
by a strong hand and quotes Plato to the effect that absolute democracy leads to
dictatorship and tyranny. 319 Lebed seemed to never talk about democracy — only about
restoring order: "Power must be strong. 'Patriot' will never be a dirty word, whereas
'democrat' has already become one.
"
In a way, Lebed's meteoric rise from ousted paratrooper general to president-in-
waiting was similar to Yeltsin's own turbulent arrival on the political scene. But unlike
Yeltsin, whose gospel was the destruction of communism and the introduction of
democratic reforms, Lebed was banging on a different drum. 320
Lebed's democratic credentials were vacillating at best. He once confessed that
"To conduct diplomatic negotiations with some parliament to receive power and to
maneuver is not my style." 321 He also described himself as a "semi-democrat," and
expressed his lack of faith in the parliamentary system. 322 During his election campaign,
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Lebed initially impressed US officials by his opposition to the war in Chechnya, Russian
expansion, and his new stated openness to NATO expansion. After his appointment to the
administration, however, he showed another side, making openly anti-Semitic statements
and criticizing Western religions. 323
Does he believe in the free market? Basically, yes, but not out of conviction.
Rather he is realist enough to understand that a market economy of some kind is the only
economic engine capable of making Russia powerful. 324 But the kind of market economy
he is likely to favor is not the kind that Yeltsin or the rest of his administration may have in
mind. He once said, "The Russians do not want the stagnation of advanced socialism or
degradation of capitalism - we want our own Russian way of development." 325 Lebed
stressed the country was in need of a policy of national pragmatism, and believed that
nothing short of a strong-handed policy could help achieve decent living standards.
Is Lebed a "nationalist?" Certainly. But what kind of nationalist is he? Nationalism
was a key to Lebed's rise in politics, and this appeal must be understood to understand a
possible future leader of Russia.
Lebed learned to be a politician, adjusting his positions to suit his voters.
Nowhere is this more apparent than in his nationalistic views. He started out as an
imperialist hard-liner, but than began articulating some of the most important concerns of
the Russian public. These concerns were fear of crime and corruption and humiliation and
regret about the collapse of the great Russian military. He voiced nostalgia for Russia's
great power prestige and a thirst for law and order.
Lebed later learned, however, that over 80 percent of the Russian public did not
support using the military in the New Independent States of the former Soviet Union, not
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even to assist ethnic Russians residing there. 326 The majority of Russians favored an
immediate end to the war in Chechnya, and most even favored Chechen independence if
that was the price for bringing the Russian troops home. 327 Lebed apparently was trying to
respond to these concerns, but at the same time keep nationalism as a distinctive part of
his program.
As a result, many of Lebed's statements seemed to contradict each other. As
commander of the 14th Army in Moldova, Lebed stated that the Slavic nations of the
former Soviet Union ~ Russia, Belarus and Ukraine ~ will find themselves together again
by the end of the century, possibly with Kazakhstan. "I'm deeply convinced of it," he said.
"It's like cutting flesh, and it can't go on like this." 328 Statements like that, and the actions
of the 14th Army as the perceived defenders of Russians cut adrift by the end of empire,
made Lebed a focus for wounded nationalism and right-wing politics in Moscow and in
the army itself. Yet two years later, Lebed repeatedly stated that although he believed in
unification, he was categorically opposed to the use of force to reunite the old Soviet
Union. 329
Basically, what Lebed said and what he signaled where not the same. Trying to
come to power, he often shaded the truth about the past, as he did with his role in
violently suppressing ethnic conflict in Azerbaijan and Tbilisi, Georgia. As a politician, he
had a steep learning curve when it came to doing what he perceived as right for the
Russian people.
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As an example, Lebed called recreating the Soviet empire a hopeless dream. 330 He
also sharply criticized Soviet rule in Central Europe, and considered the fall of the Berlin
Wall to have been an "act of common sense." 331 It is difficult to determine ifLebed
softened his views because he is a realist, or because of his learning process as a politician.
In contradiction, he alarmed Ukraine after claiming in an open letter published in
the Black Sea Fleet newspaper that the Ukrainian port city of Sevastopol belongs to
Russia. 332 He once called Russia and Ukraine two "organically linked" Slavic states. 333
Lebed also often called for Russian troops to be stationed in neighboring countries
such as Ukraine, demanding action to defend the rights of ethnic Russians living as
minorities in ex-Soviet states. 334 But Lebed proclaimed that he will not permit
"irresponsible experiments with the army" and suggested the creation of a "nucleus of the
mobile armed forces of Russia." 335 He idealizes the Russian Army as the only friend of the
nation, and writes at length of the need to revive it from its current disarray brought on by
"Russian traitors" inspired and financed by foreign countries eager to keep Russia weak. 336
In most of Lebed's 1995 autobiography he recounts his military career. During this
time he claims he was constantly confronted by difficult problems which baffled others,
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but thanks to his skill and ingenuity were always solved. 337 The implication is that he was
just the man to solve Russia's current problems. In the book he exhibits his personal
biases: he is highly critical of both Gorbachev and Yeltsin and he is even more critical of
General Pavel Grachev. The book, in effect his campaign autobiography largely contains
personal reflections and reminiscences rather than any focused political or strategic
vision.
Lebed's definition of the Russian people is inclusive and not based on ethnic
Russians alone. In fact, he sees as the first requirement for healing Russia is a "nationality
policy" which will unite the 132 "nations" in the country and citizens of all native religious
traditions. 339 At the same time, he sees foreign, particularly Western, influence on culture,
religion, and morals as something which is disruptive and must be resisted. Although
Lebed had never traveled to the West, he was extremely suspicious of it.
In Lebed's opinion, corruption among government officials and the growth of
crime were the main evils in Russia. He proposed to improve the efficiency of state
management by considerably reducing the number of public servants. He stated, "It is
necessary to break the taxes-officials-bribe-businessman chain." 340 In his view, it was the
former high party bureaucrats who simply stole state funds under their control and
privatized them for their own gain. Lebed's first priority to break this chain and protect
the common citizen was for "every corrupt functionary to be declared a state criminal,
starting with the police," whom he called mere "decorations." 341
337
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In his electoral policy document, Lebed promised to issue presidential decrees,
spearheaded against organized crime, which will make it possible, in his opinion, "to arrest
the chieftains of criminal groups using the existing information, and to undermine the
crime system." 342
On "putting things in order in the economy," Lebed suggested a reform of the tax
system with a view to making it most clear and easy to understand, as well as reforming
the banking sector and making the state play a more active role as a guarantor the
investment process. 343
Because of the way he entered government, Lebed gained the aura of a savior of
democracy. 344 This notion is misleading, especially considering his statements that the
parliament should be appointed by the president. Anybody who takes this idea literally
could be deeply disappointed.
A. FOREIGN POLICY
"Russia has something to oppose the widening ofNATO. We have rockets. They're
rusty, but they're rockets." -Moscow Times, 2 October 1996
In Russia, the president has far more power than parliament does. Under the
Russian constitution, the presidency dwarfs all other political institutions, and it is
ultimately the president who determines the country's domestic and foreign policies. If
Alexander Lebed is elected president, it will have widespread impact on world affairs -
though the impact may not be as severe as many Western analysts fear.
The greatest impact of Lebed as president is likely to be in foreign policy. Despite
popular dissatisfaction, market reforms are firmly established in Russia with more than 80
per cent of the workforce employed by at least partially privatized enterprises. Reversing
^"Presidential Candidates Background -- Lebed," TASS, 14 June 1996.
'"Ibid.
344,1A General More to Fear Than Greet," Moscow Times, 27 June 1996.
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this change in ownership would be practically impossible. 345 Lebed will probably moderate
his sometimes extreme speech if he becomes president.
Because he prefers to have a buffer zone in Central Europe, Lebed has always
objected to NATO enlargement. NATO experts expressed the hope that Lebed's impact
on Russia's foreign policy would be insignificant when he was in Yeltsin's administration,
since he would be responsible for handling the country's internal problems. 346 But even in
that post, Lebed threatened to retaliate against German business interests in Moscow if
NATO expanded to Russia's borders. 347
NATO enlargement was one issue, similar to his strong nationalistic rhetoric,
where Lebed softened his one time inflammatory language. He once warned that
expanding NATO eastward will bring on a third world war. He was most likely
exaggerating, but his real concern was that NATO is, by its nature, a military alliance.
The alliance, he believed, was directed at Russia. Lebed's response was that Russia must
bank on the leverage of nuclear weapons to keep the West from menacing its borders. A
nuclear war would be "a catastrophe for humankind" in which there will be "no winners,"
But ifNATO extends membership to former Soviet allies in Eastern Europe, "Russia will
be required to move to the tactics of nuclear deterrence," he said. "The result will be the
next abrupt spiral of the arms race." 348 NATO indicated it regarded Lebed as an advocate
of great- power ambitions and anti-western policies. 349 Lebed, however, does not refute
NATO's right to exist, just the motivation behind its urge to expand.
345 Chrystia Freeland, "When the Reds Turn to Brown," Financial Times (London), 21
October 1995, p. 8.
34eM. Podkopayeva, "Russia And Pinochet," Zavtra, p. 2, in Russian Press Digest, 3 July
1996.
^Carol J. Williams, "Russians Drawn to Both Sides ofMaverick Lebed," Los Angeles
Times, 14 October 1996, p. Al.
348 Joseph Albright and Marcia Kunstel, "Rising Russian General Warns of a New Nuclear
Arms Race," Austin American-Statesman, 12 November 1995, p. El.
M9M. Podkopayeva, "Russia And Pinochet," Zavtra, p. 2, in Russian Press Digest, 3 July
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After months of dealing with the issue in Moscow, Lebed moderated his views and
showed the world he was becoming a politician. On this stance, at least, he was learning
the art of political compromise. Instead of being openly critical ofNATO enlargement, he
in effect challenged the West to reconsider its options: "We will find ways of bringing to
the attention of the British and American taxpayers the fact that the creation and
improvement of military infrastructure in the Baltic countries will cost them roughly $100
billion... So if you have enough money and energy to expand, feel free." 350
Later during his time as national security chief, Lebed flatly added that the
prospect ofNATO expansion "does not bother me" and that he would find a way to
persuade Western taxpayers of the pointlessness of "paying absolutely enormous sums of
money to sustain a raised fist against thin air." 351
Unlike most of his colleagues, Lebed understood that NATO's enlargement was
inevitable and that, far from threatening Russia directly, the process will occupy the
western alliance for years. It may even cause more problems than it solves, especially on
the question of basing nuclear weapons. 352
Lebed wanted the issue ofNATO's enlargement to become a dilemma as soon as
possible. He did this by accepting enlargement as a "political" act but without the military
consequences of nuclear security. Lebed said the countries of Central Europe may become
members ofNATO provided that no western nuclear weapons are stationed on their soil
and no western military bases and armed forces exist there. 353 This difference would turn
NATO, a military pact, into a more political organization. By trying to block deployments
350ITAR-TASS World Service, Moscow, 18 June 1996.
351
Valery Begishev, "A Union ofTwo Politicians," Lesnaia gazeta, 25 June 1996.
352For example, NATO will take on security commitments in Eastern Europe just at the
moment when every member is cutting defense expenditures. This will cause many
problems at NATO headquarters in Brussels. The Russian foreign ministry also had this
view. See "Lebed and NATO - a closer look," Foreign Report, 1 August 1996.
353
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of nuclear weapons and western forces in Central Europe, Lebed tried to remove NATO's
reason for existence.
Lebed could easily disrupt what remains of the constructive US-Russian
relationship. His verbal attacks against Madeline Albright in September 1993, whom he
accused of intervening in Russian domestic affairs, clearly revealed that he favored a firm
policy toward the United States. 354
He also said that Russia's defense interests would suffer if it ratified the START-2
treaty.
355 According to Lebed, the political situation and balance of power in the world
today are quite different from those at the time when the treaty was signed, which is why
the ratification must be preceded by a thorough expert assessment. 356
Some in the US think that Russia needs a strong, authoritarian leader to introduce
stable capitalism, but Lebed would be unlikely to have an agreeable foreign policy. Lebed
has recently muted his hostility to the West, but his memoirs are contemptuous of Mikhail
Gorbachev and his advisers for their policy toward the West. In 1995, he called NATO a
drunken vandal in Bosnia and said the IMF loan to Russia was designed to finance the
354
Vladimir Shlapentokh, "The Enfeebled Army: A Key Player in Moscow's Current
Political Crisis," European Security 4, no. 3, (Autumn 1995): 417-37.
355A major development in reducing the threat of nuclear weapons and controlling the
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Leonard S. Spector, Tracking Nuclear Proliferation (Washington, DC: Carnegie
Endowment, 1995), 29.
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Chechen war. 357 By all indications, his biggest concern is the decline of the Russian state
and military.
On the subject of relations with the US, Lebed noted:
Relations with the USA will continue to play a significant role for Russia
In a whole number of aspects we can and must cooperate fruitfully. This
refers first and foremost to problems of nuclear security and the drain of
technology for the production of other forms of weapons of mass
destruction, to the development and the joint implementation of measures
to combat international terrorism and the spread of narcotics. But we need
to look at things soberly and realize that there are bound to be differences
in the interests of our two countries. 358
B. ECONOMIC POLICY
We have a market, but it is a market of bribes. Government officials are
trading in power. It does not matter to me if these officials are communists
or democrats. They are one and the same. I intend to take measures to
separate these two components.
-Official Kremlin International News Broadcast, 1 3 May 1 996
Lebed was conspicuously silent on the subject of economics throughout his rise in
politics. In the summer of 1995, the leader of the KRO, Yuri Skokov was quoted in the
Russian press as saying that Lebed "does not have enough education" in this field.
Beyond ritual attacks on Yeltsin's "shock therapy" and on a privatization process that
enriched thousands of totally unworthy Soviet managers, he offered few specifics.
When Lebed blasted the Yeltsin government for its "shock therapy" economic
reforms, he asserted, "We have no socialism, no capitalism, no kind of market. It's totally
unclear what the government wants." Lebed said the country must find "a third way, a
Russian way," to replace Soviet-style socialism and the disorienting market reforms of the
357
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Yeltsin era. "Capitalism will never succeed in Russia," he said, adding that a "social
explosion" would result if people were allowed to buy and sell land.
The beginning of the reform process, however, has already begun. However
suspect the figures, the magnitude of change over the past few years is remarkable. In the
economy the non-state sector is now said to employ more than 40% of the workforce;
70% of trade, catering and service industries, and one-third of large and medium
enterprises are said to be in private hands. 359 Russians still favor gradual economic reform.
Only on the issue of privatizing big enterprises has there been a swing, with a majority
now opposing it. 360
During his campaign Lebed avoided a common economic policy with other
members of his Third Force coalition. He declared, "There are three presidential
candidates, Lebed, Fedorov and Yavlinsky. Each of them has its own program and the
program has an economic chapter. I am not going to poach on anyone's ideas. I see no
point." 361
The basic components of Lebed's vague economic policy were: self-reliance, the
elimination of economic dependence, and encouragement ofRussian industry and
entrepreneurialism. Lebed envisioned a strong state sector, active restructuring of the
economy in the direction of developing science-intensive areas of production and the
reduction of raw material exports. 362 Some analysts have described this simply as
359Report by Russian Ministry ofEconomics, BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 5
March 1994.
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economic patriotism. Due to his inexperience with the subject, Lebed's views on
economic policy never had the chance to mature during the election campaign. 363
Initially, Lebed maintained that Russia's move toward capitalism turned "the
Motherland into a garbage pit for colonial powers," but later accepted the basics of
capitalism. Lebed made his most direct remarks about his economic policy during a May,
1996 press conference. The state, he maintained, has a strong position in a market
economy, but should not interfere with free trade:
In the state apparatus government officials fulfilled orders, they
implemented the law, they saw to it that all the other citizens in the state
observed the law. In theory, government officials should not meddle in the
affairs of the market. There is the market in which everything is determined
by the price, by supply and demand, by trade. Those who engage in trade
do not meddle in affairs of state administration. 364
At the same press conference, Lebed addressed the problems of illegal and unfair
privatization:
Today we have a nomenklatura monster. You can endlessly object to me
and say that we have privatized and corporatized enterprises. But where
are all these plant directors, these bankers moving over to? They are
moving over into the category of civil servants. Then he has the right to
decide to grant or to deny a credit, to delay repayment of a debt, to grant
premises or not, it is the civil servant who adopts decisions on the basis of
what he is promised or given. That isn't right. This is a monster. Until we
have killed that monster nothing good will come out of our efforts and we
will eke out a meager existence. There is no alternative. 365
Lebed's economic rhetoric during the Russian presidential election was very
different from that of other candidates. He was not the politician that tended to make
elaborate promises to attract votes, insisting, "I am not going to promise anything to
363
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anybody, I do not play these games." Lebed always tried to formulate even the most
complicated problems in a clear and understandable way: "I have long come to realize
that free cheese can be found only in a mouse trap... I suggest that we all work, work for
our own benefit. I shall give you a free hand. I shall give you protection, and we shall
work together. This is what I call proper order in the country." 366 Such statements,
however, added to his credibility in the eyes of voters who were disheartened with
unfulfilled promises. He attacked statism and social democracy, and insisted
"Nomenklatura capitalism is nothing but chaos. " 367
After joining Yeltsin's administration, Lebed issued a 22-page policy program
entitled "A New Approach to the Problems ofNational Security," which addressed
economic issues. Among other things, he said he would boost the state's role in the
economy and reshape reform policies to benefit the defense and agriculture industries. He
had a firm belief that "the main threat to national security is the lack of an economic
strategy and rational state regulation of the economy." 368
The document he issued outlined a series of economic initiatives designed to
increase national security, including measures to stem capital flight, more state control of
agriculture and an anti -corruption and tax evasion task force. 369 On the one hand, Lebed
was opposed to economic monetarism and the policy aimed at eliminating the budget
deficit. On the other hand, he supported the stepping up of agricultural reforms but
insisted on constant state control of the processes of land use.
While his economic policy remained vague and unfocused, Lebed was certain he
could not return to the Soviet system of a centrally planned economy. This system failed
366
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miserably and attempts to return to a central economy will collapse immediately. Lebed
certainly understood that the painful economic changes must continue. He told the
newspaper Trud, "Without a market and private property, people work much worse."370
The economic debate in Russia is not about the ultimate goal of "capitalism Russian
Style."
371 Even ifLebed becomes president, the debate is about how fast and in what way
Russians will achieve capitalism.
370Gwynne Dyer, "A Good Day in Russia: Yeltsin's Allies Will Give Country Stability at
the Centre," Ottawa Citizen, 6 July 1996, p. B2.
371
Philip Hanson, "The Future of Russian Economic Reform," Survival 36, no. 3, pp. 28-
45.
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VI. FOREVER A SOLDIER: LEBED EXPOSED
A. THE APPEAL OF LEBED
With his former boxer's battered face, and a voice like artillery fire, Lebed stood
out in Russian politics. It might appear that Lebed brought something new to the Russian
political landscape. He was the honest warrior against the powerful and corrupt in
Moscow. Russians seemed romantically drawn to the image of a defiant man on a white
horse who could solve their problems. If anything about his views and policies were new,
however, it was that they were a new mix of traditional political policies that have existed
for centuries.
One of the reasons for Lebed's popularity was that he radiated personal authority,
sincerity and openness that Russians generally appreciate. Also, most Russians saw Lebed
as a man who sacrificed his military career to save a people. Lebed was wronged by the
existing authority and that made him extremely well liked. His own career was a chronicle
of unrewarded sacrifice and betrayal by those he served. 372
What was the source of this battle-hardened warriors appeal? Most of all, Lebed
skillfully tapped into two major themes in contemporary Russian politics — wounded
national pride and the law-and-order crusade. This simple message convinced millions of
voters that he should be their next leader. 373 But taking a closer look, one can see that
Lebed appealed to more than just nationalism and the fight against corruption. He
appealed to Russians who shared all the values which he embodies. Together, history has
shown that the first two values are based firmly in Russian culture; the others are more
contemporary in origin for a Russian political leader. The values are: l)sovereign rule,
372Carol J. Williams, "Russians Drawn to Both Sides ofMaverick Lebed," Los Angeles
Times, 14 October 1996, p. Al.
373
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2)strong military power, 3)contemporary Russian nationalism, and 4) integrity and the
law-and-order crusade.
1. Sovereign Rule
About the presidency, I think it is fine. In Russia we had a czar, and then he
was replaced by the general secretary. Now we have a president. It is in
our tradition, and all one and the same. -Moscow Times, 4 July 1996
The first reason for Lebed's popularity was his belief of strong, autocratic—or
sovereign— rule. Lebed often called for stronger state power along with stronger defense
of Russian people and culture. The appeal was supported by Russian history, where the
sovereign ruler has always existed. That was true under the czars, and it was true under
the communists. In the Soviet Union the sovereign was the communist party, and it
claimed a monopoly on power. The party was even more centralized than the czarist
administration, and it too aspired to control the czar's vast empire. 374 Indeed, it remained
formally true until the spring of 1990, when Article 6 of the Brezhnev Constitution was
repealed and the communist party lost its constitutional hold on power. There is very little
sense, in the tradition of Russian political thought or in the practice of Russian
governments throughout the ages, that political authority needs to be constrained by
anything other than its own sense ofwhat is good or bad for the country or for itself 375
Russian history has shown that power is identified overwhelmingly with one
individual. Under the constitution, if the President dies or if he suffers from permanent
incapacity due to the condition of his health, the Prime Minister takes over as acting
374The communist party was at least as centralized as the czarist government in theory, and
more so in practice, owing to the party's origin in conspiratorial politics and to such
technical factors as improved communications and transportation. Merle Fainsod, How
Russia is Ruled, Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1963, pp. 39-48, quoted in
Rebecca V. Strode and Colin S. Gray, "The Imperial Dimension of Soviet Military
Power," Problems ofCommunism (Nov-Dec 1981): 7.
375 Rodric Braithwaite, "Russian Realities and Western Policy," Survival 36, no. 3
(Autumn 1994): pp. 11-27.
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president and elections are held within three months. That means the whole political
direction could change rapidly.
The new Russian President has powers that are only slightly less restricted than
Czar Nicholas I in the 1850s. The moment he is elected he dismisses the entire
government and appoints a new one. He has full responsibility for defense and foreign
policy and in some cases can dissolve parliament and rule by decree. 376
So far the Russian presidency has not evolved far from the Russian autocratic
tradition where the ruler continues to rule regardless of the fate of his administration.
Russia is still, in the words of Vitaly Tretyakov, the editor of one ofMoscow's best daily
newspapers, "A mixture of the authority of the Party apparatus and the monarch's
court."
377
Lebed repeatedly demanded that the president needs a strong, authoritarian hand.
Throughout his rise in politics, he campaigned for a return to more sovereign rule: "This
country has been without stern, sails and wind, and it needs someone at the helm. " He
believed that a more sovereign ruler is needed, but that democracy is inevitable. "We are
doomed to live in an authoritarian state until genuine democracy, which should not be
confused with anarchy, can be set up." In Russia, where there is no tradition of civil
society or the rule of law, the process of building a democratic modern state is bound to
take many years and undergo many false starts. 378
376A referendum on a new constitution in December 1993 secured Yeltsin himself these
powers of a democratically elected czar, which he won only by a narrow margin. The text
was decided after the President defeated his parliamentary opposition with tanks on the
streets ofMoscow two months before. In that confrontation, one of Yeltsin's main
opponents, his running-mate from 1991, Aleksandr Rutskoi, ended up in jail and the post
of vice-president was abolished. See Thomas de Waal "Autocratic Rule Carries Risk of
Political Chaos," Times (London), 4 July 1996.
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Lebed's message appealed to millions of common Russians. In a 1996 opinion
poll, 72 percent of the respondents favored "order" and only 9 percent "democracy." 379
Weary of corruption, organized crime and fallen pride, voters said they wanted strong
leadership and a new face - with a touch of the iron-fisted authority of old. 380
Historian Yuri Afanasyev insisted that there is an authoritarian legacy in Russia
that goes to "the essential nature of the Russian people. The double bondage of [the
czarist and communist] totalitarian heritage is most evident in the spiritual life of
contemporary Russia." 381 Lebed's appeal, it seems, is part of that spiritual life. The main
reason the Russian people have not escaped totalitarian systems, before or since 1917, has
been the lack of a civil society. The state monopolized every activity, and no separate
society existed apart from the state's control. 382 Lebed has even described the Yeltsin
regime as a democracy which is "totalitarian in essence" 383 Lebed believed that Russia
needed a president who will be a "master of his country," because a master would not
allow 42 per cent of the population to live below the poverty line. 384
In his memoir, Lebed emphatically portrayed himself as a man of decisive and
authoritarian action. He was forthright in his views of democracy, and for years he praised
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General Agusto Pinochet of Chile. In April 1996, he told the party convention nominating
him that the legislature should be appointed by the president, not elected. His campaign
ads described Yeltsin as a "worthy czar" but in decline, and said that "Czar Lebed," whose
powers "are on the upswing," is the only alternative to Yeltsin. 385
Though his personality is clearly authoritarian, he also professes to be an enemy of
big government. He not only opposed Communist Party control of the Army, but also of
the country as a whole. He defended the Army's actions in brutally suppressing a peaceful
demonstration in Tbilisi, Georgia in April 1989, but condemned the political leadership for
trying to use the Army for internal security. He had almost a mystical concept of the
nature and uniqueness of the Russian people, but did not postulate a mission for them of
saving the world - a claim that philosophical imperialists such as Dostoevsky and the pan-
Slav writer Nikolai Danilevsky frequently made. 386
Even with very little exposure to the West, Lebed's political intuition saw that
Russia is slowly and painfully becoming a democracy. He wants to be that democracy's
elected czar. 387 But the idea that Russia needs a determined and clear-sighted president
should not be confused with the notion that such a man must be unreasoning.
Modernization by tyranny is no more likely to work today than it did when Stalin tried it
half a century ago. 388 Lebed wrote in his autobiography, "Our Russian state is just being
born. We must purge it of the dirt of previous rulers. We must make it humane." 389
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2. Strong Military
"This is how the world is organized: It was based, it is based and it will be based on
force." - Vancouver Sun, 10 November 1995
The second reason for Lebed's extensive popularity among the Russian electorate
was his promise to restore the weak and depleted Russian military. As an army general,
he consistently maintained that the military situation was disastrous. He was one of the
most severe critics of the state of the Russian Army, which he found lamentable and close
to catastrophe. 390
Lebed described Russia's once-great military as a dwindling corps of "starving
soldiers" with no international respect. Lamenting on the growing rate of draft evasion, he
said, "A miserable situation has emerged in which we live in a country of 150 million, but
we can't even make an army of 500,000 soldiers." As chairman of the Security Council,
Lebed planned to implement vigorous military reform, abolishing the draft and creating an
all-volunteer, professional Army.
Early in his political career, Lebed moved on his own to mobilize the military vote
by creating a military-patriotic lobby, Honor and Motherland. The movement aimed to
take advantage of discontent in the officers corps over the lack of housing and the low
stature of the army in post-Soviet Russia.
In Russia and the Soviet Union, military and geopolitical factors always took
precedence over economic considerations. 391 Power came to be seen as the addition of
390Lebed charged that the Russian Army was in deplorable condition and that assertions by
the military leadership to the contrary had no basis in reality. He also said that defense-
related legislation passed in Russia was useless because its provisions were not enforced.
In addition, he also criticized the parliament for laws that drastically reduced the army's
available conscript pool; he claimed that many units withdrawn from abroad were in
disarray and not battle-worthy. He also called for Russia to export more arms. See
Pravda, 24 August 1994. Quoted from Vladimir Shlapentokh, "The Enfeebled Army: A
Key Player in Moscow's Current Political Crisis," European Security 4, no. 3, (Autumn
1995): 417-37.
391Hannes Adomeit, "Russia as a 'Great Power' in World Affairs: Images and Reality,"
International Affairs 71, no.l, (1995): 38.
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quantitative indicators, such as size of population, the volume of industrial output, the
geographical expanse of empire and the number of divisions, tanks, aircraft, missiles and
nuclear warheads. Being equal meant having just as many divisions and arms as all other
potential adversaries combined. Lebed's military talk impressed the millions of Russians
who longed for the superpower days. Russians have the idea that military power can be
transformed into political influence and that growing arsenals translated into enhanced
status, prestige and power in international affairs. 392
In addition to its utility for legitimacy, a powerful military force has a strong
psychological effect on other states and on the Russian people themselves. Military power
demands international esteem and respect - which might not have been accorded to the
Soviet regime or the Russian government on the basis of its performance in other areas of
international competition. 393
Lebed repeatedly vowed to rebuild and expand the army. He once said, "The
world stands on power, and we have become toothless." He promised to restore respect
for Russia in the world. He told the newspaper Trud that Russia should "have troops that
would scare any aggressor off." To restore the Russian army, Lebed said he would
sharply reduce the number of conventional ground force divisions because most were
understaffed and not ready for battle. He suggested that Russia should have "10 times
fewer" divisions, and "a small, mobile army under the protection of the nuclear shield."394
Lebed believed that Russia would not have to be involved in regional conflicts with great
392Report of the European Security Study (ESECS), "The Political Rationale of Soviet
Military Capabilities and Doctrine," Strengthening Conventional Deterrence in Europe:
Proposalsfor the 1980s, (London: Macmillan, 1983), 67-104.
393Rebecca V. Strode and Colin S. Gray, "The Imperial Dimension of Soviet Military
Power," Problems ofCommunism (Nov-Dec 1981): 11.
394Joseph Albright and Marcia Kunstel, "Rising Russian General Warns of a New Nuclear
Arms Race," Austin American-Statesman, 12 November 1995, p. El.
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military powers before 1999, and for that period the strength of the armed forces
personnel could be cut down to 1.2 million. 395
He said this drawdown, however, was not a result of the changed global situation,
but "a result of our impotence." Russia does not have enough strength, including armed
force, to defend its national interests. "We follow in the wake of the policy of others. This
cannot last infinitely," he once said. In his view, as soon as Russia becomes independent
politically and economically, it will have to defend its national interests outside its
territory.
396 Although the risk that international problems will arise in Russia's Near
Abroad will grow with the growth of Russia's might, influence and prestige in the world.
Russia does need an army capable of defending its borders, and it needs a minimal
numerical strength required for maintaining a sufficient level of combat readiness.
Lebed's military appeal was often connected to his anti-NATO remarks. He was
suspicious of cooperation with the West and especially NATO. "If Russia and NATO
cooperate, who are they going to be against?" he asked during an interview. "There used
to be two systems, two military blocs. One system collapsed. Its military bloc collapsed.
And the other part remains in perfect operating order. That beautiful NATO bloc was first
aimed at the Soviet Union, and it would be a pity to abandon it. So, now it is re-aimed at
Russia." 397
He once believed that Russia, threatened by NATO, may be forced to set up an
alliance of its own. "It will make Russia denounce previous agreements and turn to NATO
tactics of nuclear deterrence," he said. "And that will eventually entail another arms race
and, at best, another Cold War." 398 Lebed described Russia as a disease that the rest of the
395
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world ignores at its peril. He once said, "Russia must be loved, but not because you want
to. Russia is like gangrene on the leg. If you don't take measures against it, it will infect
the whole leg."
Lebed's point is well taken. Not only does Moscow need a reliable and disciplined
Russian Army, so too does the rest of the world. It was easy to imagine during Lebed's
rise in politics a charismatic general either launching a coup or setting himselfup as a
dissident local warlord. Had he been willing, Lebed could have done so in Moldova. 399
When the army's morale and discipline are at their lowest, then it only takes a small
number of determined and disciplined fighters to achieve victory. This was something the
Bolsheviks realized when they seized power in 1917.
Even after his appointment to the Yeltsin administration, Lebed accused the
government of allowing the military to deteriorate to the point of mutiny. He in effect
accused the prime minister and other top aides of not doing their jobs. 400 His sensational
comments also kept him in the public eye and strengthened his ties with the Russian
military, which remained an important constituency in his struggle for power.
3. Wounded National Pride: Lebed's Use Of Contemporary Russian
Nationalism
"Lebed stole my act and he stole my votes. I should take him to court."
- Vladimir Zhirinovskiy, New Yorker, 22 July 1996
The third reason for Lebed's popularity was his use of contemporary Russian
nationalism. Lebed gained strength from the increasing nationalistic sentiment in Russia
and the sense that national pride was disheartened. He appealed to this sentiment in his
campaign speeches and in his earliest interviews with the media. In 1994, he alleged that
"The West is attempting to turn Russia into a cheap supplier of raw materials, a reservoir
399Mark Galeotti, "Russia's Rotten Army," Jane's Intelligence Review 8, no. 3 (1 March
1996): 99.
^"Lebed Attacks Power Transfer, Says Yeltsin Should Step Down During Illness," New
York Times, 29 September 1996, A2.
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of free labor, and a huge hazardous waste dump for the industrial world."401 Because
"Everybody is wiping their feet on Russia...Russia has to show her teeth."402 Lebed's
popularity followed in the wake of ultra-nationalist Vladimir Zhirinovskiy and the relative
success of his Liberal Democratic Party in the 1993 parliamentary elections.
Zhirinovskiy's victory may have led to the rise ofLebed and other nationalistic
candidates, and might have been the influence for the Russian government to pay closer
attention to the issue of nationalism and take more nationalistic positions. During 1995,
Russia's government began to shift to a more nationalist and anti-western stance, objecting
to NATO air strikes in Bosnia, opposing the eastward expansion of the NATO alliance
and pledging to fund the construction of a nuclear reactor in Cuba.
Using the two national themes, Russian "greatness" and protection of Russians
abroad, Lebed gained immense political support. Like most Russians and Europeans,
Lebed and his party did not like the label "nationalist," or even the word "national."403 His
nationalist rhetoric was sharp, but his views were more sensible than the bizarre threats of
Zhirinovskiy. Lebed's brand of mainstream Russian nationalism, while appealing openly to
the emotions, was more moderate than that of Zhirinovskiy and other figures on the
Russian right. Unlike them, he refused to promise to restore the Soviet Union or to turn
Russia back into a state for Orthodox Christians.
Also unlike many other hard-line candidates, Lebed appealed to the idea that all
sorts of peoples can be called Russian. This idea, which was different than the sharp
nationalism of Zhirinovskiy, had new appeal in the wake of the disastrous war in
Chechnya.
Lebed quickly became a more convincing figurehead of nationalism than the
clowning Zhirinovskiy, although some of his statements were just as bizarre and
^Lyudmila Felixova, "Dolzhna pritupit'sia bol'," Rossiyskaya Gazeta" 6 September 1994,
p. 1.
402
Alexander Mukomolov, "Alexander Lebed: '14 Armiya v Pridnestrovye-chistaya
politika," Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 27 October 1994, p. 1.
^Victoria Clark, "Russians Soften to Mr. Iron Fist," Observer, 1 October 1995, p. 23.
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unfounded. Lebed accused foreign advertising companies and multinationals of using
psychological methods to warp Russians' minds. He also lashed out at the influx of
foreign foods into Russia's market since the 1991 Soviet collapse, saying it "reached a
level of food aggression."404 Lebed became popular with nationalists, but apparently went
too far when he denounced the proliferation of American evangelist sects in Russia. His
description ofMormons as "mold and scum" provoked a swift protest from Washington. 405
Although Lebed was too realistic to advocate the restoration of the Soviet Union,
he did call for the reintroduction of Soviet-era visa restrictions for foreigners and controls
on their freedom to travel around the country. He suggested that foreign countries should
be categorized "in terms of their friendliness" to Russia and looked more to the East than
to the West for inspiration, emphasizing the need for building closer ties with China. 406
Lebed also believed that Russian intelligence is not doing enough abroad, and should step
up its activities.
a. Background
Lebed's nationalism blended in some new elements, but using nationalism
for political gain is certainly well known. Since the time ofNapoleon, the idea of the
"nation" and the driving force of "nationalism" have dominated the making and wielding of
political, economic, and military power in every kind of society and under every kind of
ideological banner. 407 In its most basic form, nationalism is a movement devoted to the
interests of one's own nation, based upon the folk idioms, history, aspirations and
culture.
408 Nationalism is therefore strongly tied to the idea of nationhood, whose standard
elements are a shared past and a shared common will. 409
^"Grab for power: While Yeltsin recovers from a cold, third-place presidential finisher
Alexander Lebed makes ambitions known," Calgary Herald, 3 July 1996, p. A5.
"""Beware Lebed the Bear," Sunday Times (London), 7 July 1996.
nbid.
407 Harold R. Isaacs, Idols of theTribe (Cambridge: Harvard, 1975) 173.
408
Stein, ed., The Random House College Dictionary (New York: Random House, 1980)
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Post-Soviet Russia is a perfect example of a nation struggling to create a
sense ofcommon identity among the people within its borders. For this reason, Lebed's
ability to stir a sense of common Russian identity - what it means to be "Russian" - might
well have a lasting effect on Russian politics.
b. Today's Russia
Political candidates appealing to Russian nationalism were increasing in
popularity throughout Russia in 1994 and 1995. Their appeal was due largely to nostalgia
for a time when Russia was a superpower, when the gaps between rich and poor were less
visible and crime was little known. They promised law and order, cheap housing, free
health care and education, a crackdown on "unearned" income and the return of "illegally"
privatized property. A letter in the pro-Communist newspaper Sovietskaya Rossia
summed up the nationalist argument: "State property has mostly fallen into the hands of
thieves, cheats and other scum. We are faced with unemployment and collapse." Lebed
was one of the many candidates that pledged a return to honor and dignity.
There are two common characteristics of contemporary Russian
nationalism. 410 The first is a sense of Russian "greatness" and the right and responsibility
to exercise Russian leadership within the Commonwealth of Independent States. The
second characteristic is a desire to protect and promote the interests of citizens not only
within the Russian Federation but Russian Federation citizens living outside Russia (maybe
with dual citizenship) and other ethnic Russians or even Russian-speaking populations
outside Russia.
Harold R. Isaacs, Idols oftheTribe (Cambridge: Harvard, 1975), 174.
410For a discussion of this definition, see James W. Morrison, Vladimir Zhirinovskiy: An
Assessment ofa Russian Ultra-Nationalist (Washington, DC: National Defense
University, 1994) p38, and William D. Jackson, "Russian After the Crisis. Imperial
Temptations: Ethnics Abroad," Orbis 38, no. 1, (Winter 1994): 16.
In a widely accepted definition, John Dunlop concentrates on the spectrum of
Russian nationalisht thought. He identifies the liberal-nationalist, the "centrists," the
"National Bolsheviks," and the neo-Stalinists. See Stephen K. Carter, Russian
Nationalism: Yesterday, Today, Tomorrow (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1990), 124.
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Other less significant features of new Russian nationalism are a sense of
pan-Slavism, and even less significant, a connection to the Orthodox Church. Evidence of
this was the Russian attitude of support toward Serbs in Bosnia. 411
c. Russian "Greatness"
Lebed emerged during a national crisis. Russia was a lost empire, where
everything was lost that the czars and Stalin had built. Like Weimar Germany, Russia
experienced a national humiliation by losing its superpower status. It was gripped by an
economic crisis, compounded by a rupture in its social fabric. 412 Also like Weimar
Germany, Russia sustained bloody political upheavals, most notably the dissolution of the
Soviets, in the fall of 1993, and the seemingly endless war in Chechnya.
Under these conditions, there is usually no other way to unite a country's
loyal forces than to appeal to patriotic feelings. Russians believe they are a great-power
nation. The call for the restoration of Russia's past greatness, therefore, was a natural and
almost expected claim. Many other candidates also appealed to national feelings, but all of
them tended to put ideological belief first and Russia second. 413
Historically, the Russian empire was created even before the Russian nation
was created, or at least along with it. Russians have never lived in a state that was
anything but an empire. 414 Russians found it difficult to distinguish between "Russia
proper," that is, their national homeland, and their czar's imperial possessions that were
4UMoscow remained adamantly opposed to lifting the arms embargo against Bosnia and to
the adoption of military measures against the Bosnian Serbs, above all NATO air strikes
on Serb gun positions. See Yuri N. Afanasyev, "Russian Reform Is Dead," Foreign
Affairs 73, no. 2, (March/April 1994): 46.
412 Gregory Freidin, "Post-Soviet Politics; Does the Communists' Rise Augur a 'Weimar'
Russia?," Los Angeles Times, 7 January 1996, sec. Opinion, p. 1.
413
"Pravda Endorses Congress of Russian Communities," Pravda, Moscow, 1 1 November
1995, p. 4, in BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 20 November 1995.
414
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not Russian in the same sense. 415 This confusion, in turn, made the Russians more
suspicious of their subject nationalities and their demand, which they treated as a threat to
the state's integrity. 416
In the Soviet Union and the Russian Republic ethnic feeling was intensified
by deliberate policies that combined the ethnic and political divisions in the federal
structure of the state. 417 Nationalism grew by frequently promoting national cultures and
languages. Ethnic minorities received preferential treatment within their own autonomous
republics - including ethnic quotas in regional administrations and in higher education.
During the parliamentary and presidential campaigns, Lebed, however,
remained virtually the only candidate in the nationalist field who did not use ethnicity as a
basis of Russian nationalism. 418 He was not what most scholars in the West would call an
"ethnic nationalist." He had the imperial consciousness of the "greatness" of Russia, and
that ethnic differences did not matter as long as those peoples were within the "Russian
empire." This consciousness was actually a pre-nationalist idea and reflects the history of
Russia as an empire but not the history of Russia as a nation or state.
Lebed gained popularity in his call for a return to the "greatness" of
Russia, and even Yeltsin thought he could become a supporter of this form of
nationalism. Yeltsin said, "Russia was and continues to be a great world power"419 that
415 Roman Szporluk, Communism and Nationalism: KarlMarx Versus Friedrich List
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988), 206.
416Richard Pipes, "Introduction: The Nationality Problem," in Handbook ofMajor Soviet
Nationalities, ed. Zev Katz (New York: Free Press; London: Macmillan, 1975), p.l, from
Roman Szporluk, Communism and Nationalism: KarlMarx Versus Friedrich List
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should rid itself of the "anti-imperialist syndrome" and not "shy away from defending our
own interests," even when such action would be criticized as "imperialist."420
While Lebed admired Chilean military dictator General Agusto Pinochet for
turning the Chilean economy around, and talked about the need for a strong leader, he still
insisted he would work within the confines of the constitution. Although Lebed shared
the hard-liners' preoccupation with Russia's lost power, he was not one of the neo-
Imperialists that advocated marching into Kazakhstan. He once called ultra-nationalist
Zhirinovskiy a dangerous fanatic. 421
As president, Lebed claims he would cut the Army's size and make it more
professional, thus abandoning the cherished Soviet ideal of a mass army. Lebed dreamed
of building a voluntary confederation by means ofwhich Moscow would gradually
reestablish its regional leadership. 422 While this, too, presents serious problems to the
sovereignty of the new states, especially Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan, it did not
differ greatly from the program advocated by Russian Nobel laureate Alexander I.
Solzhenitsyn and what was already being pursued by the Yeltsin government.
Although Solzhenitsyn is a bitter opponent of communism, his distaste for
Western culture was widely shared by leaders like Lebed and helped to explain rapidly
growing xenophobia and anti-Americanism in contemporary Russian society. This
resentment cannot be explained in purely rational terms; it is visceral, based less on what
the outside world does than what it is and represents. 423 Much of Russian society thirsts
for a social cohesiveness and national sense of purpose that are threatened by the
420
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421
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destruction of modern culture. As a politician reaching for the reins of power, Lebed was
quick to take advantage of the people's yearning.
d. Protection ofRussians Abroad
Because the Russian empire was landlocked, about 25 million Russians
now live outside Russia in parts of the former Soviet and czarist empire - what they now
call the Near Abroad. Nearly half of these people live in Ukraine. Russians comprise
more than half the population of Belarus, and a substantial part of the population of Latvia
and Estonia. 424 The northern part of Kazakhstan is mostly populated by a compact bloc of
Russians, who live much closer to the Russian towns of Siberia than to the capital of
Kazakhstan. 425
A combination of political and economic circumstances created significant
incentives for governments in the newly independent republics to pursue nationalistic
policies that redistributed benefits and opportunities to their own indigenous nationals. 426
These policies have created both anxieties and hardships for Russians and other minorities.
In addition, open hostility toward ethnic Russians increased in a number of republics. 427
Lebed insisted that Russia was not doing enough to protect the Russians
living in the other republics, and this issue became a recurring topic of campaign speeches
and interviews. Although he was categorically opposed to the use of force to unite ethnic
Russians, he supported the use of force to protect them. He once said Russia should solve
the problem of ethnic Russians living "outside the borders of their historic homeland" with
"any available means, including military." He even suggested turning off the gas supplies
424
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of new states to quickly make them understand how independent they really were. In
June, 1995, Lebed made a startling statement concerning the newly independent states:
People must be given the opportunity of feeling the burden of sovereignty.
If you want to be happy—be happy. Live. But if I sell you something, it
will be at world prices. And if you are unable to pay, I will turn off the
faucet. If such a policy were to be implemented, all these movements
towards sovereignty and independence would be sharply curtailed. Sit there
without gas, without oil, without coal, without timber. While I explain to
you in smooth Russian that you will sit out the rest of the century right
where you are. You have sovereignty to warm yourself, and independence
to eat.
428
Cynical statements like this contradicted his statements opposing the restoration of
the Russian Empire.
In his autobiography, Lebed explains his views on "how we arrived at
where we are." Unlike other popular nationalists, Lebed said years of incompetent, corrupt
leadership, not evil foreign conspiracies, made Russia weak. He said, "I want Russia to be
strong within its present borders," denying that if he were president he would attempt to
re-establish the Russian empire. But a Russia under Lebed would still view the territory of
the former Soviet Union as its sphere of interest. He said, "Until we solve the problem of
our 25 million Russians [living in former Soviet republics] in a civilized way, we will need
bases in foreign countries."
It must be remembered that the often-cited figure of 25 million ethnic
Russians is from the Soviet census of 1989. The government spent decades directing a
campaign of Russification of the many non-Russian nations it controlled. Many "ethnic
Russians" are merely Russian-speakers. 429 Not surprisingly, the "25 million" figure is used
widely by Russian politicians because it helps legitimize interference in the Near Abroad.
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The nationalism of Russian greatness and protecting Russians abroad was a
prominent theme in all platforms in the 1 996 elections. All candidates assured the public
that they would defend Russian national culture and Russian national interests, usually
with the implication that Yeltsin's economic reforms had been carried out too much the
way the West wanted it and too little regard for the ordinary Russians. Lebed also
combined his assertive nationalism with strong support for protecting entrepreneurs,
lowering taxes, and reducing the bureaucracy. 430 Interestingly, he apparently did not know
that all these positions are closer to British and American conservative principles than to
the traditional Russian attitudes he said he was defending.
4. Integrity and the Law and Order Crusade
"Eleven million people believed I can impose order, and I take on myself that difficult
responsibility.
"
- International Herald Tribune, 3 July 1 996
Finally, if there is one key feature that stands out about the political character of
Alexander Lebed, it is integrity. Lebed has been described as, "Blunt, brilliant, decisive,
fair, and incorruptible."431 It was also these qualities which made the Yeltsin
administration uneasy during Lebed's rise in popularity. Integrity is the one ingredient that
is consistently lacking in contemporary Russian politics, and is a significant reason for his
appeal. Most Russians believed that members of the elite used market reforms to
transform the privileges they enjoyed under communism into the even more pleasant
rewards of capitalism. The majority of Russian voters are convinced that corruption is
common at the highest levels of government. This widespread belief served as a focus for
public resentment of the country's leaders.
Lebed, however, often described himself as free from ambiguity or dishonesty. 432
He portrayed himself as a plain and honest "officer and gentleman" in contrast to Russia's
430Jack F. Matlock, Jr., "The Struggle for the Kremlin," New York Review ofBooks 43, no.
13, (8 August 1996): 30.
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corrupt politicians. A month before Yeltsin fired him, Lebed was still considered by
opinion polls to be Russia's most trusted politician, something that being out of the
Kremlin may only enhance. 433
As an army general, he insisted that Russian officers must prove that "not
everything has been wasted by drunkards, that honor and dignity are alive, and that this
honor and dignity will protect our Motherland." After he devoted himself to politics in
1995, his reputation for strong character was already well established, both inside the
military and out.
Attempts by General Pavel Grachev, the former Defense Minister and Lebed's old
rival, to dig up evidence of corruption from his time as commander of the 14th Army in
Moldova completely failed. Even Moldovan leaders, who had few reasons to love Lebed,
admitted that he was personally honest and a strict disciplinarian. 434 One military
inspection after another failed to find anything wrong with his 14th Army in Moldova. On
the contrary, Lebed boosted morale, beefed up military drilling, created a special "Russian
Soldier of the Future" program based on the Green Beret training routine, and almost
eliminated the hazing and suicides which plagued the rest of the Russian military.
To many Russians, Lebed had the moral authority to be the leader of the nation.
He was an honest officer in an army commanded by a corrupt senior officers. He did not
own a vacation home or a limousine and even gave up drinking. In a country where
alcoholism is the leading cause of death and the primary reason for falling life expectancy,
Lebed proudly stated, "There should be at least one man in Russia who is sober."435 For
this he was widely applauded.
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Lebed campaigned that the main goal of the President is to establish law and order
in the country. In his opinion, the country was in chaos, corruption was rampant and the
national interests ofRussia were being neglected by those who were responsible for
foreign and defense policy. 436 As the new chairman of the national security council, he was
also charged with cracking down on crime, which was by then understood as the number
one social problem in Russia.
Democracy and free markets cannot survive without the rule of law. In Russia,
however, precious little has been achieved in establishing a firm legal basis for a civil
society based on democratic principles. 437 For example, private companies find little
protection from the police, who sometimes are co-conspirators with the mob. In 1994,
dozens of senior police officers were fired for cooperating with the Mafia, while others
were killed by criminals for refusing to cooperate. 438
The rise of organized crime is perhaps the most troublesome problem in Russia
today. The Soviet system was corrupt in many ways, but the corruption took place
according to established conventions and within a framework of order. With the collapse
of the Communist Party and the rise of unregulated private enterprise, corruption,
coercion and the violence that go with them are spreading exponentially. The murder rate
is rocketing upwards. People fear to go on the streets. Some Russian businessmen say
openly that it will soon be necessary to set up death squads to eliminate the villains. The
real risk to Russia's future may not be that it will revive the authoritarian patterns of
Russian past, but that it will become a seedy, violent, corrupt and poverty-stricken
imitation of Latin America today. 439
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Lebed claimed he would restore law and order, defend Russia's national interests
and protect ordinary citizens from the excesses of the market economy. "Russia will be
led out of its troubles not by some film actor with a Hollywood smile but by a person who
is honest, principled and sound of mind."440 In a campaign speech, he made it clear he was
concerned about corruption: "Those who profit are the ones at the top. They keep he
doughnut for themselves and give the hole to the people. ' ,441
Lebed promised he would reverse "unfair" privatization by forcing those who
profited "illegally" to give the money back or lose their businesses. Although, he did not
say how he would distinguish honest entrepreneurs from the opportunists: "It's hard, but
it can be done. When I am elected [President], we'll talk."442 To the people who became
property owners in accordance with law, Lebed said they have "nothing to fear. Nobody
will confiscate his enterprise. I wish him the best and he can work in peace."443 More than
any other issue, this may create widespread domestic tension at all levels of a Lebed
government.
Lebed talked as if he equated privatization with crime and corruption. Although in
1 996, while still emphasizing crime and corruption, he became vocal in his support of
private property. Lebed clearly gave Russia's new businessmen the message that he would
be like Chilean leader Agusto Pinochet, a dictator who also supported capitalist
development. 444 Lebed, however, did not favor Pinochet's free trade policies, but instead
the state-oriented, protectionist policies of the Asian dictators of the past and present.
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Lebed's use of the anti-crime slogan was a winning move. After he joined Yeltsin's
team, he left no doubt he would impose a strong hand on Russia's domestic chaos. In one
widely publicized statement he declared, "Of course we will have to shoot people, but
reasonably, with minimal loss, just those who refuse to be persuaded."445 IfLebed
achieves presidential power, his fight against the corrupt former communists holding
power and property has the potential to ignite serious domestic issues, possibly leading to
a question of legitimacy of his government from those who are a victim of Lebed's strict
policies. The question also remains whether Lebed's characteristics of honor and integrity
will survive the immense temptations of government in Moscow.
B. MAVERICK OR RUSSIA'S NATIONAL HERO?
During his four months in office, Lebed sparked as many political fires as he put
out. As he continued his way towards his goal ofbecoming Russia's next president, the
Russian people were increasingly drawn to both sides of his split personality, as impressed
with the maverick as with the miracle worker. 446 He negotiated a peace settlement in
Chechnya, calmed the fear over eastward NATO expansion, pacified troops on the verge
of mutiny and gave disillusioned Russians a leader they could believe in.
But there was another side to Lebed. He also slandered "foreign" religions, upset
diplomacy with Ukraine, suggested a coalition government with communists, and openly
coveted the job of the president who appointed him. 447
Lebed's image as a "Mr. Clean," who could sweep corruption from the Kremlin,
police, army and security services began to fade after the appointment to Yeltsin's
administration. Yet Lebed's less attractive public side should not have come as a surprise,
445Ann Leslie, "Whatever Russia's Election Result, Lebed is the Man to Watch," Daily
Mail, 4 July 1996, p. 24.
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considering his history. Analysts and journalists seemed to easily forget that Lebed earned
his reputation as a tough leader in brutal fashion while he was in the military.
Before the 1996 presidential elections, it was difficult to ever picture Lebed as a
member of Yeltsin's administration. At a time when the defense ministry desperately
needed a political advocate and administrator, he was a fighting general going against the
grain. His sense of betrayal by politicians was a recurring subject of his announcements.
In September 1992, for example, he complained that: "This former great power has fallen
into miserable pieces, it is being torn apart, it is being sold. Tverskaya street, one of
Russia's main streets, has turned into a pitiful imitation of one ofNew York's backstreets.
"
Lebed's blend of nationalism and anti-corruption zeal led to considerable friction
with the President. Asked if he would investigate corruption even if the problems led to
the people close to Yeltsin, Lebed said he would move slowly and peacefully. But, he
added, "I will create strong order from this Russian mess. 448 It was a promise that might
have caused a great deal of conflict with those in the administration.
Another problem for Yeltsin was that Lebed was happiest when fighting the
establishment from the opposition's side. While Yeltsin became famous for criticizing the
status quo as Moscow communist party chief, Lebed became popular by attacking the
corrupt military establishment far removed from politics in Moldova. He launched his
political campaign when he was forced into retirement in 1995. Yeltsin was quick to
recognize the parallels and his aides started negotiations with Lebed long before the first
round of the presidential elections. 449
Even some admirers wondered ifLebed, who was not known for his political
sophistication, could run the country. 450 But Lebed, like other politicians in this fragile
democracy, learned as he went along. Few of Russia's leaders have mastered the art of
""Yuri N. Maltsev, "Lebed Is in Position To Shape Russia's Future," Christian Science
Monitor, 10 July 1996, p. 19.
^Carey Scott, "Lebed Reaches for the Reins," Sunday Times (London), 7 July 1996.
450Candice Hughes, "Blunt General Waits in Wings of Chechen Crisis," Associated Press,
11 January 1995.
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political correctness, but it did not make them all potential dictators. 451 Lebed had a
tendency to make spontaneous comments without thinking and to backtrack later.
Talking tough was how he got to the top and it was a habit he had difficulty breaking.
Part of Lebed's appeal was that he was not a career politician. His remarks in
campaign speeches and interviews were often spontaneous. Yet he also showed he is self-
confident enough to revise his views in the face of evidence. 452
As an example, Lebed changed his opinion on the Soviet operations in Georgia and
Azerbaijan that he commanded. By March of 1995 he had concluded that these were both
costly mistakes. He regretted, "Everything we tried to hold onto by force was lost." 453
Lebed has also denounced Soviet intervention against Hungary in 1956, Czechoslovakia in
1967, and Lithuania in 1991, not to mention Russia's ongoing military assault on
Chechnya, which he has criticized harshly. One reason that then-Minister of Defense
Grachev relieved Lebed in June of 1995 was that he refused an order to lead Russian
forces intervening in Tajikistan's civil war. He asked, "Why should a Russian general help
one group of Tajiks kill another group of Tajiks?"454 This is a surprising question from
someone with Lebed's history of human-rights abuses in Azerbiajian and Soviet Georgia.
It seems Lebed's biggest problem was not the goals that he had for the Russian
people, but the way he changed his ideas on how to accomplish the task. Sometimes he
sounded merely like a firm but fair administrator, but other times he came across like a
brutal commander at his worst. According to journalist Frederick Starr, Lebed quickly
grew impatient with the give and take of democracy, which appealed to those who
451Gwynne Dyer, "A Good Day in Russia: Yeltsin's Allies Will Give Country Stability at
the Centre," Ottawa Citizen, 6 July 1996, p. B2.
452
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thought Russia needed a "strong hand." Although at the same time, he was distressing to
Russia's new democrats. 455
There are still no guarantees that Lebed's views and policies will not continue to
change. Parts of the Russian society, such as the military-industrial complex, the security
and the armed forces, remain inherently hard-line. They will always seek the most senior
political figures to represent them, and Lebed seems to be almost tailor-made for such a
role.
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Political analyst Alexander Golz wrote in the army newspaper Krasnaya Zvezda
that Lebed's "personal courage, obvious military talent and the independence of his
judgments, combined with his integrity and his open contempt for political maneuvering,
make him a rare figure in Russia today. "457 Clearly Russia needs such people as Alexander
Lebed, but it is unlikely that Russia needs a leader that resembles General Agusto
Pinochet.
C. "I AM A BIRD OF A DIFFERENT HUE"
1. Lebed's New Set of Rules for Russian Politics
"I am not a liberal. I am a general." - Ottawa Citizen, July 4, 1996
Lebed seemingly became the Russian politician that defined the middle ground
between the communists and reformers, but his constituency was totally independent from
either side. He advanced this identity during his campaign by refusing to join a Yeltsin-led
coalition of democratic candidates, because he did not think "the existing government is
any better than communists." In an Izvestia newspaper interview he said, "As long as the
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cards or tricolor badges, there will be no normal life. Both the Whites and the Reds have
the same nomenklatura! origins but I am a bird of a different hue. "458
After he was forced to resign from the army, Lebed lost the aura of the persecuted
general speaking for the disgruntled Russian military. Moreover, he was seen by some in
the career military as having pushed the army toward a confrontation with the defense
minister and the president that eroded the military's neutrality and its position "outside of
politics. " Lebed still quickly became a general who used his military command to boost his
political career.
459 By appealing to the media and civilian paramilitary forces, such as the
Cossacks, Lebed played by a new set of rules for Russian politics.
Many in the West believed that after Yeltsin was re-elected president, Russians
may have voted into power an enigmatic ex-general with nationalistic views and a violent
temper. 4* While he did have nationalistic views, Lebed never openly suggested using
violence against Russia's ethnic minorities and believed that Russia should withdraw from
Chechnya. 461 Although he made many inflammatory statements and saw no ethnic
difference between Russians and Ukrainians, he did not think it practical or possible to re-
create the Soviet Union. He did not approve of professional soldiers being used to control
civilians, as Lebed himself used in Tbilisi and Azerbaijan, and were being used in
Chechnya. Lebed likes authority, but above all he was a pragmatist who advocates force
only when unavoidable. He was blunt with a strong sense of mission.
Reflecting on the collapse of the Soviet Union, Lebed had this to say on the use of
force:
458
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I know for sure that constitutional order cannot be restored by using air
force, tanks and artillery. We used military power in Tbilisi, Baku, Vilnius.
Where are they today — Georgia, Azerbaijan, Lithuania? Everything we
tried to keep by force was lost. Now everything is being done in order to
lose Chechnya. 462
These remarks, made while Lebed was still in the army, seemed to contradict his
statements that Russian troops were necessary in foreign countries.
His questionable comments after his appointment to Yeltsin's administration about
his opposition to "foreign" religions, however, reflected his ethnic origins as a Cossack.
Cossacks have been traditionally feared not only for their legendary fighting prowess in
defending the czar's southern borders, but also for their brutality against Jews in the state-
organized pogroms in pre-Revolutionary Russia. 463
Lebed discovered, at the expense of his public image, that attitudes permissible in
Russian army barracks do not play so well under the scrutiny of the world's television
cameras.
464 During his 1996 visit to the US, Lebed tried to assure Jewish groups that he
was "misquoted" about there being only two religions in Russia, though his subsequent
praise of Jews as "managing money well" assuaged nobody. 465
Nationalists who can talk the language of the common people, which includes a
market economy but does not mean cooperating with the West, are an attractive option in
the rough and ready world of today's Russia. Zhirinovskiy showed this with his stunning
successes in the parliamentary elections of 1993 and 1995. But Russians did not want a
man who most consider to be a lunatic as their president. Scott maintained that Lebed was
^^odion Morozov and Vladimir Snegirev, "Lebedinyi ryk sotriasayet kremlevskie steny,'
Komsomolskaya Pravda, 2 March 1995, p. 1.
^Carey Scott, "Lebed Reaches for the Reins," Sunday Times (London), 7 July 1996.
""Ibid.
^William Safire, "Lebedtime Story," New York Times, 25 November 1996, p. A13.
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a bright, believable, clean-looking military man who capitalized upon the emotions that
Zhirinovskiy had stirred with his populist rants. 466
Before Lebed's departure, Aleksei Golovkov, a campaign aide to Lebed and the
deputy chairman of Parliament's budget committee said, "Lebed is not inclined to play the
political games according to the rules established in the Kremlin. Either he will be
squeezed out of these games and will be compelled to leave, or the rules of the game will
be changed."467 Yeltsin vividly demonstrated that he was not one to change the rules, but
because of this characteristic, Lebed remained far more admired by Russian voters than
any of his rivals. 468
2. Neither Red Nor White, But Green
Hey, little apple tree,
Color so ripe,
On the left we fight the Reds,
On the right the Whites
-Peasant song of the Russian civil wars, 1918-1922469
Lebed had spent his entire adult life in the army, and appealed to Russians for what
he is not. He seemed unspoiled by politics. He was not allied with any of the Moscow
political factions, which seemed to always be arguing with each other. He was not a
reformer, not a Communist, not associated with the unpopular war in Chechnya and was
not linked to the "party of power" in the Kremlin.
On the Russian television program Vremya, Lebed raised the possibility of a civil
war after the 1 996 presidential elections between what he called the Reds and Whites, or
communists and reformers. When asked what side he would be on, he insisted, "I will be
^Carey Scott, "Lebed Reaches for the Reins," Sunday Times (London), 7 July 1996.
"'Michael R. Gordon, "Russian Vote Sets Off Battle, This Time in Yeltsin's Camp," New
York Times, 6 July 1996, p. Al.
Alessandra Stanley, "A General on His Own," New York Times, 18 October 1996, p. Al468
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with the Greens, and beat the Reds until they whiten and the Whites until they redden."470
Fitting for Lebed to align himself with the "Greens." Whether or not he understood the
reference, the Greens was the label attached to the peasant rebels during the Russian civil
wars between 1918 and 1922. Lebed's followers of the nineties could certainly be
characterized as peasant rebels. During that time, the peasants were fighting on two
fronts, just as Lebed's followers were confronting two political ideologies.
Lebed was quick to identify with the military sentiment before the 1996 elections.
He related with soldiers' confusion about a possible confrontation, but voiced his ultimate
concern to prevent violence:
I am against shooting. I had my fill. I think all the potential has been
exhausted... We must think about how we should live, and not how we
should shoot. I personally intend to chop the hands of those who are
anxious to shoot. And to all the others I wish a long and happy life. And I
don't mind what they call themselves. Let them live, let them create, and
strive, build communist or democratic villages, throw chairs at each other
in parliament ~ nothing wrong about that, it can even be useful sometimes.
But the guns should be mothballed. 471
These were not the words of a democrat, but neither were they the words of a red-brown
nationalist ready to implement a martial law state.
During his rise in politics, Lebed refused to name himself as a "democrat" and said
that he "would have refused" orders from Grachev to attack the "White House" in
October 1993. 472 At the same time, however, he distanced himself from the official
opposition and in the December 1993 election "voted against all candidates and trusted
470
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none."
473 Remarking that he did not support Yeltsin's reforms, nor the communists
insistence on stopping the reforms, Lebed once stated: "As for myself, I want to preserve
peace and calm in the center... Both these flanks are tantamount to war. I am against
war..."
474
Lebed appealed to hard-liners with his vision of a strong army and a mighty Russia
and to reformers with a liberal economic program. His slogan of "Truth and Order" and
promise to purge corruption and crime appealed to many Russians. He blasted the
Communist past and the "even greater vileness and lies" of today's Russia. At the end of
his campaign, however, Lebed saw Russia as a battlefield oftwo ideas - the old idea of
communism and the new idea of imperfect democracy. "I'm choosing the new idea,"
Lebed announced after joining forces with Yeltsin. "You cannot go very far with old
ideas."475
D. A SOLDIER'S DUTY TO THE PEOPLE
"Russia has chosen the right course. But a bill has been drawn on people's expectations,
and it must now be redeemed."
-Lebed shortly after Yeltsin's reelection, The Guardian, July 5, 1996
Alexander Lebed was a phenomenon. He was an incorruptible leader in a corrupt,
disheartened bureaucracy. In a political field of scandalous ex-communists, he assured
voters that he upheld the deepest sense of personal honor. The Grachev feud graphically
473See Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 16 November 1994. Quoted from Vladimir Shlapentokh,
"The Enfeebled Army: A Key Player in Moscow's Current Political Crisis," European
Security 4, no.3, (Autumn 1995): 417-37.
474,1Gen Aleksandr Lebed Confident of Winning Presidential Election," Russian Television
Network, Moscow, 23 February 1996 in BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 26
February 1996.
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demonstrated his conviction that when a man loses his honor it can rarely be restored. His
honor and incorruptible image were the backbone of his popular success.
Throughout his rise in politics, Lebed was convinced that the armed forces
encapsulated most of what was good, honorable and worthwhile in Russian (and Soviet)
life. This gave him a very wide platform on which to campaign. In part, this reflected his
experiences in Moldova. Having supported the "Dniester Republic", he increasingly came
to see its leaders as little more than opportunist mafiosi. In February 1994, he denounced
the Dniester regime as "criminal" and "a bunch of adventurists who came to power by
exploiting people's natural desire for freedom."
While Lebed was often crude, forceful, and hostile to his political authorities, he
was also a fierce advocate of the military discipline which, ultimately, subordinated him to
them. His transition from the hero of the coup in August 1991 to the "black general" of
1993 illustrated so many of the traits of Russian political leadership at the time and
highlighted its mood of despair and alienation.
Similar to ex-Vice President Alexander Rutskoi, an unsuccessful officer-turned-
politician, Lebed will always be at heart a soldier. His sense of duty and national honor
persuaded him to involve himself in politics, and he was a charismatic candidate. Although
he did not have the skills of a politician or economist, he knew how to answer questions
and focus on one issue.
Making a conscious decision to involve himself forcefully and directly in Russian
politics, it took a lot to make the soldier Lebed resign from the army. It was more likely
that he would have inherited the role as the "voice ofthe army" after his resignation.
Lebed often claimed he was pushed into politics. Moreover, he was compelled to act on
his own. Sooner or later, the voters were bound to turn towards him.
Lebed was, above all, a fighting general and a self-styled independent when the
Yeltsin government desperately needed the military's support. While many in the West
characterized Lebed as a nationalist plotting to turn the country into a martial law state, he
in fact upheld the regime he opposed, and became the soldier's ideal of honor and selfless
commitment to the nation.
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Lebed was respected in the army for his professionalism and plain talking, but
many civilians also chose him because they believed he offered a third way between the
anarchy of Yeltsin's rule and the defeat of retreat towards Communism. Moscow Times
correspondent Alexander Zhilin contends Lebed is still considered the most credible
unofficial leader of Russia's military, and he is doing everything he can to maintain this
identity.
476 His moral support among the officers' corps - and now among a large segment
of the population - will give him the strength to withstand the ups and downs ofRussian
politics and may well carry him to his goal of Russia's highest office.
476
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vn. CONCLUSION
"I was born a winner. Sooner or later I will be. The country needs order, and I will bring
this." - Daily Mail, July 04, 1996
Lebed's popularity was a disturbing symptom of Russia's tendency to look toward
its military officers for a savior. His message had strong appeal to millions ofRussians
battered by the dismantling of a state-controlled economy that long provided a low but
reliable standard of living. 477 The discontent in Russia was aggravated by a general
breakdown of order, rising crime and a sense that it lost its place among the first rank of
world powers. During the rise of Alexander Lebed, the greatest force in Russia was not
democracy—it was nationalism.
Lebed was a charismatic patriot and crusader for justice, but he was also simply a
politician trying to achieve power. In doing so, his political campaign skillfully used
nationalism and the appeal of strong military leadership at a time when everything he grew
up to believe in gradually came apart during the five years after the Soviet Union's
collapse. In Russia's situation, the people were demanding a leader like Lebed, and if he
did not exist, another surely would have been created.
He possessed an imputed charisma that he was able to project upon the Russian
people. By creating an ambiguity, Lebed could lead people with their response to his
assertions and allegations. Rather than the people responding to Lebed, Lebed was the
mythical man on horseback responding to the wishes of the people. He was a product of
the situation.
IfLebed is someday elected president, there is no doubt that he would move the
regime towards a new type of authoritarianism. As he has asserted, "Democracy is fine,
but Russians will need decades to grow into it."478 So today, Russia's future remains open.
Andranik Migranyan, a member of Yeltsin's advisory council, could not say for sure where
477nThe Race for Russian President," New York Times, 18 February 1996, p. A12.
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1995, p. 14.
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Russia will go after the elections of 1 996 ~ toward a consolidation of democracy or a
consolidation of authoritarianism. 479 It will be a distinctively Russian future. Russia will
not become like America, Germany or Japan. One thing that looks certain is that
Alexander Lebed will remain in the political spotlight for years to come.
The West is still undecided as to how to treat the coming of Alexander Lebed.
Initially the West reacted calmly to Lebed's sudden rise to political prominence. 480 A
spokesman for the US State Department welcomed Lebed's appointment to Yeltsin's
administration by saying Lebed and Yeltsin seemed to complement each other in a tandem
of like-minded politicians. 481
New assessments of Lebed's role, however, revealed serious doubts after the
western community recalled that previously Lebed had behaved as a confirmed Russian
nationalist. The most accommodating assessment came from the London School of
Economics: it was argued that given Russia must find its own path leading to democracy
through authoritarianism, Lebed was the best choice for that role. 482
After Lebed was fired four months later, senior American officials saw little effect
on Russian-American relations because Lebed had not yet become an important player. 483
They were, however, worried that the popular but controversial peace settlement Lebed
479Lee Hockstader "Russian Democracy Gets Another Chance; But Potential for New
Kremlin Conflicts Remains After Ailing Yeltsin's Victory," Washington Post, 4 July 1996,
p. A01.
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negotiated with secessionists in Chechnya could unravel. 484 US Ambassador Thomas
Pickering noted that Lebed's departure may open a political vacuum. Lebed is "a
considerable force in Russian politics ... (but) Yeltsin has made clear, when it comes to
the crunch, he will act. "485
There is no way to know if the US should fear the worst from Lebed's rise in
politics, but even Lebed admitted that Russia has little choice but to engage the West.
The US should likewise reach out to the possible future leader of Russia. In a positive
gesture at maintaining communication, high level discussions began in November 1996
between Lebed and US Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott.
During the visit, Lebed demonstrated he was not the inept politician portrayed in
Western journalism. He was well briefed to give answers Americans want to hear. In a
favorable statement for Americans, he said he is "not going to have a hysterical fit because
ofNATO's expansion."486 Yet, as if Russia were threatened by the West, he also spoke
vaguely about a "new security system," which is appealing to his Russian constituency.
The best way for the US to respond to Lebed or other nationalist leaders is simply
not to appease them. This means the firm and consistent advocacy ofNATO expansion, a
refusal to foster Russian illusions by treating Russia as a superpower, and devising
programs that bolster Ukraine's economic and political independence. 487 The US should
also keep giving assistance to Russia's considerable democratic forces. This policy should
be central to a US-led response to Russia's return to a hard-line government.
Russia's political elite still have deep psychological scars from the collapse of their
once mighty Soviet empire. The leaders ofRussia will be dealing with this enigma for
484Steven Erlanger, "For White House, Lebed's Dismissal Is a Case ofDogs Fighting
Under a Carpet," New York Times, 18 October 1996, p. A16.
485Susanne M. Schafer, "Perry: TSfo Fundamental Change 1 In U.S.-Russian Relationship
With Russia," AP Worldstream, 17 October 1996.
486William Safire, "Lebedtime Story," New York Times, 25 November 1996, p. A13.
487Adrian Karatnycky, "The Russian Front-Runner," Wall Street Journal, 22 September
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many years to come, and until a younger generation takes power, they will continue to
create tension with the US and Europe. Because the idea of democracy will take many
years to take hold, the end of the Yeltsin era will bring new opportunities and dangers, for
Russia and for the world.
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APPENDIX A. SELECTED COMMENTS OF ALEXANDER LEBED
• ON WHY HE SHOULD BE PRESIDENT OF RUSSIA: "I stop wars. " 25 November
1 996, New York Times
• ON MIKHAIL GORBACHEV: "Mikhail is constantly trying to turn himself into my
daddy - and I am constantly trying to stay an orphan." NTV, Moscow, 6 May 1996.
• ON GENERAL COLIN POWELL: "We are both patriots and professionals. We
understand what war really means." New York Times, 13 October 1995
• ON THE BREAK-UP OF THE SOVIET UNION: "Anyone who doesn't regret the
passing of the Soviet Union has no heart. Anyone who thinks it can be put back
together has no brain." Baltimore <Sw2(From wire reports) 29 December 1995.
• ON HIS ADMIRATION OF CHILE'S FORMER MILITARY DICTATOR, GEN.
AGUSTO PINOCHET: "In general, I'm not one to praise Pinochet. But what did he
do? He saved the state from total collapse and put the army in a place of pride. With
its help, he forced people to get back to work. The loudmouths were forced, and were
forced in a brutal manner, to get back to work." Reuters, 20 July 1994
• ON GOVERNING RUSSIA: "What's wrong with a military dictator? In all its history,
Russia has prospered under the strictest control. Consider Ivan the Terrible, Peter the
Great or Stalin." Financial Times, 6 September 1994
ON RUSSIAN LIFE: "We have a wonderful territory one-eighth of the world, its
mineral wealth is unbelievable but we live like pigs, year in and year out, decade after
decade. Why? Eventually the question is about how the life of society is organized,
right? That is exactly what we want to change: the organization of the life of society."
Russia's Independent Television, 30 June 1995
• MORE ON RUSSIAN LIFE: "Most Russians don't care whether they are ruled by
fascists or communists or even Martians as long as they can buy six kinds of sausage in
the store and lots of cheap vodka." - Financial Times (London), 6 September 1994
ON RELIGION: "I do not go to church. I am a nonbeliever. Everyone is born on his
own and dies on his own. Everyone comes to God on his own, too. I have not come to
God, but maybe I will." Moskovskiye Novosti, 10 September 1995
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• ON FORMER DEFENSE MINISTER PAVEL GRACHEV: "He has lost his honor
and dignity. I consider him a prostitute, and I don't like prostitutes, whether in skirts or
pants." Corriere Delia Sera,\5 October 1995
• ON PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE GRIGORIY YAVLINSKIY: "I am a friend of
all professionals, and Grigoriy Yavlinskiy is a professional. The fact that we have been
given places in different political cages does not mean we have to sit in them." Ekho
Moskvy radio, 31 January 1996
• ON WHAT IT TAKES TO COMMAND TROOPS : "A good officer is first of all a
good actor. The people who come into the army are all different, and you fail ifyou
try to treat them the same way." Trud, 28 October 1995
• ON RELATIONS WITH UKRAINE: "The Black Sea Fleet question is being decided
by rust. Neither Russia nor Ukraine can resolve the issue. It's a great idiocy and a
crime against our shared future. There's not a single archaeologist or historian or
anyone else who can explain exactly what is the difference between Ukrainians and
Russians." Ostankino Radio Mayak, Moscow, 15 December 1995
• ON COMMUNISTS AND THE NEW RUSSIAN DEMOCRATS: "We are not a
nation, but a demographic hole, and still we have Reds and Whites, only now they are
called communists and reformers, or communists and democrats. But basically they are
still Reds and Whites. This is their essence." Official Kremlin International News, 13
May 1996
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APPENDIX B. CHRONOLOGY OF LEBED'S LIFE AND CAREER
1950 Born on 20 April in the industrial city ofNovocherkassk in the Rostov region of
southern Russia.
1962 Witnesses the "Novocherkassk massacre" on 2 June, when Soviet troops
guarding the local Communist headquarters opened fire on workers staging a rare
protest against rising prices and falling wages. The shooting killed 24 people, and
several others were subsequently executed.
1973 Graduates from Ryazan Higher Airborne Assault Command School, and takes
command of paratrooper unit at age 23.
1980-82 Commands the first battalion of the 345th Separate Paratroops Regiment in
Afghanistan. Awarded the highest Soviet military decoration, Hero of the Soviet
Union, for bravery in combat.
1985 Graduates with distinction from the Frunze Military Academy.
1985-89 Rises from paratrooper regiment commander to division commander of the
elite 106th Guards Airborne Division in Tula, approximately one-hundred miles south
ofMoscow.
April 1989 Sent to put down demonstrations in Tbilisi, Soviet Georgia. Over twenty
people were killed and dozens wounded when a spetsnaz unit under his command used
sapper shovels and chemical weapons to suppress ethnic unrest. Lebed maintains he
flew in with reinforcements after the attacks had happened.
January 1990 Named by an Azerbaijani parliamentary commission as the individual
who ordered soldiers to open fire on demonstrators in Baku, Azerbaijan. Using
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armored personnel carriers, his troops shot, stabbed to death and crushed more than
120 Azerbaijanis.
1990 Quits Communist Party after attending two party conferences, saying he became
tired of "screaming, rackets and petty bickering."
1991 Protects Russian President Boris Yeltsin's Moscow stronghold during hard-
liners' coup attempt against Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev. His tanks
inadvertently became part of the barricades protecting the building. Says it was not a
stand for democracy, but that he could not kill Russians.
1992-94 Commands Russian 14th Army in Moldova's breakaway region of Trans-
Dniester, scene of ethnic conflict between the Moldovan government and mainly Slav
separatists. Lebed's forces launch artillery barrages against the Moldovans, yet
separatists took credit. Because Lebed kept silent about the attack, he was widely
praised for ending the bloodshed peacefully.
1 995 Quits military over conflict with Defense Minister Pavel Grachev. Grachev had
called for bringing Lebed's 14th Army and its arsenal back to Russia proper and
demanded both the removal ofLebed and a dramatic reduction in the 14th Army's
manpower.
December 1995 Elected to the State Duma, lower house of parliament.
June 1996 Finishes strong third in presidential elections; joins Yeltsin's team as head of
Security Council. Lebed persuades Yeltsin to dismiss Defense Minister Grachev and
the leading members of Yeltsin's inner circle assembled around him since August of
1991.
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August 1996 Signs agreements with Chechen separatist leaders ending 20 months of
fighting in the breakaway republic. Accord is publicly praised but meets with resistance
from some top Russian politicians who say it will cause Russia to lose Chechnya.
October 1996 Dismissed as head of Security Council. Yeltsin accuses Lebed of
excessive ambition and complains that Lebed made decisions without consulting the
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